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Abstract

This dissertation analyzes struggles over the development of Barbadian health and
sanitation during the period between the world wars. In doing so, it examines how the British
Empire tried to use development policies to maintain its power overseas during the interwar
years. During this period, British policymakers sought to improve health and sanitation to pacify
restive Barbadian laborers influenced by transnational pan-African and socialist ideas following
the First World War. However, white Barbadian elites, influenced by ideas of eugenics and
population control, opposed metropolitan efforts to develop health and sanitation in the colony.
Rather than repairing the colonial relationship, British development efforts instead resulted in a
protracted legislative and public battle over health reform. White creole resistance to public
health policies both destabilized British reform efforts and further undermined black Barbadian
understandings of imperial identity. By the 1930s, Pan-African critiques of empire, which the
British government had fought to suppress following the First World War, found renewed energy
in the midst of British failures to provide basic welfare services to poor black subjects. The
fractures in these bonds of empire ultimately resulted in serious labor disturbances that reemphasized the tensions of British colonialism and redirected the course of imperial policy. By
focusing on these conflicts, this project reveals how struggles over colonial reforms on the
ground transformed ideas of emerging nationhood, imperial identities, and British strategies of
rule in the years leading up to decolonization.
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Chapter One
Introduction

In 1929, a West Indian shopkeeper named Alfred Goring appeared before the British
sugar commission in the colony of Barbados. The commissioners were interviewing a number of
local physicians and residents in an attempt to determine why the death rate in the colony was so
high. Goring’s description of infant care in a system that forced poor black mothers employed in
agriculture to return immediately after childbirth to canefields or starve made for horrifying
testimony. Goring stated, “When they have all gone out to work there is nobody left to care the
children who lie in their own mess right through to their swaddling-bands.”1 As Goring’s
testimony made clear, in the plantation-based colony of Barbados, where labor was both plentiful
and cheap, black lives were expendable. In the following days, Barbadian pan-Africanists
discussed the visit of the sugar commission during meetings of the local Universal Negro
Improvement Association (UNIA) chapters. In Barbados, they declared, “the white man never
die from starvation, he die from the counting of his money but the Negro die from starvation.”2
However, according to the activists, this situation was not just the fault of local white elites.
Barbados, the speakers argued, belonged to England, and Barbadians had always been loyal
subjects: it was the English who were allowing Barbadians to starve.3

1

Barbados Department of Archives, Black Rock, Barbados (hereafter BDA), Pam 136 A, Proceedings of the West
Indian Sugar Commission, additional testimony, 97-99.
2
BDA, GH 4/36, Detective Brathwaite to Detective Inspector, October 30, 1929.
3
BDA, GH 4/36, Detective Skeete to Sargeant Jones, October 28, 1929.
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The testimony before the Commission, and the reaction of Barbadian pan-Africanists,
illuminates some of the deep tensions that marked British colonialism during the interwar period.
British propaganda and rhetoric had long portrayed the empire as a “trustee” and caretaker for
subject populations. However, by the post-World War I era, increasing awareness of the
suffering endured by most British colonial subjects undercut longstanding justifications for
imperialism. The experience of war, international exchanges of people and information, and the
influence of anti-colonial ideas led colonial subjects worldwide to understand that British claims
of trusteeship were, in fact, hollow. For the Caribbean colonies, which ranked amongst Britain’s
oldest imperial possessions, the failures of British rule became particularly pronounced. Poor,
black West Indian subjects, long ensconced in British culture, traditions, and education, were
amongst those who believed the most in promises of trusteeship, yet also suffered deeply from
imperial neglect.
The British West Indies, once boasting the wealthiest and most lucrative colonies in the
empire, had fallen into economic stagnation by the twentieth century.4 The colonies were
profoundly marked by the legacy of slavery and the plantation, as a predominantly black,
exploited workforce labored on sugar and banana estates that experienced ever-decreasing profits
in a crowded global market. The monoculture and labor saturation of most Caribbean colonies
stifled economic opportunity, and the majority of black West Indian workers had little access to
participation in the exclusive colonial states and assemblies that managed their affairs. The social
and physical consequences of this economic servitude and political disenfranchisement were
severe, as impoverished West Indian workers suffered high rates of disease, malnourishment,

4

O. Nigel Bolland, The Politics of Labour in the British Caribbean: The Social Origins of Authoritarianism and
Democracy in the Labour Movement (Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers, 2001), 123-126.
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and mortality.5 Throughout the Caribbean, even as young West Indians were taught that they
were British subjects belonging to a great and wealthy empire, the bleak daily struggles faced by
these children and their families threw the promised rewards of Britishness into harsh relief.
The most economically depressed and unhealthy of these colonies was the island of
Barbados, one Britain’s oldest imperial possessions. Established in 1627, just a year prior to the
Massachusetts Bay Colony, Barbados boasted the nickname of “Little England” for its
longstanding adherence to English customs and culture. The white elites who governed the small
colony, situated on the meeting place of the Atlantic Ocean and the Caribbean Sea, considered
themselves members of the English gentry and romantically christened the island “Bimshire,”
imagining it as a far-flung county of England. This sense of belonging to the “mother” country
was not confined only to white planters, however. Barbadians of all backgrounds expressed their
connection to Great Britain, as the black middle classes made claims to Britishness for social and
political advancement.6 Even poor black sugar workers swore allegiance to the Crown out of a
belief that Queen Victoria had freed their enslaved ancestors.7 Dispossessed black laborers in
Barbados believed in the notion of trusteeship, adhering to the idea that the British government
would someday intervene on their behalf.8
Despite the pride that so many Barbadians claimed in being British, the colony was a
tragic representation of British colonialism. The chronically low wages and systems of

5

West India Royal Commission Report (London: HMSO: 1945), 134-154.
Anne Spry Rush, Bonds of Empire: West Indians and Britishness from Victoria to Decolonization (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2011).
7
See, for example, BDA, GH 4/36, Detective Brathwaite to Detective Inspector, Report on Workingmen’s
Association Meeting, June 11, 1927. Other poor West Indians also swore loyalty to the British monarch because of
Queen Victoria. See, for instance, Brian Moore and Michelle Johnson, Neither Led Nor Driven: Contesting British
Cultural Imperialism in Jamaica, 1865-1920 (Kingston: University of the West Indies Press, 2004), 271-310.
8
Colonial subjects in other parts of the empire also believed that the British monarch would protect their rights
against white British settlers, and sent petitions to the Crown in an attempt to redress local grievances. Ravi de Costa,
“Identity, Authority, and the Moral Worlds of Indigenous Petitions,” Comparative Studies in Society and History
48:3 (2006): 675–80.
6
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exploitation that characterized the rest of the post-emancipation British Caribbean also existed in
Barbados, where social divisions according to race and class were particularly rigid. The wealthy,
white planter and merchant class, the largest resident white population in the British Caribbean,
sustained harsh rule over an enormous, mostly-black labor force by keeping workers in a state of
constant poverty. The majority of Barbadians belonged to this poor class of black workers, who
cut sugar cane, performed domestic service, or labored as dockworkers for pitiable wages. The
black and colored middle classes, concerned with protecting their tenuous economic positions,
had little sense of racial solidarity with the poor black masses.9 Even the community of
impoverished white “redlegs,” who were widely shunned by white elites, considered themselves
racially superior and scorned all black Barbadians.10 The effects of segregation, poverty,
malnutrition, and overcrowding were catastrophic. Poor Barbadians suffered high rates of
disease and death, which mostly derived from preventable causes such as poor diet and a lack of
sanitary facilities. The most heartbreaking consequences of these conditions fell upon the
youngest and most vulnerable Barbadians, as the colony consistently had the highest infant
mortality rate in the British Empire. In some years, nearly half of newborns died before they
reached the age of two.11
The miserable conditions of poor, black West Indians demonstrated the harrowing
repercussions of longstanding British neglect in the region. Following the end of the Great War,
as the problems of British imperialism became increasingly clear, the influence of the Bolshevik
Revolution and ideologies like pan-Africanism provided a new language for transnational
9

Colored refers to Barbadians of mixed descent. Gordon K. Lewis, The Growth of the Modern West Indies (New
York: Monthly Review Press, 1968), 229-230.
10
“Redlegs” were poor, white descendants of predominantly Irish and Scottish indentured servants, who had
migrated to the colony in the seventeenth century. Jill Sheppard, The “Redlegs” of Barbados: Their Origins and
History (Millwood, NY: KTO Press, 1977).
11
The National Archives, Kew, United Kingdom (hereafter TNA), CO 28/302/29, The Duke of Devonshire to
Charles O’Brien, September 14, 1923; The Thirteenth Annual Report of the Public Health Inspector (Acting), 1925,
in The Official Gazette, August 18, 1927, 1101.
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critiques of capitalism, inequality, racism, and empire. West Indians were in the thick of this
flourishing international milieu, whether it was in diasporic urban centers like London and
Harlem, or in the villages and rum shops of the Caribbean.12 Black West Indians had a
compelling case to make against British colonialism, as black troops had suffered discrimination
in European armies, black workers labored under the exploitative rule of white employers, and
black babies died while white children lived. In the years following the war, black West Indians
organized to press for improved economic and social conditions in their home colonies.13
In particular, the rise of Marcus Garvey’s UNIA and the social and political movement it
represented was profound in Barbados as well as the wider Caribbean. Garvey, a Jamaican panAfricanist, argued that all people of African descent shared a common experience of
discrimination, poverty, and inequality. According to Garvey and his followers, the only way to
end black suffering was to unite the African diaspora and found a black nation. Garvey’s vision
of black nationalism, with its corresponding message of racial and economic empowerment,
spread around the world in the years following the First World War.14 As Adam Ewing has
persuasively argued, what was important about Garveyism was “the engagement of its

12

Paul Gilroy, The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1993); Winston James, Holding Aloft the Banner of Ethiopia: Caribbean Radicalism in Early Twentieth
Century America (London, 1999); Brent Hayes Edwards, The Practice of Diaspora: Literature, Translation, and the
Rise of Black Internationalism (Cambridge, 2003); Michelle Ann Stephens, Black Empire: The Masculine Global
Imaginary of Caribbean Intellectuals in the United States, 1914-1962 (Durham, 2005); Susan Pennybacker, From
Scottsboro to Munich: Race and Political Culture in 1930s Britain (Princeton, 2009); Minkah Makalani, In the
Cause of Freedom: Radical Black Internationalism from Harlem to London, 1917-1939 (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 2011); Carol Polsgrove, Ending British Rule in Africa: Writers in a Common Cause
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012); Lara Putnam, Radical Moves: Caribbean Migrants and the
Politics of Race in the Jazz Age (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013); Marc Matera, Black
London: The Imperial Metropolis and Decolonization in the Twentieth Century (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 2015).
13
Bolland, The Politics of Labour, 155-211.
14
Tony Martin, Race First: The Ideological and Organizational Struggles of Marcus Garvey and the Universal
Negro Improvement Association (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1976); Mary G. Rolinson, Grassroots Garveyism:
The Universal Negro Improvement Association in the Rural South, 1920-1927 (Chapel Hill: The University of North
Carolina Press, 2007); Colin Grant, Negro with a Hat: The Rise and Fall of Marcus Garvey (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2010).
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proponents in a sustained and more informal project of organizing, networking, and
consciousness raising” across the diaspora. It was important not only as an ideology, but as “a
method of organic mass politics.”15 This new method of mass politics reached poor black
Barbadians, who found in pan-Africanism a language to explain their suffering, take pride in
their African heritage, and find hope in belonging to an international political movement that
transcended the boundaries of one colony or empire. As urban laborers embraced black
internationalism and middle-class black professionals slowly gained the right to vote through
property ownership, non-elite Barbadians increased their demands for political representation
and economic opportunity.
As radical movements gained momentum, and anti-colonial nationalism spread
throughout the empire, it became clear to anxious officials in the colonies as well as in London
that something had to be done to prevent an imperial crisis. For British administrators, the
presence of unrest in the Caribbean colonies was symptomatic of even deeper problems in the
wider empire. Additionally, the proximity of the newly restive British West Indian colonies to
the United States caused concern, as the rise of American economic and military dominance
following the war meant that Great Britain needed to maintain its strategic foothold in the
Western Hemisphere. Yet as U.S. philanthropic organizations like the Rockefeller Foundation
took an increasing role in the region, British officials worried that the U.S. was a better caretaker
of British subjects than Britain itself.16
These multiple challenges, in combination with a new international focus on the principle
of trusteeship in colonial affairs, transformed how Britain governed its empire. The “third British

15

Adam Ewing, The Age of Garvey: How a Jamaican Activist Created a Mass Movement and Changed Global
Black Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 5-6.
16
Steven Palmer, Launching Global Health: The Caribbean Odyssey of the Rockefeller Foundation (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 2010).
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Empire,” or the stage of British colonialism from the end of World War I to the post-World War
II period, was a time fraught with tension as Britain struggled to pay the costs of imperial
occupation and maintenance while colonial peoples made increasing claims for expanding the
rights of British subjecthood.17 During this era, imperial officials struggled to balance these
demands with the need to preserve British hegemony overseas. In an attempt to maintain
Britain’s legitimacy as a global power and to secure the support of subject populations, colonial
authorities in London began to urge a number of reforms to relieve the misery of subject
populations. Colonial officials hoped that improvements in education, development of
infrastructure, and advances in sanitation across the empire would stave off unrest and reinforce
traditional colonial power structures. Protean attempts to improve colonial welfare through
nascent development policies became a central component of British approaches to imperial rule
in the twentieth century.18
The idea of colonial development has its roots in the nineteenth-century idea of a
“civilizing mission” that rationalized European imperial expansion. The language of “trusteeship”
situated Europeans as a group meant to oversee and guide “backwards” populations, which
justified and maintained colonial rule by keeping subject people in a state of perceived
dependency.19 By the interwar period, as critiques of imperialism mounted, colonial officials and
metropolitan experts increasingly used the term “development” to describe state-directed efforts

17

Mrinalini Sinha, “Whatever happened to the Third British empire? Empire, Nation Redux,” in Writing Imperial
Histories, ed. Andrew S. Thompson (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013), 168-187. See also John
Darwin, “A Third British Empire? The Dominion Idea in Imperial Politics,” in The Oxford History of the British
Empire, vol. 4, The Twentieth Century, ed. Judith M. Brown and Wm. Roger Louis (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1999), 64-87.
18
Penelope Hetherington, British Paternalism and Africa, 1920-1940 (London: Frank Cass, 1978); Michael
Worboys, “British Colonial Science Policy (1918-1930),” in Colonial Sciences: Researchers and Institutions, ed.
Patrick Petitjean (Paris: Orstom Editions, 1996), 99-111.
19
Michael Cowen and R.W. Shenton, Doctrines of Development (London: Routledge, 1996).
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to benefit the lives of colonial peoples.20 Development became, according to Frederick Cooper
and Randall Packard, “a framing device through which colonial regimes tried to respond to
challenges and reassert control and legitimacy.”21 Imperial governments worked to reinforce
colonial rule by spearheading improvements in local infrastructure and services, and expanding
the governing power of local states.
This dissertation explores the different ways in which British efforts to reshape colonial
relations played out in the colony of Barbados from the end of World War I to 1940. During this
period, British policymakers pressured the Barbadian government to improve health and
sanitation in order to pacify restive Barbadian laborers influenced by transnational pan-African
and socialist ideas following the war. Officials focused on health because it was an issue that
dramatically displayed the extent of official neglect on the bodies of colonial subjects.
Inadequate sanitation and limited access to medical care affected Barbadians personally, whether
it was a whole family infected by typhoid due to lack of sanitary facilities, white “redlegs”
suffering from hookworm because they worked barefoot in waste-soaked fields, or laboring
mothers who watched helplessly as their children died from dysentery. Such miserable
conditions, in Barbados as well as other British colonies, provided ample evidence for critics of
empire, capitalism, and racism following the war, and imperial officials came to believe that
winning the hearts and minds of their subjects could be achieved by improving their bodies.
Health and welfare, then, became tools of colonial statecraft for imperial officials
attempting to pacify restive subjects during the interwar period, and the British government
initiated a number of official commissions to spearhead medical reforms in Barbados. Yet, as

20

Hetherington, British Paternalism in Africa, 90.
Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard, “Introduction,” in International Development and the Social Sciences:
Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge, ed. Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1997), 18.
21
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this dissertation argues, British efforts to improve Barbadian health to create stability only led to
further conflict. Welfare discourses provided political tools for Barbadian pan-Africanists, who
criticized white indifference to black suffering in the colony. Their arguments were strengthened
when white creole elites resisted medical reform in order to maintain local hegemony. Barbadian
elites, who maintained a level of local political and economic control unique in the British
Caribbean, refused to concede to any outside influence. Conflicts between white creole elites and
the British state over the question of health reform would have long-lasting implications. When
the British government ultimately refused to supersede local white elites to fulfill their
commitment to Barbadian welfare, it both undermined the belief of Barbadian workers in the
idea of British protection and trusteeship, and created the space for Barbadian claims to greater
participation in the state. Increasingly, aspiring black politicians began to make a case for their
leadership abilities based on improving Barbadian social conditions.
Rather than repairing the colonial relationship, then, the ambivalence and contradictions
intrinsic to interwar British development policies instead resulted in a protracted legislative and
public battle over health reform. Focusing on these nascent development policies helps explain
the mechanics of British imperial decline and the process through which postcolonial nations
emerged. At all levels, the politics of disease, mortality, and sanitation were shaped and
transformed reciprocally between colony and metropole, and created room for resistance never
anticipated by British policymakers. Conflicts over health became a prism through which both
Barbadians and British officials alike sketched out evolving understandings of the state, the
nation, and the empire in a period in which these notions were in flux. Thus, the very policies
meant to restore British imperial power actually began the process of decolonizing the Caribbean.
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Modern imperialism was marked by great strain and fragility, as the liberalism of
nineteenth-century empires advocated equality and the universal nature of man while at the same
time creating categories of exclusion to justify imperial expansion.22 These paradoxes meant that
colonizers had to continually re-define knowledge categories in order to uphold their power.23
Scholars of colonial health and medicine have contributed a rich literature about these colonial
knowledge projects, both by analyzing biomedicine as a tool of imperial conquest and by
contributing to understandings of how indigenous subjects resisted, co-opted, and transformed
Western medicine.24 During the expansion of nineteenth-century empires, health was central to
how the British government exerted and maintained its rule, as it gave “a pretext for the
extension of state power into the everyday lives of its subjects.”25 Medicine became central to the
idea of a “civilizing mission,” working both as a tool of control as well as establishing “the moral
authority of the imperialising power.”26 Yet, while colonialism used the body as a place for
constructing its authority and control, this process was not monolithic. Instead, “the body formed

22

Thomas C. Holt, The Problem of Freedom: Race, Labor, and Politics in Jamaica and Britain, 1832-1938
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991); Thomas Metcalf, Ideologies of the Raj (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1994); Uday S. Mehta, Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century Liberal Thought
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999); Ann Laura Stoler, Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and
the Intimate in Colonial Rule (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); Jennifer Pitts, A Turn to Empire: The
Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).
23
Frederick Cooper and Ann Stoler, Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1997).
24
Shula Marks, “What is Colonial about Colonial Medicine? And What has Happened to Imperialism and Health?”
Social History of Medicine 10, no. 2 (August 1997): 205-219; Warwick Anderson, Colonial Pathologies: American
Tropical Medicine, Race, and Hygiene in the Philippines (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006); Alison Bashford,
Imperial Hygiene: A Critical History of Colonialism, Nationalism and Public Health (Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2004); Philippa Levine, Prostitution, Race and Politics (London: Routledge, 2003); Laura Briggs,
Reproducing Empire: Race, Sex and U.S. Imperialism in Puerto Rico (Berkeley: University of California Press,
2002); David Arnold, Colonizing the Body: State Medicine and Epidemic Disease in Nineteenth-Century India
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Megan Vaughan, Curing Their Ills: Colonial Power and African
Illness (Stanford: Stanford University Press), 1991.
25
Norman Owen, “Towards a History of Health in Southeast Asia”, in Explorations in Social, Medical and
Demographic History, ed. Norman Owen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987): 19.
26
Lenore Manderson, Sickness and the State: Health and Illness in Colonial Malaya (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), 231-235.
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a site of contestation and not simply of colonial appropriation.”27 More than a simple tool of
empire, colonial medicine became a locus for the struggles, strains, and tensions of colonialism.
By the twentieth century, a focus on native welfare in colonial policy became imperative
as challenges to empire mounted, both by anti-colonial nationalists and by British audiences
skeptical of the benefits and morality of empire.28 Colonial medicine became both “mission and
mandate”; on the one hand, medicine worked to modernize colonial societies along European
models, while on the other hand, colonizers emphasized medicine as crucial to developing
indigenous welfare.29 At the same time, by the interwar period, international bodies like the
League of Nations Health Organization were working to manage diseases and populations across
borders through global cooperation and the standardization of biomedical knowledge.30 As ideas
of European “trusteeship” for subject peoples intrinsic to the League of Nations mandate system
became part of the wider logic of postwar empires, developing colonial health and welfare
became a new strategy of British rule as an effort to convince subject populations and world
opinion alike of the benefits of imperialism and the ability of Great Britain to manage and
maintain colonial bodies.
Focusing on interwar colonial welfare policy bridges two historiographical fields. As
Warwick Anderson has pointed out, many historians of colonial medicine cease their analysis at
the end of the long nineteenth century, while historians of development confine their work to the
post-World War II period. Instead, he argues, there exist “continuities between the late-colonial
civilizing process and international development projects” during the interwar period that require
27
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further analysis.31 Much of the literature on colonial policy and development focuses on colonial
administrators and decisions by metropolitan governments.32 However, scholars have begun to
instead pay attention to how development policies and ideologies intersected with local
conditions, revealing the limitations of these initiatives as well as how development models were
informed by local knowledge.33 These scholars have shown that colonial development was not a
single discourse or system imposed by Europeans on colonized people.34 Monica van Beusekom,
for instance, demonstrated that interwar French development policies were not simply top-down
state practices, but were transformed through a process of negotiation and exchange with rural
African farmers.35 Furthermore, as Joseph Hodge and Helen Tilley have shown, interwar
development logic was influenced by the increasing faith of European governments in scientific
knowledge. Colonial officials relied upon social scientists, medical doctors, and expert advisors
to gather information about local conditions in the colonies, knowledge that metropolitan states
used to craft policies.36 Thus, scholars have demonstrated that ideas of colonial development and
improvement were not concrete initiatives, but consisted of a series of struggles between colonial
officials, metropolitan experts, local medical practitioners, and colonial subjects.
The vast literature on colonial development during the first half of the twentieth century
focuses heavily upon African and Asian colonies, but as I show in this dissertation, the British
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government also experimented with development schemes in the Caribbean during the interwar
years.37 Furthermore, most of the literature on colonial development centers on European
attempts to make colonies more economically profitable, mostly through agricultural
“modernization” and reform.38 While economic policy was crucial, efforts to improve health and
welfare also became part of the logic of development efforts during the interwar period. For the
British Empire, the twin emphasis on economic and social development became codified in the
1940 Colonial Development and Welfare Act. The roots of this legislation lay in British
struggles in the Caribbean in the years leading to World War II.39 Analyzing conflicts over
interwar health and welfare policies in the West Indies, then, illuminates both the genealogy of
postwar development programs as well as the problems that characterized late colonialism.
The British Caribbean has been a rich field of study for analyses of the tensions of
colonialism. While most scholarship on this region focuses upon experiences of slavery, the
post-emancipation period has also attracted considerable scholarly attention.40 Historians of the
post-emancipation British Caribbean have analyzed at length the “problem of freedom” for West
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Indian people and the various social, political, and economic transformations following the
abolition of slavery.41 Yet, surprisingly, few studies have been conducted about health and
medicine in the West Indies during this time period.42 West Indian medical history both
illustrates and departs from the arguments made in the existing literature of colonial health,
medicine, and development. In the Caribbean, as in Africa, British officials were concerned with
managing, controlling, and pacifying black bodies, and attempted to use health policy as a tool of
colonial power throughout the interwar period.43 Along with this came familiar stereotypes of
“unfit” black mothers and “lazy” black laborers that were part of the disciplinary racial rhetoric
and hierarchy of colonialism. Yet, in Barbados there was less of a concern regarding “native
policy,” because Barbadians were not indigenous subjects, but creoles: neither African nor
European.44 Also, unlike relatively “new” colonies in Asia and Africa, in which imperial science
competed with indigenous methods of healing, European medical knowledge was already
41
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entrenched in Barbados from three centuries of colonial rule. There was not, as David Arnold
observes in early colonial India, “a general atmosphere of suspicion, doubt, and resistance that
haunted Western medicine.”45 Rather than resist, many Barbadians welcomed and participated in
European healing practices.
This dissertation will discuss how the story of health and development in interwar
Barbados was a political and economic struggle conducted on a number of levels, including a
contest over policy.46 Both British administrators and white Barbadian elites desired to control,
order, and govern black colonial subjects, but had opposite strategies to achieve this goal. British
policymakers viewed health reform as a tool of empire, a method to manufacture consent and
loyalty from disillusioned black workers. In contrast, Barbadian elites regarded reform and
centralization as a threat to local power in the island, and believed that improving the standard of
living of poor, black laborers would have a negative effect their willingness to work. The
conflicts between these two “top-down” strategies of managing black bodies would produce
serious problems for both the local and imperial states. When white elites refused to implement
reforms that would benefit the wider population, both working- and middle-class black
Barbadians used struggles over health reform first to criticize local white rule in the island and,
later, the unwillingness of the British government to intervene on behalf of its subjects. At the
same time, aspiring middle-class politicians of color adopted welfare discourses to garner votes
from people who desired reform and make a case for their own leadership over the local
government. At all levels of this story, welfare and development provide a lens to understand
how British and Barbadian people navigated the tensions of late colonialism and worked out
conflicting perspectives on the role of the state. Yet, there is a deeply human component of this
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narrative that should not be lost in wider claims about politics and colonial power. Many
Barbadians simply wanted access to a better life, and having a chance at watching their children
survive infancy was a key component to that life.
As challenges to imperialism mounted after the war, metropolitan officials increasingly
blamed poor social conditions in the Caribbean for the unrest, and came to believe that
preventing disease and lowering high infant mortality rates would make West Indian populations
less susceptible to radical politics. In the mid-1920s, the Colonial Office began to place great
pressure on the Barbadian government to centralize and modernize the fragmented, inefficient
public health system in the colony. Yet, these policies were not high-minded reforms imposed
from above, but were mutually constituted in correlation to local knowledge and practices.
Indeed, the basis for British pressure to reform Barbadian public health in the 1920s lay in the
medical advice and reform efforts of the white, liberal Barbadian physician John Hutson, who
had been advocating health modernization since the early twentieth century. Metropolitan
experts, such as the physicians and scientists in the Colonial Advisory and Sanitary Committee,
then adopted Hutson’s ideas. The Colonial Office used the advice of these experts to urge
Barbadian health reform, bringing the combination of local and metropolitan knowledge in
colonial policy-making full circle.
Nevertheless, while metropolitan policymakers viewed health reform as a strategy of
pacification, white elites in the colony had a different understanding of how to deal with the
problem of radical unrest and electoral change. The power of the white ruling class in Barbados
rested on decentralized, local rule, a personal culture of violence and rewards, and severe
economic and social controls.47 This pattern of rule, similar to that of white settler colonies in
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Africa and the Dominions, had been in place in the colony almost since settlement. Contrary to
British policymakers, white elites in Barbados believed that if the lives of laborers became too
comfortable, whether it be through higher wages or better social conditions, they would be less
inclined to work. Thus, when British officials urged reform efforts to centralize and improve
Barbadian public health, it struck at the heart of white planter power in the colony. Conservative
white Barbadians used every discursive and legislative tool in their arsenal to resist Britishmandated health reform efforts. By the late 1920s, elite resistance to medical care led to
increased backlash against local rule, as black Barbadians came to understand the indifference of
planter and merchant elites to their welfare.
White resistance to health reform was not the only problem with colonial development
initiatives in Barbados. As the debates over public health in Barbados reveal, there were serious
problems with British colonial policy itself. Even though Lord Devonshire had famously
declared that Britain’s postwar purpose was “the protection and advancement of the native races,”
the emphasis on colonial welfare after the war was, in actuality, a “complacent trusteeship” that
British officials would abandon when it became too difficult or costly to implement.48 When
white Barbadian elites opposed metropolitan efforts to develop health and sanitation in the
colony, the British government refused to override their authority. This inaction showed black
Barbadians that the British government did not actually care about their welfare, and would
rather keep them subject to the autocratic rule of an intransigent, racist, exploitative, and violent
white elite rather than take the political risks of direct intervention. Instead of restoring
Barbadian loyalty to the empire, health reform only exposed the ambivalence of Britain’s
commitment to the welfare of black subjects, and destabilized British colonialism further.
Increasingly, black Barbadians would take local reform into their own hands.
48
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Welfare initiatives in the empire were also constrained by the British policy of selfsufficiency, in which each colony had to pay for its own government and infrastructure.49 When
the Colonial Office pressured Barbados to reform its public health system, therefore, they
expected the Barbados government to pay for it. Additionally, the individuals that crafted these
policies did so with mixed motives and in the midst of great disagreement. International pressure
towards trusteeship forced Colonial Office officials to pay lip service to colonial welfare, but the
British Treasury rejected efforts to pay for colonial projects. On a different level, while British
imperialists desired colonial development to benefit Britain economically and increase British
prestige, the doctors, experts, and humanitarians employed by the Colonial Office cherished a
sincere, if paternalistic, desire to benefit native wellbeing. Interwar development policies were
thus disjointed, conflicting, and ambivalent, and expose the fractures and tensions of late
colonialism.
Finally, as the dissertation will show, the same knowledge systems that constituted
British strategies of rule were also the ones that contributed to imperial decline, as British reform
efforts opened the door for Barbadian agency and critiques of empire.50 When metropolitan
experts and officials sent commissions to inquire into health conditions in Barbados, Barbadians
increasingly, and collectively, began to understand the extent of suffering under both local and
imperial rule. When the local government refused to implement British-mandated health reforms,
it exposed the fragility and ambivalence of imperial power. At the same time, British promises of
imperial responsibility and trusteeship seemed like a great lie as the metropolitan state did
nothing to alleviate Barbadian suffering. It appeared that the British government was offering
less and less, while ideologies like black internationalism posed an attractive alternative to the
49
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British imperial system. Focusing on struggles over public health in Barbados, then, provides a
useful lens to analyze how both British and colonial subjects negotiated shifting imperial
relationships in the twentieth century.
This dissertation is organized into chronological chapters. Chapter Two, entitled “‘We
want the loyalty of the black man’: The empire in crisis,” discusses growing unrest in Britain’s
colonial empire following the First World War. The immediate post-war years heralded a
colonial crisis for British administrators as strikes, protests, and radical organizations spread
throughout the Caribbean. In Barbados, state-sponsored violence and coercion contained the
immediate threat of revolution, but postwar unrest made it clear to British officials that new
tactics of colonial rule would be required to pacify Caribbean subjects.
Chapter Three, entitled “The Development Cure: New Directions in Trusteeship,”
explores British responses to the postwar colonial crisis. As fears of unrest in the Caribbean
began to subside, a series of commissions to the region exposed the miserable health and living
conditions experienced by the vast majority of West Indian subjects. British policymakers came
to believe that in order to repair colonial relationships fractured by war and anti-imperial
discourse, they would have to improve the welfare of colonial subjects.
Chapter Four, entitled “Public Health and Elite Power in Barbados,” evaluates struggles
between the Barbadian and imperial governments over public health reform in the late 1920s.
British pressure to reform Barbadian medical policy sparked extended conflict between white
Barbadian elites and imperial officials over how to prevent unrest in the colony. Even as a series
of malaria epidemics killed thousands of poor Barbadians and pointed to the desperate need for
health reform, white elites refused to concede to British pressure.
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Chapter Five, entitled “Warning from the West Indies,” describes how the Colonial
Office withdrew from trying to improve colonial welfare and the consequences of this decision.
As the Great Depression put further strain on already desperate Barbadian laborers, it became
clear that the British government would not come to the colony’s aid. The combination of
economic desolation, worsening health conditions, and the circulation of radical pan-African
critiques of empire contributed to growing unrest in Barbados as strikes and disorders broke out
throughout the British Caribbean.
Finally, Chapter Six, “‘A West Indian Nation is in process of birth’: Caribbean Riots and
Policy Revolution,” evaluates the effect of West Indian unrest on British colonial policy and
discourses of Barbadian nationhood. Even as war approached in Europe, the actions of frustrated
Caribbean workers would force the British government to spearhead an extraordinary
transformation in how it governed the empire. In addition to imperial policy, the disturbances
would cause discourses on welfare to become integrated in the nationalist claims of aspiring
Barbadian politicians.
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Chapter Two
“We want the loyalty of the black man”: The Empire in Crisis

Introduction
On November 11, 1918, the Allied powers agreed to an armistice with Germany in a
railcar in the forest of Compiègne, France. With the announcement of the war’s end, bells rang
across Europe as the devastation of the First World War finally drew to a close. Celebrations also
broke out around the world as the colonial subjects of Europe’s far-flung empires heard the news.
For this was their war too; 650,000 colonial troops fought in European battlefields, with millions
more providing the labor, material, and valuable food supplies that kept the war effort going.1
Yet for Great Britain and France, the end of the war heralded a colonial crisis. The
senseless violence and destruction of the conflict led colonial subjects to mount critiques of
European civilization, myths of supremacy, and the entire political-economic order of the West.
Furthermore, as the peace negotiations in Paris promised independent states to Eastern European
nationalities, colonial people from India to Indochina took seriously Woodrow Wilson’s promise
of self-determination.2 Soldiers and sailors of color, according to David Killingray, “laid claim to
what they believed to be their earned rights as imperial citizens rather than as mere colonial
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‘subjects.’”3 Despite widespread celebrations of an Allied victory in the streets of London,
officials at Whitehall saw the tensions exposed by the war, combined with new ideas of selfdetermination, as a threat to the future of the British Empire. The immediate postwar years saw
revolution in Egypt, riots in India, and disorders in the Middle East, to which the British
government responded with violence and repression. As news spread of bloody British reprisals,
such as the 1919 Amritsar Massacre in the Punjab, fewer and fewer people believed in Britain’s
claim of performing a beneficent “civilizing mission” in the colonies.4 In fact, even though the
terms of the Treaty of Versailles in June 1919 brought the British Empire to its territorial apex,
postwar anti-colonial nationalist movements exposed the true fragility of imperial power.5
In the Caribbean, as elsewhere in the colonial empire, postwar unrest threatened British
imperial hegemony. Yet, the proximity of British West Indian colonies to the United States
meant that the region had added significance following the armistice. World War I had shifted
global power dynamics, as the United States entered the world stage as a stronger financial and
military power. Already a significant presence in the Caribbean due to the construction of the
Panama Canal, interventions in Cuba and Haiti, and the philanthropic activities of the
Rockefeller Foundation, the postwar years would see the United States take a more expansive
role in the region, which troubled policymakers in London who feared national decline.6 British
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West Indian colonies thus became a battleground for Britain’s attempts to maintain its status as a
great power in the face of rising U.S. influence.
In the years following the war, the Caribbean also became a locus for radical critiques of
empire. As it did in other parts of the colonial world, the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution provided a
source of inspiration for West Indian subjects who had long endured the economic exploitation
of white planter elites. Socialist critiques of capitalism and imperialism circulated amongst
Caribbean laborers as the war drew to a close. But beyond these class-based explanations of
West Indian poverty, the war also fomented new understandings of shared concerns and
experiences that existed across transnational and racial boundaries. As the most influential
intellectual discourse in this region in the interwar years, Pan-African evaluations of imperialism
drew attention not just to the experience of economic exploitation shared by colonial laborers,
but to the more specific commonality of black suffering under white rule around the globe. This
served as a powerful ideological identification for black populations searching for an explanation
of their misery.7 Often formulated by West Indian intellectuals, pan-African discourse increased
during the war years as black soldiers serving in Europe collectively encountered racial
discrimination and came to understand a sense of a common racial experience that transcended
national and colonial lines. During the course of demobilization, West Indian soldiers radicalized
by their wartime experiences brought new ideas and criticism of empire back to their home
colonies, where many would become leaders of organized labor or contributors to radical presses.
Returning Barbadian troops brought similar ideas back to “Little England,” and the
immediate postwar period saw strikes, protests, and unrest in what had previously been
considered a peaceful and quiescent colony. Pan-African ideology had great appeal for poor
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black Barbadians, who had long labored under the racist and exploitative control of white
planters. Black Barbadians joined local chapters of Marcus Garvey’s Universal Negro
Improvement Association, circulated critiques of capitalism and racism in radical newspapers,
and fomented strikes in both the urban and rural spaces of the island. As labor agitation spread,
colonial administrators scrambled with how to pacify the region, first quelling the unrest with
military force and then turning to economic reforms to pacify restive subjects. Yet in Barbados,
British efforts to prevent unrest collided with the historical conservatism and obstinacy of the
ruling elites, who balked at outside interference and insisted on dealing with Barbadian problems
locally.
The political structure of Barbados, unique in the Caribbean, meant that Barbadian elites
responded to the postwar crisis in a very different way from the British government. Rather than
contain unrest through amelioration, Barbadian elites placed the island under a state of de facto
martial law by allowing the police to search homes without notice or warrants. At the same time,
local elites remained confident that the many social controls established in the colony following
slavery would limit the scope of radical politics. The immediate post-World War I years in
Barbados would highlight the fractures of British colonial rule, as pan-African ideas intersected
with increasing dissatisfaction on the parts of the laboring masses, and imperial strategies of
achieving peace clashed with local methods of governance.
The political, economic, and social order of Barbados
In Barbados, the volatile postwar conditions intersected with the distinctive power
structure and culture of the island. The Barbadian colonial government and law had been created
under slavery to serve the needs of the white oligarchy, and the British government had
historically allowed Barbados to govern itself. While a British governor oversaw the executive
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branch of the government, the Barbadian Constitution restricted his powers over the legislature.
This meant that, rather than having executive power to make and enforce policy, governors of
the colony spent most of their time negotiating with the local assemblies in order to make them
comply with imperial directives. These governors received little supervision from England and
were expected to keep the peace by accommodating planter demands, while also protecting the
interests of the disenfranchised black Barbadian population.8 As most governors found, juggling
these two competing responsibilities was impossible.9 The independent Barbados legislature,
which consisted of two bodies, the House of Assembly and the Legislative Council, remained
primarily concerned with preserving the power of the elite white planter and merchant class of
the colony. While the Legislative Council was appointed, members of the House of Assembly
were popularly elected. However, onerous income and property qualifications for the franchise
meant that the electorate was restricted to approximately two percent of the population, who
were the wealthiest inhabitants of the colony.10 Over the centuries, the conservative Barbadian
planters who dominated the legislature had grown accustomed to passing legislation that
benefited their interests, without outside interference by the British government.
In addition to legislative control, white elites maintained extraordinary power over black
labor in the colony. Following full emancipation from slavery in 1838, the high ratio of freed
slaves to land meant that white Barbadian planters were able to maintain an extraordinary level
of economic control. Unlike colonies like Jamaica, where freed slaves were able to leave the
plantation and settle on public lands, an independent peasantry did not develop in Barbados.
Without access to property for purchase or to public Crown lands, freed Barbadian slaves were
8
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forced to persist as laborers on large sugar plantations and remain subject to their former
masters.11 The planters also implemented restrictions on emigration, ensuring that a large
workforce was readily available.12 The steady surplus of labor in Barbados not only kept wages
low, but also meant that agricultural workers could be easily replaced. The development of this
agricultural proletariat left the Barbadian social system largely unchanged after emancipation.
Barbadian elites used state institutions at every level to force workers to remain on the
plantations, allowing white elites to remain after emancipation to oversee their still-profitable
estates. Planters implemented a tenancy system to regulate black labor. Elites rented a portion of
land to their workers in exchange for their work, which kept laborers in constant debt to the
estate. Since the workers also rented their houses from the planters, they lived in constant fear of
homelessness. These controls meant that few Barbadian workers could attain the status of a truly
free laborer. Workers who moved to different estates would also have to pay fees due to an
onerous rent-fine law passed following emancipation.13 Additionally, planters had to right to
evict workers for insubordination as defined by the planter and to send workers to jail for a
variety of minor infractions.14 While emancipation was a dramatic legal break with the past, then,
freed laborers remained in a state of economic bondage to their former masters.
Planter control over the legislature, the legal system, land, and wages put black
Barbadians, particularly agricultural laborers, in a permanent state of economic and political
dependency. In many ways, the power structure in Barbados resembled that of the southern
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United States.15 As Mark Schultz has shown for rural southern whites in Georgia’s Hancock
County, planters had “direct and personal control over a majority of Hancock’s black laborers
and answered to no one for their manner of administration.” The nature of white supremacy in
rural Georgia meant that “powerful white southerners enhanced their own personal power by
upholding a decentralized authority structure and a culture of paternalism.”16 Similarly, in a
small, agricultural colony of Barbados with a sizeable British-descended elite, the personal
nature of white rule informed racial order. Even the topography of Barbados assured white
control and surveillance over black labor. The entrances to plantation great houses, marked by
extraordinarily tall groups of palm trees, could be seen for miles across the relatively flat
landscape of the island. Even when agricultural workers returned to their villages, the presence
of the plantation was ubiquitous. The island was, itself, a panopticon.17 As Mary Chamberlain
has pointed out, the position of Glendairy Prison, located in the center of the most populous part
of the island, was meant to evoke constant surveillance.18 The political economy and geography
of Barbados made for a distinctive pattern of local rule in the British Caribbean, in which a
comparatively large creole white class reigned over an impoverished and disenfranchised black
workforce.
By the late nineteenth century, a number of labor rebellions had caused most other British
West Indian territories to lose their independent legislatures and became Crown Colonies directly
administered by Great Britain. However, Barbados was able to retain its relative independence
from British oversight. In 1875, the Colonial Office had proposed that Barbados join with the
15
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neighboring Windward Islands. Most planters and members of the Barbados Assembly
vehemently opposed confederation, arguing that imperial officials wished to dismantle their
rights and revoke self-government. Anti-confederates launched a campaign against imperial
supporters and the Barbadian governor, John Pope Hennessy, who had been appointed to oversee
the transition. The governor and pro-confederates attempted to garner working class support for
federation, and black Barbadian working classes who viewed the move as a threat to planter
control organized in support of it.19
By April 1876, tensions had reached a point of open rebellion, as working-class
frustrations with white rule combined with desperation over unemployment, hunger, and low
wages. During Easter in 1876, hundreds of black laborers revolted for nine days, attacking
plantations, destroying planter property, carrying flags, and claiming to be agents of the governor.
They saw their actions as the final step that would push Barbados towards confederation,
believing that greater imperial control would afford them more opportunities. However, their
faith in the empire and its policies faltered when the forces of imperial power stepped in to
suppress the uprising. Governor Hennessey sent in the British military to suppress the riots, and
the insurgency came to a swift end. The rebellion shook Parliament’s attempts to reform the
government of Barbados, and it abandoned the confederation idea and replaced the Barbadian
governor.20 Barbados thus remained one of the only British West Indian colonies to resist Crown
rule, and the island’s elite celebrated its continued self-government.
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As the confederation crisis subsided, Barbadian planters faced a new problem. In the
1870s, the introduction of European subsidized beet sugar to the market dramatically drove down
sugar prices on the global market. The dramatic reduction in sugar prices made estates across the
West Indies insolvent. As other West Indian colonies faced declining profitability century, estate
owners were forced to sell their land to British corporations and absentee owners. In Barbados,
by contrast, planters were able to maintain local ownership over estates because they obtained
credit locally, rather from metropolitan financiers. Estate owners increasingly relied upon a
developing merchant class based out of Bridgetown trading houses, who managed to keep the
sugar industry afloat and, therefore, locally-controlled. By the late nineteenth century, Barbados
was run by a white oligarchy comprised not only of white planters, but also a powerful “agribusiness bourgeoisie” of elite merchants.21
While planters and merchants managed to keep Barbadian land and finances under local
control, economic depression caused increasing social tensions in the colony. The brunt of the
sugar crisis fell upon black Barbadian workers, as planters cut wages and food prices rose. By
the 1890s, the crisis had brought widespread unemployment, hunger, and poverty to Barbados.
At the same time, dwindling emigration opportunities caused the population density to climb to
1,096 persons per square mile.22 The impoverished black population of Barbados responded by
rioting in the cities and in the countryside, stealing food, setting fires to fields, and demonstrating
in the streets. Outbreaks of “potato raids” spread throughout the last two decades of the century,
as desperate laborers took matters into their own hands and looted fields for food.23
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The new pro-empire Secretary of the State for the Colonies, Joseph Chamberlain, took
notice of conditions in the West Indies, which he termed “Empire’s darkest slum.” In 1897, as
part of his broader plans to strengthen the British Empire, he sent a Royal Commission to the
Caribbean to investigate the depression and the sugar crisis. In Barbados, workers organized and
sent appeals to the Commission begging for land to alleviate their slave-like conditions and
poverty. The commissioners agreed that the laboring masses needed their own land to establish a
peasantry and have the ability to grow small food crops. After their departure, though, the
recommendations were adopted only sporadically, and mostly in Crown Colonies, where the
British government had more direct control over the local government.24 Furthermore,
commissioners tended to oppose higher wages for workers, believing that it would cause laziness.
Their solution resulted in grants for the planters to revive the sugar industry, doing little to
alleviate the problem of Barbadian laborers.25 Once again, Barbadian planters were able to avoid
imperial reforms that threatened the dependency and helplessness of their workforce, and were
able to retain control over local affairs.
In addition to the material and structural methods of local rule employed by white
Barbadian elites, the Barbadian social and cultural system was a powerful weapon in the arsenal
of planter hegemony. Black Barbadians faced both state and personal violence if they became
too unruly, and the “carrots” offered by white planters, such as allowing small gardens and
grazing properties, could be withheld to punish insubordinate workers. Furthermore, the complex
race and class divisions in post-emancipation Barbados not only meant that the large, poor, black
workforce suffered racial and economic discrimination at the hands of white elites, but also
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social separation from the colored and black middle class of the island.26 The unique level of
planter control in Barbados meant that social mobility, already limited in other colonies, was
nearly impossible to attain. However, following emancipation an Afro-Barbadian middle class
did develop in the island, comprised of the roughly 12,000 free blacks in the colony from the
slave period.27 Members of this class might own small plots of land or a dwelling near
Bridgetown, and a select few owned sugar plantations and employed former slaves. As white
Barbadian racism increased after emancipation, elite blacks began to embrace their racial identity
and tried to fashion a political place for themselves as the voice of the black masses.28 In 1843,
Samuel Jackman Prescod, a colored Barbadian physician, became the first person of African
descent to be elected to the Barbados Assembly.29
Elite Afro-Barbadians, along with other black West Indian middle classes across the
region, challenged the racial hierarchy of British rule by claiming that they were both black and
British. Aspiring black and colored professionals adopted the culture and manners of Victorian
British respectability, donning “white masks,” in Fanon’s terminology, for social mobility.30 Yet,
no matter the wealth or education attained by Barbadians of African descent, the color bar in the
colony prevented full inclusion into the social order. As the black Barbadian politician Grantley
Adams would reflect, for the respectable black middle classes of the colony, men and women of
color were barred from participation in elite society, such as admission to social clubs. This
created “a profound resentment-- all the more potentially dangerous because it is ‘bottled up’-on the part of the coloured middle classes against the whole social order which keeps them in
26
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some respects worse off than are the labouring classes.”31 Not only did Afro-Barbadian middle
classes attempt to access the economic and social privileges of white elites, then, but did so by
excluding the lower classes. To protect their positions, elite Barbadians of color distinguished
themselves from the black masses, and remained more focused on attaining civil and voting
rights than with liberating workers from planter control. Indeed, politicians of color like Prescod
rejected democracy and universal suffrage, believing with other liberals that only men of means
should be able to vote and participate in politics.32 Like in other West Indian colonies, race and
class mattered in influencing allegiances and the scope of political activism.
In Barbados, ruling elites also sought to gain the acquiescence of non-whites through a
hegemonic cultural system that disciplined Afro-Barbadians of various backgrounds to seek the
perceived rewards of “Britishness.”33 White elites had long claimed a particularly overblown
sense of the colony’s cultural and historical relation to England and the monarchy, an
identification that became widespread amongst the island’s residents. For example, when
Edward, the Prince of Wales, visited the West Indies in 1920, articles in the Barbados Globe
used the occasion to boast about the preference of Great Britain for “Little England.” The Crown,
the paper argued, had chosen Barbados as the first location Prince Edward’s visit not “due to the
accident of geographical position,” but because “the ever British history of the island” placed the
colony “in a street all alone among West Indian possessions.”34 Barbados “alone among British
West Indians have known no flag other than the Union Jack,” had “one of the oldest
representative Assemblies in the Empire,” and possessed their own “Trafalgar square and a
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Nelson statue.”35 This sense of Barbadian exceptionalism, and its special claim to British
heritage, was key not only to elite Barbadian identity, but also to the self-imaginings of the black
middle and lower classes.
Schooling was a major site for the communication of British traditions and heritage.
Crucially, colonial schools ensconced young West Indians in the values of Christianity, British
culture, and the importance of hard work.36 Primary education was free for Barbadian children,
but schools taught little more than basic math and reading. Rather than an opportunity for
advancement, then, school was more often “a means of social reproduction.”37 Barbadian writers
like Austin Clarke remember the mythology about British benevolence taught in schools: “The
only things we heard in history about the Amurcans were slaves.... It was the Amurcan blacks
who were slaves, not the English blacks! England would never allow any of her subjects to be
held as slaves.”38 George Lamming, in his classic novel of Barbadian life, In the Castle of My
Skin, also wrote about teachers who taught young black children that no one in Barbados had
ever been a slave. As schoolchildren learned, “It was in another part of the world that those
things happened. Not in Little England.”39 Lessons such as these taught Barbadian children that
the British Empire was just and good, particularly when compared to the United States.
Contrasts between the United States and Britain were common. The British government
participated in advertising the comparisons, circulating reports in the colonies stating that there
were no Jim Crow laws in the British Empire, and black British subjects became attorneys, chief
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justices, and legislators in their home colonies.40 West Indians seemed to believe in pro-British
rhetoric. In 1919, when rumors spread that Great Britain would cede Caribbean colonies to the
United States as payment for its war debts, West Indian migrants in Harlem sent an urgent appeal
to the Colonial Office. Members of the Barbados Civic Centre in New York wrote as “loyal
coloured subjects of Great Britain” to warn the British government about “America’s policy
towards the Negro past and present.” Even though West Indians suffered, the petitioners
continued, they would rather “bear more of Great Britain's burden than to fall under America’s
sovereignty for one day.”41 West Indian newspapers also compared the records of the United
States and Britain on slavery, stating that the British Empire had treated its slaves well and freed
them because the British “realized the iniquity of their past acts,” while the United States had to
fight a war to end slavery.42 Faith in the essential justice and goodness of Britain, in particular
the British monarch, were widespread. In political meetings during the 1920s, poor Barbadians
often expressed confidence that the king would step in to help his colonial subjects if he learned
of their suffering.43 The idea that black West Indians were better off under British rule than black
Americans in the United States bred acquiescence amongst Barbadian workers of color.
For the black and colored middle classes, education was the chief avenue for economic
and social advancement. Austin Clarke, for instance, was born in a poor village near Bridgetown,
but was able to gain middle-class status for himself as well as his family after he won a
scholarship to attend secondary school. When he received his scholarship, his mother rejoiced,
for “she had at last achieved something beyond the expectations of the village. The village of St.
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Matthias celebrated with her that day.”44 Such examples imbued many black families with hope
that they, too, could attain social mobility through education. Schools conveyed the idea that
“Britishness” had intrinsic value, and adopting the trappings of Britishness meant access to
opportunity otherwise unavailable to black Barbadians. By gaining fluency in British history and
values through education, Barbadians had the chance to join the ranks of other great Englishmen
and become lawyers, doctors, and teachers. Barbadians of color, then, came to see British culture
as something that belonged to them, just as it belonged to white Britons in the metropole.45
Church was also a central institution that spread British values and culture to black
Barbadians. Similar to Jamaica, where Union Jacks hung in Anglican cathedrals and ministers
made links between “God and Empire” in sermons, Christian churches taught black Barbadians
that the path to both earthly and heavenly rewards lay in the pursuit of respectable Victorian
Christianity.46 In general, planters urged a program of “moral training” for black workers to keep
the laboring population quiescent.47 Barbadian clergy members preached the values of thrift and
morality instead of raising wages during times of prosperity, advising workers to sacrifice small
luxuries for practical goods. Priests and planters alike believed that workers needed to be
civilized, not enriched, and argued that workers needed to change their lifestyles rather than
receive higher wages in times of trouble.48 The interrelated roles of the church and the state in
Barbados served as yet another way in which traditional elites maintained control in the colony.
Again, black Barbadians adopted British values and culture as a means of advancement, as
attending church and leading a “moral” life promised, if not eventual belonging in the middle
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class, access to a better afterlife. The emphasis on “respectability” in social interactions meant
that outright resistance and disrespect for traditional authority was rare in the island.
By the early twentieth century, the economic and cultural domination of white planter
rule began to shift when the United States embarked on a major construction project in Central
America. In 1904, when the U.S. renewed construction of the Panama Canal, it recruited workers
from all around the world.49 In particular, the U.S. looked to the British Caribbean, with its
English-speaking populations, for a steady labor supply. The U.S. set up its main recruiting
station in Bridgetown, causing Barbadians to make up nearly half of the workforce in the Canal
Zone. Attracted by wages that doubled what they could make at home, West Indian migrants
flocked to Central America to work on the canal.
Between 1904 and 1914, as many as 45,000 Barbadians, or about one-quarter of the
island’s population, went to Panama. The remittances that they sent back to the island, as well as
the change in demographics, transformed power relations in the colony. Remittances from
migrants in Panama allowed many families to purchase their own land and escape direct planter
control for the first time, and increased class distinctions amongst the black workers of Barbados.
“Panama money” also caused the working masses to become less quiescent, as increased cash
reserves allowed feelings of independence for the first time. As a more autonomous class of
Afro-Barbadians emerged in the early twentieth century, it increased the class-consciousness of
all black Barbadians.50
At the same time, encounters with U.S. racism in the Canal Zone caused greater racial
awareness for Barbadian migrants. The U.S. classified canal workers through designations of
“Gold” and “Silver” rolls, a thinly-veiled system of racial segregation that accorded higher
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wages to gold employees as well as access to better toilet facilities, clinics, and other amenities.51
Black West Indians were typically assigned as silver employees, and the affects of lower wages,
poorer working conditions, and mistreatment at the hands of white overseers led black workers
in the Canal Zone to organize a series of strikes and protests beginning in 1915. Through
common experiences with racial discrimination in the Canal Zone, many Barbadians came to see
themselves as having something in common with the other African-descended workers in
Panama and even around the world.52 The experience of World War I and pan-African critiques
of racism would only further contribute to the transformation of social relations in Barbados.
World War I and the Caribbean
When World War I began in August 1914, both black and white Caribbean subjects
clamored for a chance to fight for king and country. According to Anne Spry Rush, many “joined
the war effort, at least in part, out of a feeling of loyalty to an idealized British Empire.”53
Caribbean subjects also viewed enlisting in the war as a chance to prove their equality as Britons
and gain more rights for themselves in their home colonies.54 Initially, the prospect of arming
black colonial troops frightened British officials, as it threatened to undermine imperial
arguments about racial hierarchy. By 1915, however, the British government made the decision
to allow black colonial troops to serve in the army in Europe. Following the announcement,
thousands of West Indians flocked to recruitment offices throughout the Caribbean to join the
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war. For the most part, the War Office agreed that the members of these new West India
Regiments would be treated and paid the same as white British soldiers. West Indian troops
departed their island homes to join other troops on the Western front with the expectation that
they would fight as British people in a British war.55
Yet, the experiences of black Caribbean soldiers in the war proved disappointing to
people that had been raised to believe in their innate Britishness. As Richard Smith has argued,
British military officials prevented black soldiers from participating in combat. Furthermore, in
order to restore the racial hierarchy implicit in imperialism, military officials portrayed black
soldiers’ lack of combat experience as proof of their immaturity and childishness.56 In addition to
facing racial discrimination at the hands of white Caribbean officers and English troops, most
black West Indians had to perform the most humiliating and menial work in the British army,
such as scrubbing latrines. Unequal pay, unfair treatment, and lack of promotions caused serious
disillusionment amongst the once-eager recruits. For instance, in August 1918, Barbadian troops
stationed in Egypt signed a petition claiming that they were being treated differently than other
British regiments. Complaining that they were not allotted a recent pay increase granted to other
soldiers, they wrote that they “had all along imagined ourselves to be Imperial troops… We are
yet to know whether we are Imperial troops or Colonials; as a matter of fact the War Office has
referred to us as ‘natives.’”57 For men raised to believe that they were British, this treatment was
humiliating. West Indian soldiers petitioned the War Office repeatedly that they were victims of
color discrimination and demanded pay equal to that of other British soldiers.
Following the armistice, this resentment came to a head when all of the British West
India Regiments met to prepare for demobilization in Taranto, Italy. There, they were assigned to
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labor details such as unloading ships and other tasks normally reserved for nonmilitary workers.
The continuation of discriminatory treatment caused widespread resentment amongst the troops.
This culminated on December 6, when the men of the 9th Battalion mutinied against their officers.
At the same time, 180 West Indian sergeants joined together to petition the Secretary of State for
the Colonies, writing that the conditions they had observed in France and Italy had not fostered
“the most cordial feelings for the Empire in West Indians” and complained that, even though
they were “British,” they were not allowed to advance in rank beyond sergeant. According to the
officers, West Indians had been fighting in “a World War for Justice and Freedom” yet were not
accorded the same rights as other British soldiers.58 The Taranto revolt provided an outlet for
disillusioned soldiers to vent their frustrations.
The mutiny lasted for four days as other West Indian troops refused to work and violence
broke out between black West Indian troops and specific officers who were perceived as
discriminatory towards black troops. The revolt ended when a machine gun company and British
battalion arrived to end the disorder, disbanding the 9th British West India Regiment and
disarming the rest. Yet, even though the mutiny was short-lived, the feelings of resentment
remained amongst West Indian soldiers. Following the revolt, approximately sixty noncommissioned officers in Taranto formed an organization called the Caribbean League to discuss
issues of black rights and independence for West Indian colonies.59 At one meeting, a sergeant
reportedly was applauded for stating “that the black man should have freedom and govern
himself in the West Indies and that force must be used, and if necessary bloodshed to attain that
object.”60 The soldiers in the League vowed to encourage strikes and disorder upon their return
to the Caribbean to fight discrimination and agitate for expanded rights. As the formation of the
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Caribbean League suggests, some troops came to see themselves as being commonly West
Indian during the conflict, which fostered a new sense of nationalism. The experience of war, in
particular racial bias and unequal treatment as colonial subjects, had destabilized feelings of
Britishness amongst West Indian volunteers and fostered a sense of racial solidarity.61
Following the Taranto mutiny, the British government began to take the petitions from
West Indian soldiers more seriously. While still denying that West Indian troops were paid
differently based on their race, H.T. Allen at the Colonial Office noted that the political
implications of the dispute had become “of a sufficiently serious nature to warrant careful
consideration.” While “The West Indian negro is in general proud of his British nationality,” he
noted, allegations of racial discrimination will “arouse, and has in fact already aroused, great
resentment.”62 This emphasis on instilling a sense of Britishness amongst colonial subjects was
key to preserving British colonial power and stability in the Caribbean. Allen recommended that
the British government grant the pay increase to West Indian troops in order to stave off further
unrest, but this took months to implement.63
Restive West Indian regiments continued to pose a worrisome threat to colonial officials
as they faced the problem of demobilization. This was heightened by the fact that racial tensions
within British regiments continued after the war’s conclusion. In early 1919, for example, a
colonel in the 3rd Royal Berkshire Regiment in Dublin complained about black West Indian
soldiers that had been enlisted in white battalions. He wrote that they would “get hold of white
women” and that “The men don’t like going on guard with a lot of niggers,” and demanded that
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they be demobilized at once.64 The violent reactions of white Britons to black colonial subjects in
their midst threatened to further radicalize the beleaguered West Indian troops as they returned
home. The Colonial Office warned West Indian governors that the Caribbean League “has been
discussing negro rising” which would begin in Jamaica and spread to the other islands, and they
proposed “suddenly falling upon and murdering the whites.”65 Even as delegates met at
Versailles to grant new mandates and territories to the British Empire, the Colonial Office
worried that it was on the verge of losing its existing imperial possessions.
Pan-Africanism and demobilization
In the midst of official fears of West Indian unrest, chapters of a new pan-African
organization were being established in the Caribbean. Jamaica-born Marcus Garvey’s Universal
Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), which he established in Jamaica in 1914, expanded
and began to spread his message of racial unity and black nationalism after he arrived in Harlem
in 1916. According to Garvey and other pan-Africanists, the legacy of slavery and racism had
created a common experience of suffering for all people of African descent. The UNIA, as it
came to be known, espoused a transnational vision of black identity based in the notion that
people were not necessarily rooted within specific borders, like the United States, and in fact
shared connections and commonalities with others of African descent around the world.
Garvey’s philosophy not only espoused racial uplift and redemption, but also pledged to end
black suffering by uniting all people of African descent. Garvey’s pan-Africanism, then, not only
explained the process of black disempowerment, but also offered the promise of liberation
through the Garvey’s promise of forming a black nation in which all members would be equal.66
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Throughout 1919, the UNIA expanded its membership globally from its headquarters in
New York, spreading black nationalist ideas across the Atlantic with its weekly publication, the
Negro World. Garvey’s pan-African ideas were particularly appealing to Caribbean troops.
According to Adam Ewing, Garveyism was “a movement that resonated with people’s dreams,
hopes, and expectations—a movement that encourage them to organize against large and
intractable systems of power.”67 Like black laborers of various nationalities who collectively
experienced racial discrimination in the Panama Canal Zone, British West Indian troops had
come to realize that they shared similar experiences of segregation, humiliation, and poverty
with other people of African descent. As soldiers from Barbados, Trinidad, Jamaica, and other
colonies met through the experience of war and demobilization, commonalities of race came to
transcend divisions along colonial lines.68 Rather than pledging allegiance to Great Britain or an
individual colony, many black West Indians found a powerful new identification that
transcended the borders of their home islands as well as the bounds of the British Empire itself.
As chapters were founded throughout the West Indies, the rhetoric of the UNIA became a
powerful tool to explain black poverty and lack of opportunity for social and economic
advancement.
The spread of pan-African ideas added to British anxieties over demobilization. Officials
feared that British West Indian troops would spread their dissatisfaction upon returning home,
and incite revolts similar to the disturbances at Taranto. Naval commanders suggested
dispatching warships to the Caribbean both as a warning to potential agitators and for rapid
deployment in case of serious unrest. In January, an officer in the Royal Marine Artillery warned
that residents in British Guiana, Barbados, Trinidad, and Jamaica felt “a good deal of uneasiness
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as to what will happen when the black troops… are brought back,” and advised that the British
government send three cruisers equipped with machine guns to deal with a potentially explosive
situation.69 As soldiers returned home and began to relate their war experiences, British fears of
West Indian unrest came to fruition.
In Barbados, the return of troops and seamen from Europe indeed caused increased
tension in the colony.70 In March 1919, as Governor Charles O’Brien relayed to the Colonial
Office, returned soldiers caused “a considerable amount of local excitement,” fomenting strikes
and urging workers to organize for better conditions. In Bridgetown, “a spirit of disorder and
lawlessness was prevalent and was daily increasing,” and some had even attacked policemen
with stones.71 According to O’Brien, returned soldiers were dissatisfied about their treatment at
Taranto because they were treated as laborers, not “fighting men who had proved their value” in
the war. Police reported “a sullen feeling” among returned soldiers as well as “a section of the
coloured people,” augmented by the dissemination of newspapers like the Negro World, which
“incites hatred of the white race.”72 Editorials by former soldiers circulated in the local radical
press and spread word of the disillusionment experienced by formerly patriotic black West
Indians. One such writing reflected that West Indian troops were “indifferently treated, snubbed
and misled,” and “kept out of the actual fighting” to be used “for exploitation.” They had fought
for the Union Jack in defense of a set of values, “ideals which are at present abstract to us
because of our helplessness, ideals we one day will have enforced.”73 British claims to fairness,
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freedom, and justice, once so appealing for black West Indians, had been denied to them, but
Barbadian troops returned home determined to access those rights through other avenues.
As soldiers related their experiences to their friends, families, and fellow workers, a
feeling of cynicism spread throughout Barbados. According to the governor, agitators were
stirring up “strife and raising the racial question.”74 Demobilized veterans were joined by
workers returning from the Panama Canal Zone, who also spoke about their experiences with
racism and discrimination abroad.75 It was apparent that the ideas of pan-Africanism brought
home by troops had touched a nerve in the colony. For black Barbadians, trapped within severe
systems of economic and social controls, the promise of liberation was alluring.
Pan-Africanism was so powerful for black West Indians because it promised to redeem
blackness from the historical stigma and shame of slavery. According to “Blackie,” the
pseudonym for a Barbadian pan-Africanist commentator, the black Barbadian laborer was “in a
condition similar to that of his slave father” because “he does not reap the fruit of his labour, his
master reaps it.” He was compelled to work constantly, in an “unhealthy” environment. “His
stomach, his wife, his children and his home are neglected.” Barbados consisted of “half starved,
and half-naked Negroes working on the plantations or in other capacities with no account take of
their welfare by their masters—employers.” Because of these poor conditions, black laborers
endured derision from white elites. Yet, Blackie argued, the nonwhite Barbadian was “a good
citizen,” “not lacking in intellectual faculties,” and “patriotic.”76 That Blackie had to launch such
an extended defense of black Barbadians against the charge that they were “good for nothing”
shows that black suffering and disenfranchisement in Barbados was not just economic, but also
social and psychological. Lured by the appeal of a more just economic system and a world in
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which black lives were afforded dignity, Barbadian workers embraced the liberatory promises of
transnational ideologies in droves during the months following the armistice.
As events unfolded in Barbados, local elites responded to the postwar crisis in their own
harsh ways. The reaction of the Barbadian government to the unrest confounded colonial
officials, illustrating both the nature of Barbadian elite rule as well as the tensions that marked
British power in the colony. In response to the postwar strikes and unrest in the colony, the
House of Assembly passed a draconian law unlike any other in the West Indies. The 1919 Peace
Preservation Act empowered the Barbados government to “cause a search to be made in any part
of the Island for arms and ammunition” without a warrant or notice, seize any arms they found,
and impose onerous fines on individuals found with weapons or ammunition. It also added that
“Persons may be arrested without warrant by a Constable on suspicion of having or carrying
arms or ammunition.”77 Considering the level of control Barbadian elites maintained over the
local government, and its history of using harsh legislation to maintain social and economic
hegemony over the labor force, the act was consistent with longstanding elite strategies of rule in
the island.
The West Indies Department found the act entirely too severe and feared even worse
consequences because of it. While the Colonial Office was keen to quell disorder, it felt that the
proposed act went too far. According to H. Grattan Bushe, the Legal Advisor for the Colonial
Office who would later govern Barbados, “It provides for the search of houses and persons—
summary arrest—and the whole paraphernalia of martial law.”78 The clerk E.R. Darnley, for
instance, conceded that although “recent disorders in Barbados and the repatriation of the troops
made a fairly stringent Peace Preservation Act necessary,” the act went too far by “authorizing
77
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search before proclamation.”79 Others stressed that it was “wholly illogical” to allow the
government to “search houses and seize arms before it has been made illegal to have arms.”80
The Barbados Peace Preservation Act violated the principles of “British justice” that colonial
administrators liked to believe were available to all British subjects. Even though the Colonial
Office had dispatched warships and troops to the West Indies to violently suppress postwar
disorders, it feared that a permanent state of martial law would only exacerbate the grievances of
radicalized black workers.
The “Red Summer”
During the summer of 1919, British fears of racial unrest in the colonies came to the
metropole with the eruption of racially motivated riots in Cardiff, Liverpool, and other port cities
around Britain. The war years had destabilized class relations in Britain, and working-class
communities inspired by revolutionary socialism and the breakdown of social hierarchy caused
by war had come to adopt force to gain concessions from their employers.81 Class tensions
coincided with racial hostility, as white sailors and dockworkers found it difficult to find work
after the cessation of hostilities due to the presence of colonial workers in Britain. Thousands of
African and West Indian subjects had remained in Great Britain after the war after serving as
seamen and soldiers during the conflict. The presence of such a significant black community in
Great Britain for the first time aroused no shortage of ire within the white working-class
communities in which these migrants resided, not only because white workers competed with
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black laborers for jobs, but also for wives: a number of black workers married white British
women.82
Conflicts between white workers and colonial laborers occurred regularly in 1919, but
culminated in a series of major racial riots during the summer. In June, white residents in
Liverpool violently attacked black migrants and ransacked their homes and businesses. Similar
attacks took place in other port cities. In response to these violent reprisals, African and West
Indian subjects residing in Great Britain engaged in riots, strikes, and demonstrations throughout
the summer. The unrest, which took place over material concerns like wages and unemployment,
also became intertwined with anxieties over who could be considered “British.” As black
workers in the metropole laid claim to a British identity through war service and, subsequently,
the rights of British citizenship, white workers responded with claims that Britishness meant
whiteness.83 The riots had long-reaching consequences in Britain, as racial stratification
hardened within the labor force and discriminatory practices took root that would continue to
affect black migrants to Britain for decades to come.84 The effects of the riots also had farreaching effects outside the metropole, as news of racial unrest in Britain spread across the
Atlantic.
The events of the so-called “Red Summer” were widely reported in the Caribbean, and an
awareness of shared racial injustice spread throughout the black diasporic spaces of the British
Empire. The Colonial Office scrambled to keep reports about the riots in England from filtering
back to the West Indies. Yet, as more seamen were repatriated to the West Indies, they shared
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information about the racial violence and disorder spreading around England. Even British
administrators were stunned at the content of the riot reports. Colonial Office clerk Edward
Darnley, while claiming that “in more cases the negroes were the aggressors,” concluded that
white behavior during the riots was of “a very savage character” and warned that they should not
send too much information from the reports to the West Indies.85 Assistant Under-Secretary of
State for the Colonies, Gilbert Grindle, agreed, writing that the reports were “disappointing” and
he “had hoped we might be able to make up a good statement on the coloured riots, but the
material is not promising.”86 The behavior of white Britons towards black seamen was a
damning display of British racism, and colonial officials struggled to keep the information away
from restive colonies as the riots continued throughout the summer.
In response to the riots as well as to the spread of pan-Africanism, various branches of
the British government became involved in the effort to quell racial discontent both at home and
in the colonies. In June 1919, the Director of Intelligence for the British government, Basil
Thomson, warned of “the growing nationalistic feeling among negroes” and suggested that West
Indian governors should report about unrest and rumors about pan-African activity in their
colonies. He included a report about various black political activities around the world such as
black colonial activists in Paris, W.E.B. DuBois and the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People in the United States as well as the labor and civil rights activist
A. Philip Randolph's work with American Jews that linked together “Jewish and Negro
pogroms.”87 Thomson's “Report on Revolutionary Movements Abroad” associated panAfricanism with the spread of socialist ideas across the world, and warned of “a growing
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restlessness among the Negroes not only in the United States but secretly in the West Indies.”88
As the British government monitored pan-Africanist movements, the revolutionary tide
continued to spread.
In July 1919, disorder broke out in British Honduras in what contemporaries called a
“race riot.” The colonial government had instituted a ban against the Negro World. In response, a
black radical, Herman Hill Cain, had organized a deputation to call for a repeal of the ban, which
the governor ignored. Cain’s local radical newspaper carried articles about Garvey and news of
the race riots in Liverpool and Cardiff, as well as letters by black West Indian soldiers
complaining of their treatment in the war. Censorship of the Negro World and news of the
British race riots combined with the tensions of demobilization to produce a riot on July 22.
Black ex-servicemen, who had been excluded from a social event due to their race, marched
through the streets, vandalizing the stores of white elites and breaking windows.89 They were
soon joined by 4,000 working-class black subjects who looted white businesses. The local police
force, comprised mostly of black officers, was uncooperative and refused to stop the riot. It was
only when a British warship arrived and deployed troops to the colony that the disturbances
ceased.90 As the grievances of returned soldiers combined with a new awareness of racial
discrimination spread by the UNIA, colonial officials worried that the disorders would only
spread further.
Fears of a “race war” mounted as demobilization continued. A ship’s captain reported to
the Colonial Office that white civilians aboard his ship had been assaulted by demobilizing black
troops. Warning that a “considerable amount of unrest exists in Trinidad and Barbados,” he
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recommended that the British government station white troops in Jamaica, Trinidad, Barbados,
St. Lucia, and Belize for the next two years.91 Milner wrote that “there is no doubt that the
world-wide economic unrest has spread to those Colonies and it is unfortunately the fact that
race antagonism has been fostered by the colour disturbances in Liverpool, Cardiff and London,
by the racial troubles in the United States, and by discontent among returned soldiers and
repatriated seamen.”92 Officials worried that, like in the case of British Honduras, black police
officers would renounce their loyalty to the Crown in the case of what officials termed a “race
war.” According to Grindle, it was “too risky to rely entirely on black police to deal with a racial
riot.”93 Another clerk, J.V. Fiddes, agreed, and like others tried to impress on the Secretary of the
Admiralty the need for a stronger naval presence in the Western Hemisphere. According to
Fiddes, “In view of existing conditions and the excitable nature of the negro population it is
therefore essential that a reserve of white force should, as a precautionary measure be available
for some time to come within easy reach of any possible seat of disorder.”94 It seemed the
Colonial Office had concluded that the appeal of pan-Africanism was such that black subjects
would now stick together regardless of class or imperial loyalties.
Even conservative Barbados was not immune from the threat of revolution. As riots
broke out in British Honduras, Governor O’Brien sent the Colonial Office a flurry of anxious
despatches. According to the governor, the return of restive black troops was causing Barbados
to experience an “undercurrent of unrest similar to the whole world.”95 O’Brien warned that
drought and the high cost of living could lead to worse unrest, and predicted that the next six
months would be a time of anxiety. In fact, he had received a “violent anonymous letter” from
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men in four parishes stating that “the jails will be insufficient to hold the people who are in
want.”96 Local forces, he feared, were “inadequate to deal with trouble. Local strikes and
discontent existent ... Strongly recommend presence of ships of war Barbados during whole
period of ‘demobilization.’”97
As unrest continued to affect Barbados during the summer of 1919, colonial officials
urged Barbadian elites to adopt reform measures to pacify restless laborers and prevent unrest.
The Colonial Office sent numerous dispatches to Governor O’Brien, asking him to pressure
Barbadian employers to mollify angry laborers by raising wages and reducing unemployment.
Privately, Colonial Office clerks attributed the problems in Barbados to planter greed. As one
official noted, “Cheap labour has been the bane of the W.I. planter” and they would need to
modernize and start paying higher wages immediately, or see the unrest continue.98 Yet, the
Colonial Office did not have the power to force Barbadian planters to increase wages, so
Governor O’Brien was tasked with persuading white elites to lower the unemployment rate in the
island to stave off future disorder. This he dutifully attempted in July 1919. The content of the
meeting reveals the frustration experienced by British governors in general in attempting to relay
imperial advice and directives to Barbadian elites.
During the meeting, O’Brien warned planter and merchant elites that a “crisis” was
inevitable, due to a “very great change that has come over the world with the present war.”
Returned soldiers added to the discontent, as veterans vented their frustrations “regarding their
treatment at Taranto and feeling that they are not appreciated by the colony,” as well as
resentment about the treatment of black subjects in Liverpool and Cardiff. In particular, he
warned that the Caribbean League meant “to stir up the coloured man against the White in one of
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the West Indian Colonies,” and he feared that “some of our people have been in close contact
with it.” The unrest, O’Brien stressed, arose from the “belief among the working class that they
have not been allowed to share the return of good times in the ratio of labour in other places.”
The governor warned that he had already received threatening letters claiming that the working
classes were going to seize what they wanted. Even historic Barbadian attachments to the
monarchy were beginning to fray, he claimed, as during rehearsals for peace celebrations
someone had said “To ----- with the King I am done with him.”99
In order to prevent major disturbances, O’Brien stressed that employers would need to
grant “concessions” to their workers. “Labour through the World is demanding and obtaining a
larger share of the profits in all industry and neither you nor I can stop it whatever our feelings or
prejudices.” He encouraged them to “employ every employable man, woman and child,” assist in
planting food, and think about how to keep their laborers as busy as possible.”100 However,
Barbadian planters ignored O’Brien’s advice. Confident in their hegemony over Barbadian labor,
white Barbadian elites continued to pay their workers starvation wages even as strikes and riots
broke out in neighboring islands. O’Brien, like scores of British governors before him, was
helpless to override the decision of the planters.
Focus on social conditions
The postwar unrest in Barbados and the wider Caribbean demonstrates how pan-African
ideas and the spread of UNIA branches intersected with widespread economic misery in the
West Indies. British administrators realized that force alone would not be enough to quell the
dissatisfaction of Caribbean subjects with British rule. When Barbadian planters ignored imperial
advice about how to pacify poor workers, British officials worried that anti-colonial sentiments

99

TNA, CO 318/349/53, Charles O’Brien address to Barbadian planters, July 30, 1919.
Ibid.

100

	
  

52

would become more widespread. Although most radical criticism in Barbados was directed at
local elite rule, some Barbadians began to blame the British Empire for the social and economic
problems in the island. One editorial declared that “British policy in the West Indies has failed to
develop these colonies to the standards obtaining politically, socially and industrially in the self
governing dominions.”101 The claims of British neglect made by Barbadian and other West
Indian radicals led colonial officials to conclude that these issues had to be addressed to prevent
further disorder. In an attempt to get to the roots and quell discontent in the Caribbean, the
British government began to focus on social conditions in the West Indies.
The Colonial Office circulated a request for information about the state of housing, wages,
education, and living conditions in the Caribbean. The Barbados report, submitted by John
Bovell, the Director of Agriculture for Barbados, was a damning indictment of the colony’s
unequal power structure. It revealed a society of poor, exploited laborers ridden with disease,
starvation, and poverty. Bovell described the system of disempowerment in the colony, in which
planters cut pay when laborers did extra work to earn more money. This meant that laborers had
a tendency to “work as seldom as possible, and to perform their work as badly as possible.” In
addition to these reasons, he said that widespread disease, particularly hookworm, prevented
many laborers from doing their work. He wrote that the poor classes were “in a state of semistarvation due to the want of sufficient food” and that desperate peasants stole food and livestock
prevalently.102 Even though Bovell sympathized with the planter class and agreed with
contemporary assumptions of the inherent indolence of the black West Indian laborer, his report
was unable to hide the wretched conditions that so many Barbadians suffered.
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When the report reached the Colonial Office, despite his differences with the planters,
O’Brien wrote a hot rebuttal to defend Barbadian elites, arguing that as a whole, they “treat their
labourers with fairness.” O’Brien also launched into a defense of the unsanitary and overcrowded
conditions that laborers faced. Overcrowded homes, he wrote, were justified because in
Barbados, people stayed outside all day and only used their homes for sleeping. He argued as
well that residents did not require as much clothing as in other places and that they only worked
in old clothes. Regarding wages, he noted that, while laborers could probably use better wages,
the “Barbadian coloured labourer is patient and apathetic, and one drawback is that an increase in
wages in many cases leads to shorter periods of labour, the labourer preferring his ease and a
bare sufficiency to a fuller life of labour.”103 O'Brien's unsympathetic and racist portrayal of
labor relations in the colony shows how, despite his problems with the planters, he continued to
uphold their interests.
In contrast to O’Brien, other British administrators in Barbados expressed dismay at the
conclusions of the report. The Colonial Secretary, Francis Jenkins, sent a private note to the
governor relaying his concerns about the high food prices in the colony. Jenkins wrote, “I am
forced into the view which is a most unpopular one to give expression to here. Viz.- The view
that the worker in Barbados is not getting an adequate wage.” He noted that food prices had gone
up 100 percent and clothing 300-400 percent, but wages were not keeping pace. If things
continued as they were, Jenkins warned, “it seems to me that trouble must come.” Jenkins came
to believe that, in this new era of anti-colonial nationalism and worker unrest, such conditions
were not sustainable if the British Empire wished to endure. Furthermore, he took the
opportunity to complain about the problems with local rule and planter obstinacy. Despite the
representative government in Barbados, he lamented, “no member of the House of Assembly can
103
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be found to champion the cause of a large section of the population. It is not fair or right that the
Governor should have to take up such a case and, if the House was really representative he
would not have to do so.”104 The constitutional structure of Barbados meant that the only
advocate for the working masses was a British governor who harbored derision for black laborers
and had no power to enforce imperial policy.
However, the former Colonial Secretary, T.E. Fell, warned Jenkins “never to give
utterance to such views as these in public.” If he did so, it would “be stirring up trouble, setting
class against class and being told to ‘remember Pope Hennessy.’” This admonishment was a
powerful one for Barbadians. John Pope Hennessy, the reformist governor of Barbados during
the Confederation Riots, was used to remind administrators of the dangers of change.105 Indeed,
Jenkins was very keen to keep his ideas private, demonstrating the Barbadian government’s fear
of the populace seizing any perceived sympathy by a government official as tacit approval of
reform. Jenkins’s utterances to the governor would have been considered inflammatory if shared
publicly. O’Brien, too, complained of his position in private correspondence with the Colonial
Office. While he wanted to prevent unrest, he believed that he was in a quandary, since he had
been repeatedly warned that if a governor were to address the labor question publicly, it would
result in “the uneducated coloured people taking the view that it is a license for them to break out
and take all they want.”106 In many ways, then, British power was limited in Barbados. British
colonial officials on the ground had to strike a very fine balance between appeasing obstinate
white elites and managing an impoverished, desperate population seemingly on the verge of
revolt. The tensions caused by negotiating between these competing groups would only increase
as postwar unrest continued.
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Fears of “race war” from the Colonial Office
Fears of West Indian racial disturbances continued throughout the autumn of 1919. When
Colonel Unsworth of the Salvation Army visited the Colonial Office to report on his recent trip
to the West Indies, he warned British officials that he was “pessimistic” about the situation there
because the “feeling of black against white is growing more intense all the time.” Unsworth
attributed the causes to low wages, since laborers made about a quarter in their home colonies
what they could make in locations like Cuba.107 Grindle agreed that the threat of trouble was real
and that there was no “special remedy for it.” The Colonial Office could try to prevent disorder,
improve conditions, and “be careful over questions of race, but nothing we can do will alter the
fact that the black man has begun to think and feel himself as good as the white.”108 Assertions
of equality, inspired by pan-African ideology after the war, posed a serious threat to the
hierarchical structure of colonialism.
In particular, the West Indies Department grew concerned with the lively public
discourse and printed materials that were spreading pan-African ideology and anti-colonial
sentiments throughout the West Indies during the course of mobilization. Some West Indian
governments had already passed laws to restrict the freedom of the press. For instance, British
Honduras had long enforced legislation to suppress the Negro World, though copies of the
publication were still smuggled into the colony.109 Colonial officials encouraged a more
comprehensive move to prohibit incendiary literature in the Caribbean, warning that problems
with “mischievous publications” would continue spreading throughout the West Indies.110 In
early September, Lord Milner wrote to the West Indian governors that due to unrest amongst
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“the coloured population of the West Indies,” he approved “the exercise of stricter control over
the press by means of legislation giving power to suppress any publications of a character either
seditious or calculated to incite to crime.”111 Even though the British government boasted of a
liberal vision for its empire, the deployment of British warships in the Caribbean and restriction
of free speech pointed to the repressive nature of colonialism.
When the Colonial Office urged the Barbados government to censor the Negro World, the
House of Assembly refused to consider such legislation. Dispatches from Governor O’Brien
shed light on elite’s logic in this circumstance. In September, O'Brien informed the Colonial
Office that the law against seditious publications “would have no chance of acceptance in the
House of Assembly.”112 He conceded that “unrest exists among the coloured population of
Barbados” and “the returned soldiers of the B.W.I. Regiment and the repatriated coloured
seamen form generally speaking a discontented element.” Yet, despite the unrest, local elites
were confident that British cultural hegemony remained strong in Barbados. Written petitions
and complaints he received began by stating the services they offered to “King and Country” of
which “they appear to have an altogether exaggerated idea.” As the governor explained, “This
confirms my belief that the general atmosphere of Barbados is not favorable to revolt. The better
class coloured man is too deeply religious and loyal to the Crown to favour concerted measures
against authority.”113 Both the governor and Barbadian elites were confident that the appeal of
Britishness would always be more powerful than an organization like the UNIA. Ironically, then,
repressive Barbados was one of the few West Indian colonies in which the Negro World was
freely circulated.
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In Barbados, unlike other British West Indian colonies, grassroots political activity was
slow to develop. Activists in British Guiana, Trinidad, and Jamaica had begun forming reform
organizations in the late-nineteenth century, which ranged from moderate middle-class
associations to labor unions. The Trinidad Workingman’s Association (TWA), for example, was
founded in 1897, followed soon by other labor and pan-African organizations. Political
organizations in these colonies often focused on the problems with Crown Colony government,
critiques that increased after the war as West Indian people made increasing demands for selfgovernment.114 Barbados, by contrast, had a representative government, though it remained
under the control of the planter and merchant oligarchy. While some moderate franchise reforms
were passed in the nineteenth century, the system of economic and political domination in
Barbados stymied the development of organized, grassroots political activity amongst
disenfranchised Barbadians. Nevertheless, the experience of black Barbadian soldiers in the war
had politicized returning troops as well as urban workers exposed to pan-African discourse. As a
result, a number of small radical presses proliferated in Barbados in the years following the war,
which spread the messages of Garvey and news of his followers to the literate working
populations of the island.115
Barbadian radical papers reprinted news about UNIA branches around the world, and
other West Indian Garveyites wrote to relay their activities. A St. Vincentian organizer, for
example, reported that although the government had blocked circulation of the Negro World, the
almost 500 local UNIA members there were continuing to fight against those who would “stop
the progress of us, poor and innocent Negroes.” Despite the efforts of governments everywhere,
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“the right of the Negroes will overcome the might of the whites.”116 When British Guiana
instituted a ban on the Negro World, the Weekly Illustrated Paper argued that Garvey’s paper
“should be read and reread,” maintaining that if reading the paper led to death, then “martyrs
should be found ready and willing to be sacrificed in this good cause.”117 Pan-African
newspapers accused the British government of trying to sabotage and undermine Garveyism
worldwide, decrying British censorship of the Negro World in Africa and British assistance to
the United States government in order to undermine UNIA activities in New York.118 Knowledge
of the actions and struggles of other UNIA members gave Barbadian pan-Africanists a keen
sense that their movement was part of something bigger than one colony. A letter from “Blackie”
in the Weekly Illustrated Paper objected to press statements that the launching of the Black Star
Line, Marcus Garvey’s steamship company meant to foster trade amongst black businesses and
communities worldwide, was an important day for black Americans. Instead, he argued, the
event was also important to Barbadians as a “red letter day in the history of our race.”119
The circulation of pan-African ideas in Barbados and the wider Caribbean frightened the
Colonial Office, who expressed consternation when the Barbadian government declined to adopt
press censorship. Allowing Barbadians to openly read and circulate the Negro World, in addition
to other pan-African papers, made it much harder for the Colonial Office to regulate the
circulation of Garvey’s ideas in the wider Caribbean. Indeed, while Trinidad blocked importation
of the Negro World, sailors continued to bring copies ashore which were easily obtained in
Barbados.120 Grindle wrote that there was “rather more risk of trouble in Barbados than the local
116
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people realize. The white class there does not appreciate the altered tone of the black man, and is
over-confident.”121 Despite the growing popularity of the UNIA in Barbados, Governor O’Brien
assured the Colonial Office that the publication did not cause “actual crime” though the
“inflammatory headlines may cause some excitement” among the “uneducated readers of
criminal instincts.”122
Colonial Office warnings of Caribbean unrest came to fruition when strikes spread
throughout Trinidad in December 1919. Beginning with a dockworker’s strike, the disturbances
soon spread to the entire colony as workers in other industries joined the strikes in
demonstrations and marches through the streets. Just like in British Honduras, the British
government responded by deploying imperial troops to arrest demonstrators and put down the
unrest with force.123 After the Trinidadian government arrested nearly 100 strikers and instituted
a renewed campaign of repression, the strikes eventually unraveled. Even though the government
had succeeded in halting the disturbances, the unrest in Trinidad caused deep anxiety for the
British government as well as neighboring West Indian states.
British officials worried that, in light of the miserable wages earned by most West Indian
workers, the unrest would continue. In particular, concerned Colonial Office clerks warned that
Trinidad’s unrest could spread to Barbados, “where industrial conditions are far from
satisfactory.”124 The West India Office, a pro-planter political group in Great Britain, sent an
urgent message to the Barbadian legislature warning that disorders could erupt at any time.
Algernon Aspinall, the director of the Office, warned “Trinidad disturbances causing grave
anxiety, from private information received we consider it very desirable to anticipate similar
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trouble Barbados by increasing wages generally otherwise Government may insist if strikes
break out.”125 These trepidations about disorder spreading to Barbados and other colonies
prompted the Colonial Office to send a severe dispatch to all West Indian governors in midDecember. The document warned that wages were too low across the region and that “this is one
of the chief causes of widespread unrest. Please consider what attitude you will adopt in the
event of its becoming necessary to intervene in strikes or labour troubles.”126 Separately, Leo
Amery, the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, wrote to Governor O’Brien and urged him
to do anything possible to increase the laborers’ wages at least to pre-war levels.127
Even though his summer pleas had been ignored, O’Brien once again met with leading
planters and merchants of the colony to relay the contents of the telegram. The governor urged
Barbadian elites to take the Colonial Office’s advice immediately instead of waiting for
disturbances to break out as they had in Trinidad. Indeed, he argued, the success of labor
organization in Trinidad was partly due to “Barbadian born” migrants, so the unrest could easily
spread to Barbados. At the same time, he cautioned that the constabulary and Defence Force
were not large enough to be stationed throughout the island in the case of more serious unrest.
Rather than wait for a cataclysm, he advised them to “put the matter on a sound business footing.”
O’Brien reminded the planters that they had experienced prosperity during the war and it was not
unreasonable that laboring classes wanted some part of that.128
Despite the events in Trinidad, Barbadian elites responded negatively to his address. C.E.
Gooding, a planter, objected to the contention that Barbadian laborers were being paid less than
before the war, and in fact, he argued that they were paying laborers more than ever. Personally

125

TNA, CO 318/351, Algernon Aspinall to Edward Darnley, December 12, 1919.
TNA, CO 318/352/18, Telegram from Milner to West Indian governors, December 16, 1919.
127
BDA, GH 3/5/1, Amery to O’Brien, December 23, 1919.
128
BDA, GH 3/5/1, Address by O’Brien to Barbados employers, December 23, 1919.
126

	
  

61

he “saw no signs of discontent” amongst the laborers. G.L. Pile, another planter, agreed that
Barbadian workers were too placid to revolt, and blamed laborers for their own poverty. He
argued that plantation workers would only work four days a week when they had the opportunity
to work five or six and make more money, so “people would not work for as much money as
they could earn.”129 The merchants in attendance also maintained that they had been increasing
wages. F.O. Swan argued that the proof was that “many more ‘poor’ people travelled by train
way now than formerly and that hungry people did not spend their money in train fares.” The
planter E.W. Mahon agreed, arguing that Barbadian workers wasted what little income they had.
What “the labouring population insisted upon was their leisure” and if they increased wages then
they would “take their leisure.” According to Mahon and the other Barbadian elites, “They
would be willing to forego the balance of their possible earnings for their holiday.”130
Thus even when presented with the reality of disorder in other colonies and pleas from
the Colonial Office, Barbadian elites could not be persuaded to attend to the miserable conditions
of the island’s poor. They dispelled blame from the outmoded and inefficient economic system
in Barbados that profited only from the exploitation of the colony’s most vulnerable subjects.
Ultimately, white planters remained more concerned with maintaining a hold on their own
wealth than with ameliorating the conditions that lead to working-class discontent, and preferring
to use the resources of the state to maintain order. Furthermore, Barbadian elites refused to
accept British advice in dealing with potential unrest as a matter of principle. White elites viewed
outside interference in their affairs with deep suspicion, and remained more concerned with
keeping the British government out of local rule than the potential of class and racial unrest.
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Continued pan-African activity
As white Barbadian elites dismissed threats of unrest, Colonial Office officials grew
increasingly concerned with the revolutionary potential of West Indian laborers. The power of
transnational, pan-African thought particularly worried the British government. As Grindle wrote
to Winston Churchill, the Secretary of War, “unfortunately there are other and graver causes of
unrest.” Referring to UNIA, he decried “the movement which is taking place among all the
coloured races, and in particular of the organized effort to stir up racial feeling in the coloured
populations of the U.S. of America. It is understood that several W.I. negroes are among the
organizers of the movement in the U.S., and there is evidence that they are making efforts to
extend it to the colonies whence they came.” The political appeal of UNIA and other pan-African
groups was serving as a powerful uniting force for black West Indians, as the ideology of black
internationalism seemed to offer a more promising alternative for black advancement than blind
British loyalty. West Indian unrest, Grindle warned, had become about “their race and colour”
and “it can but be feared that their presence will make any W. Indian riot of the future far more
formidable” than in the past.131
The continued spread of UNIA branches in Barbados seemed to confirm Colonial Office
fears. The war had increased the cost of living in Barbados, and as wages remained stagnant,
UNIA membership swelled to over 1,800.132 Barbadian UNIA leaders emphasized the dignity
and value of African-descended people, and urged black islanders to unite and press for better
wages. The Barbadian police extensively reported on the meetings, which were held both in
Bridgetown as well as in outlying districts. According to detectives, many speakers tried to
foment racial tension and referred to whites in bitter terms like “bloodsucking capitalists, who try
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to get their labor for little or nothing.”133 While pressing for higher wages was important, UNIA
had wider appeal for black Barbadians than simply explaining economic suffering.
As the movement gained traction in 1920, the language of global racial unity under the
leadership of Garvey remained a continual theme. UNIA meetings around the island emphasized
the connection between Barbadians and a black nation that transcended the bounds of colony and
language. As Reverend Cragwell, a Mission minister from Shop Hill, St Thomas, declared,
Marcus Garvey “brought us a flag as a race... God gave us Africa. Our forefathers was stolen and
brought out as slaves and our good land Africa was stolen from us.” He finished by promising
them that justice and equality awaited if they would only unite, as “our destiny lies in our own
hands.”134 Again, this imagined tie between black Barbadians and people of African descent all
over the world was empowering. “He is the leader of four hundred million negroes” and “He has
given us pluck to face any white man” were common refrains at Barbadian meetings.135 Racial
pride was also central to UNIA language, as speakers declared that “the time is coming when the
whites will wish they were black. The negroes are knowing themselves.”136 More than anything,
UNIA expressed that there was no shame in being black, an empowering message for black
Barbadians who had long been told by local white elites that they were inferior, lazy, weak, and
helpless. As Barbara Bush has argued, “Garvey spoke in a language that the poor understood,
using the symbolism of Ethiopia as the source of liberation for Africans from Babylonian
repression and as the cradle of an independent and proud culture.”137
In August 1920, the Barbadian UNIA held its largest event to date at the Olympic Theatre
Hall in Bridgetown. Presided over by the Barbadian UNIA leader Israel Lovell, nearly 800
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attended the meeting held under the banner “A Race for a Continent and a Continent for a Race.”
Lovell proclaimed that it was “time that every negro should rise to a sense of his condition”
rather than letting things remain the same and accepting low wages and bad treatment.138 Other
speakers discussed “their dear old home in Africa” and urged Barbadians to unite as one people.
“People in other parts of the world have been united together, and we at Barbados can be united
also.”139 As Adam Ewing has shown for Garveyism more broadly, local followers of the
movement felt that “their often mundane and limited political efforts were joined to a vast,
expanding, and dazzling project of diasporic connectivity and international organization.” The
appeal of Garveyism was that it “connected otherwise isolated efforts within a sophisticated
network of communication.”140 The imagined diasporic ties that linked UNIA members to
movements around the globe were influential motivators for poor Barbadians, who rarely
traveled outside the confines of their village.
British officials continued to view the growth pan-African organizations with
apprehension, and were continually confounded by the reactions of white Barbadian elites to
local unrest. When responding to the widespread power of UNIA and the threat of postwar unrest
more broadly, the actions of Barbadian elites were contradictory. In some ways, local elites
seemed unconcerned with the threat of unrest, and refused to take restrictive measures like
implementing censorship laws against radical newspapers or raising wages to pacify restive
laborers. Yet, at the same time, the legislature adopted one of the strictest laws in the British
Caribbean, the Peace Preservation Act. The seemingly inconsistent actions of local white elites
in response to postwar disorder reveal a number of characteristics regarding power relations in
the island colony.
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Social controls in Barbados meant that local authorities were confident in the ultimate
“Britishness” of black workers. The Solicitor General H.W. Reece, the only member of African
descent in the Barbadian legislature, went so far as to encourage the circulation of the Negro
World in the colony. According to Reece, “it is well for the Barbadian Coloured Man to see the
disabilities of the Negro in America as he should be the better contented with his position
here.”141 Furthermore, officials understood that even if laborers dabbled in some pan-African
thought, the deep cult of imperial allegiance, which was so entrenched in “Little England,”
would be difficult to overcome. Governor O’Brien, for example, praised “the loyalty and good
behavior of the Barbadian coloured man” whose sense of religion and “wonderful personal
loyalty to the Crown all constrain him to be less the tool of the agitators.” According to the
governor, “though they may get off a lot of hot air and seditious things may be said and
disparaging remarks about the white many, frequently such meetings will end with ‘God save the
King’”142
The need to balance oaths to the king and Christian belief with radical thought presented
frustrating difficulties for UNIA leaders. At one point, O’Brien relayed merrily to the Colonial
Office that a recent meeting did not “point to a dangerous association so far as Barbados is
concerned. The opening hymn [‘From Greenland's Icy Mountains’] is delightfully appropriate to
a tropical land.” Indeed, for any meeting to be successful there it had to have hymns and prayer
and conclude with the national anthem. As O’Brien continued, implementing prayer and an
expression of loyalty to the king “discounts the work of agitators in a considerable degree.”143
Local elites understood the cultural particularities in Barbados that made it difficult for radical
movements to take hold.
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Most importantly, the economic and legal structure of the colony restricted the radical
potential of black workers. Barbadian elites maintained such tight and personal control over land
and labor in Barbados that workers faced serious deterrence when it came joining radical groups.
As UNIA gained popularity, Barbadian planters were using their considerable power to
undermine the movement. Barbadian laborers, in particular plantation workers, were prevented
from attending the meetings through strategies of employer intimidation and threats of lost
wages. Furthermore, white Barbadian elites maintained their power through the use of coercive
measures and surveillance. The Barbados government passed legislation that gave the police a 45
percent pay increase, meant to ensure the loyalty of black police officers to the local state.144
Additionally, in early 1921, the Barbados legislature renewed the 1919 Peace Preservation Act
that allowed the search of homes and individuals without warning, which caused all Barbadians
to live under the fear of arrest.145 Planters remained confident that the threat of police action,
state repression, and control over land and wages would restrict the radical potential of panAfrican thought.
Initially, the Colonial Office feared the cavalier attitude of Barbadian elites towards the
UNIA. The Colonial Office remained concerned that the Negro World and the NAACP’s Crisis
were widely read and circulated amongst educated black Barbadians, and then orated to laboring
populations at UNIA meetings.146 According to Charles Darnley, “there is always danger about
an organisation controlled, even imperfectly, by fanatically anti-white negroes in the U.S.”147
Eventually, though, Colonial Office fears of the UNIA began to decline as well as the actions of
West Indian colonial states began to take a toll on the movement. Nonetheless, Garvey’s
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movement would continue to have a marked presence in the political consciousness of many
Barbadians and continue to influence working-class organizations in the years to come.
Conclusion
By 1921, fears of an “imperial crisis” faded for colonial officials. The global
revolutionary fever of 1919 had started to wane, as official state repression combined with
grassroots fragmentation served to dilute the immediate threat of these movements. At the
official level, it appeared as if conditions had returned to a state of normalcy. The passionate
outbursts of colonial officials as they discussed the threat of labor unrest and pan-African
movements gave way to humdrum, reserved exchanges about matters of administrative policy.
The great British Empire appeared stronger than ever before, at the apex of its global power;
one-quarter of the world now lived under some form of British rule, making the empire the
largest in world history.
As the case of Barbados demonstrates, however, British power on the ground was
tenuous and uneven. White Barbadian elites retained an enormous amount of control over local
affairs, and had great leeway when it came to accepting imperial directives. British governors
had but advisory roles over the independent legislature, and Barbadian planters and merchants
preferred to administer the island in their own way, without outside interference. This might suit
the British government during times of peace, but as black Barbadians began to embrace panAfrican ideologies and question understandings of imperial loyalty, Britain’s inability to
intervene became increasingly frustrating.
The tensions of colonial administration, combined with the great chaos of the war and its
aftermath, had shaken the way that British officials could rule the empire. In particular, the
Colonial Office feared that rising U.S. influence spelled the end for British possessions in the
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Western Hemisphere. Demobilization and spreading discontent amongst West Indian troops
brought out the implications of losing Caribbean allegiance for the Colonial Office. Part of
British imperial power in the Caribbean rested on the myth that Great Britain was “better” at
caring for black subjects than the United States. Indeed, the Colonial Office often circulated
press reports of segregation, Jim Crow laws, and lynchings in the United States to further
impress upon Caribbean subjects the relative benevolence of British rule. Yet, the experience of
so many West Indians in the war had undermined British claims to racial tolerance and
acceptance. Soon after the war, Gilbert Grindle warned that if West Indians were discharged
“with a rankling sense of injustice due to their colour I fear the British connection will be
weakened just when we want the loyalty of the black man to hold out against American
aggressiveness.”148 The Caribbean, then, became a theater in which Great Britain would prove to
both the United States and the world that it was the “best” trustee of black populations. This was
important not just to secure the empire in the Western Hemisphere, but also to show colonial
subjects in Africa that the British government cared about black welfare.
Officials in the Colonial Office came to understand the tenuousness of their hold on these
far-flung possessions. Colonial subjects from Trinidad to Kenya and on to India searched for
alternatives to British rule as they re-imagined their connections to others under colonial rule and
questioned the legitimacy of European control like never before. The United States emerged
from the war as a global power, holding vast war debts for a struggling Britain. As the United
States increased its presence in the Caribbean, British holdings in this neglected and depressed
region of its empire reached new significance. It suddenly became important to secure again the
loyalty of British West Indian subjects, both to show the United States and the world that Britain
was the best caretaker of black populations, and to demonstrate that the war had not weakened
148
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the position of Britain and its empire. The struggle to regain the hearts and minds of West Indian
populations would begin with an effort to fortify and restore their bodies.
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Chapter Three
The Development Cure: New Directions in Trusteeship

Introduction
By 1921, while the threat of anti-colonial radicalism in the Caribbean seemed to have
ebbed, the nature of British colonial rule was beginning to change. The specter of revolution and
pressure from international bodies like the League of Nations signaled that European powers had
to make some effort to pacify and care for subject populations. Article 22 in the Covenant of the
League of Nations shifted the understanding of European responsibilities toward subject peoples.
According to the League, Britain and France could not simply exploit the material resources of
subject peoples, as “the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of
civilization.”1 While the concept of a “civilizing mission” had long been used to justify European
imperialism, the League made the stewardship and protection of subject populations an
international priority. The Covenant was explicitly concerned with France and Britain’s new
mandates carved out of the Ottoman Empire, but the emphasis on trusteeship would come to
influence colonial policy in other parts of the world as well.
In France, interwar colonial doctrine came to emphasize the mise en valeur, which
stressed the “improvement” of subject populations as an integral aspect of French imperialism.2
Similarly, for Great Britain, members of the League, British reformers, and colonial subjects
1
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alike increasingly pressured the British government to extend the principles of trusteeship to the
entire British Empire.3 The new emphasis on protecting native welfare became codified in Sir
Frederick Lugard’s 1922 The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa. Lugard, who sat on the
League’s Permanent Mandate Commission, emphasized that it was Britain’s responsibility to
safeguard and protect indigenous populations, even as it exploited African resources.4 The
League of Nations covenant, along with metropolitan and colonial pressures, had caused British
administrators to engage in new debates over how to justify colonial rule, and it became clear
that the British government had to take a more active role in the economic and social
development of its colonial possessions.5 The characterization of what this imperative looked
like would be in a state of flux as conflicting priorities and competing ideas on the importance of
the empire influenced shifting attitudes among colonial officials in London.
British officials had long understood the idea of “development” in terms of making
colonies economically profitable for the metropole, while “trusteeship” typically referred to
vague commitments to fostering colonial welfare as a justification for imperial rule.6 When
discussing the West Indies, for example, British officials spoke about the importance of ensuring
political stability, economic peace, and investments in infrastructure all in order to allow a more
thriving economic relationship between the region and the mother county. Yet, these priorities
existed in tension with the need to pacify subject populations to prevent disorder and answer
calls for an international vision of trusteeship. The blurred, overlapping, and contradictory
meanings of development and trusteeship would change over the course of the decade, as British
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officials struggled amongst themselves as well as with colonial subjects about how to implement
new definitions of imperial power. In their efforts to navigate the tensions between pursuing
policies that would benefit Britain yet also maintaining hegemony overseas, colonial officials
turned increasingly to expert advice and knowledge to find solutions.
Imperial power has long been both exercised and contested through processes of
knowledge gathering.7 Scholars have produced a wealth of studies about how British colonizers
used professionals like linguists and archaeologists, and methods like the census, in an attempt to
order, classify, control, and discipline native populations.8 In particular, scientific and
technological knowledge, and the idea of “improving” colonial populations, has always been
integral to the process of colonial rule.9 The destruction of the First World War, and the anticolonial unrest that followed, lead to a renewed focus on the ability of scientific knowledge both
to regenerate Europe as well as to restore imperial power in the colonies. The expansion of state
power during the war meant that, both at home and in the colonies, the government increasingly
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came to direct the course of modernization and improvement.10 Faith in the capacity of the state
to manage populations through bureaucratic control corresponded with the ethos of trusteeship
articulated by the League of Nations. According to Joseph Hodge, “With the new emphasis on
colonial trusteeship came new demands for state direction and control in such areas as health,
sanitary administration, education reform, and rural welfare.”11 During the interwar years, as
Helen Tilley has argued, surveys, reports, and the production of expert knowledge “became
prime vehicles through which colonial power was exercised.”12 Furthermore, the focus with
science and health corresponded with metropolitan concerns about how to pay for the vast
empire. Britain had emerged from World War I in enormous debt to the United States, forcing a
reappraisal of financial commitments to the empire.13 Knowledge-gathering promised to shed
light on new and inexpensive strategies of rule, and the Colonial Office increasingly worked to
amass data about living and working conditions in the overseas empire.
The focus on scientific knowledge and health also correlated with broader European
anxieties over the “fitness” of populations.14 In the early twentieth century, in particular after a
poor performance in the Boer War, British physicians and government officials concerned with
the vitality of the nation became preoccupied with dwindling birth rates, poor infant health, and
ideas of “good” motherhood.15 The demographic consequences of the First World War only
heightened fears about national deterioration, and corresponded with renewed campaigns against
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family planning during the interwar period.16 British anxieties over the perceived health or
degeneration of populations also extended to the colonies, where British officials became
concerned with the quality of colonial labor and the need for new strategies of imperial rule
following the First World War.17 Worries over controlling colonial populations increasingly
became intertwined with broader eugenic alarm over health, hygiene, and nutrition.
The 1920s thus saw increasing British efforts to coordinate scientific research that paid
attention to local circumstances in order to create new colonial knowledge and extend imperial
power. As part of these efforts, two British commissions traveled to the Caribbean to collect data
on prevailing political and social conditions as they had developed following the war. The
commissions found the political and social conditions of the West Indies to be troubling. In
particular, the poor sanitation, high incidence of epidemic disease, overcrowded housing, and
dismal infant mortality rates that plagued most Caribbean colonies exposed the very human
consequences of British neglect in the region. During the 1920s, health became one of the major
avenues through which the British government attempted to merge its twin concerns with
economic expansion and colonial stewardship.
Modernizing health conditions in overseas territories promised both to fortify the bodies
and productivity of laboring populations while also tempering the misery of desperate colonial
subjects prone to a new era of anticolonial unrest. In Barbados, improving social conditions
became urgent in the midst of unprecedented political activity amongst the island’s black
working classes. As during the immediate postwar period, UNIA chapters continued to attract
large followings and spread the message of pan-African liberation. At the same time, working16
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class black Barbadians were also flocking to a new pro-labor movement. The socialist physician,
Charles Duncan O’Neal, instituted a political party in the island and a worker’s organization,
both aimed at securing higher wages, education, and social welfare benefits for the island’s poor
residents. With the continued possibility of unrest in Barbados, British officials worked to find a
way to undercut the appeal of radical political movements and re-establish stability in the island.
Despite the promise of new strategies of rule uncovered by colonial knowledge,
information about conditions in the West Indies also posed a problem for imperial officials. As
Lenore Manderson has established, official inquires and reports about health and nutrition also
had the effect of illustrating “the scope of suffering under colonialism.”18 When the reports of the
commissions detailed the devastating health and living conditions of West Indians under British
rule during the early 1920s, it exposed the consequences of imperial neglect and economic
decline in the region and only added to the list of grievances that West Indians were articulating
against both local and imperial rule during the postwar years. In Barbados, the appalling
conditions were not new, but it was the first time that such public attention had been brought to
the severe problems with Barbadian health. As the Colonial Office acquired increasing
knowledge about the miserable state of Caribbean health, and this knowledge subsequently
became available to colonial subjects, officials in London would come to understand the
importance of relieving these conditions in order to defer attention from the problems of empire.
However, debates over how to proceed would reveal fractures within the Colonial Office and the
imperial government itself, as experts and Members of Parliament battled with permanent CO
staff over the best way to manage the health and bodies of its West Indian colonial subjects
following the war.
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The problems with Barbadian health had attracted growing local and imperial concern
since the beginning of the century, from both local physicians and metropolitan reformers. When
it came to health and welfare, it was the working classes of Barbados that suffered the most
deeply. The perspective and experiences of West Indian laborers are notoriously difficult to
recover, as both British and Caribbean archives privilege the voices of British administrators and
Barbadian elites, experts, and journalists. Yet, important details about the experiences of
working-class Barbadians can be gleaned from health reports and testimonials. Antoinette Burton
and Tony Ballantyne have argued that even though women and other “silenced” groups of people
are often absent from imperial archives, discussions of their bodies is not. Thus, they argue, the
body is a “contact zone” in imperial history, allowing a lens into “the material effects of
geopolitical systems in everyday spaces...the plantation, the theater, the home, the street, the
school, the club, and the marketplace are now visible as spaces where people can be seen to have
experienced modes of imperial and colonial power.”19 In Barbados, the experiences of poor
Barbadians have largely been lost, but discussions of their bodies have not. The life of a
Barbadian worker, as revealed in discussions of their bodies in colonial archives, was one of
rampant malnutrition, poverty, desperation, chronic disease, and hard labor. With the highest
infant mortality rate in the Caribbean, “Little England” was hardly a satisfactory model for
British trusteeship. The history of these efforts illuminates not only the dismal health conditions
of the island colony, but also the problems that the imperial government would face as it
grappled with developing the Barbadian public health administration in the 1920s.
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History of Barbadian health
Health, like most issues in Barbados, was deeply intertwined with the peculiarities of
local rule. As discussed in the previous chapter, Barbadian planters had enormous—if not
complete—control over the legislature in the island. In addition to the central government, the
island’s administration was controlled at the parochial level through the vestry system. Based on
an old English form of local administration, the island was divided into eleven parishes run by
twelve vestries. The vestries were a decentralized system of government based on the Anglican
church that collected taxes on land, buildings, livestock, and other property. The church then
used these funds to pay church officials and provide for sanitation, road maintenance, and
almshouses that catered to the poorest Barbadians. According to Bonham Richardson, the vestry
system “was a formidable weapon in the planters’ arsenal directed toward the domination of a
large and dependent black labor force.” 20 Vestry members were elected with the same voting
restrictions as the House of Assembly, which meant that most vestry officials were members of
the local elite. Because vestry funds came primarily from taxes on land, planters and merchants
remained invested in keeping expenditure as low as possible. Even though vestry members were
supposed to provide sanitation and care for the poor, their goal was really to reign in and reduce
expenditure. This meant that spending on public health and welfare was always miserly.
A number of epidemics during the first decade of the twentieth century demonstrated the
need for reform of the public health and sanitary structure of the island. In 1902, a smallpox
epidemic broke out in St. James parish. When physicians notified the first cases to the vestry, the
vestry’s health organization, the St. James Board of Health, met with the Colonial Secretary to
discuss how to proceed. The parish desperately needed hospitals to quarantine and treat the ill,
but the central government and the vestry quarreled over who had to pay for them. These delays
20
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meant that the epidemic continued unabated for nearly a month, until several schools were
finally transformed into hospitals. However, the hospitals could hold less than half of the
infected residents of the parish, and it took nearly two months to acquire vaccines for the
disease.21 The epidemic eventually spread to all parishes of the island, infecting 1,466 people
until it abated in April 1903. In his report about the epidemic, John Hutson, a white Barbadian
doctor and the Poor Law Inspector, concluded that at the beginning of the outbreak, there existed
“no organisation sufficiently complete to deal with the epidemic, and a working system had to be
gradually organized as the epidemic went on.” He continued, “The experience gained has been
valuable for future epidemics of smallpox or other infectious diseases, but in the next generation
this experience will be forgotten, if it is not put into concrete from in the shape of an improved
sanitary organisation.”22
In 1907, a severe yellow fever epidemic struck much of the British West Indies. As a
result, two years later, the Colonial Office sent Rupert Boyce, a pathologist from Liverpool, to
investigate medical and sanitary conditions in the area. Boyce visited several British Caribbean
colonies and compared how they weathered the epidemic, recommending measures that the local
governments could undertake to improve conditions. Barbados fared badly in his estimation
compared to the other colonies, and Boyce wrote a scathing condemnation of the island’s
indifference to effective health and sanitary administration. The yellow fever epidemic had tested
the medical organization of the entire Caribbean, and Boyce concluded that colonies with an
“official medical head” fared much better than those without. Barbados, he wrote, “would never
have had such a protracted epidemic, nor would it have reached its present proportions, if it had
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possessed a medical head.” More bitingly, he went on to claim that yellow fever would not have
reached the island in the first place if the colony had an experienced, full-time officer to oversee
health administration. “In my opinion, it seems incredible that a colony which prides itself in
having numerous law officers of experience, yet blinds its eyes to the necessity of a medical head,
seeing what is being accomplished to-day in Trinidad, Demerara and the Windward Islands, and
seeing the loss of trade which the island has suffered during the past two years.”23
In addition, Boyce expressed disbelief to the lack of any sort of report on the nature or
number of diseases in the colony as well as causes of mortality. “This condition of lack of
medical organisation is, in my experience, unparalleled in any other British Colony, and is all the
more remarkable considering the energy of the Barbadians and the fact that the health conditions
of Barbados are naturally so favourable that one of the obvious lines of development for the
colony is to attract the visitors who are now seeking the West Indies in increasing numbers every
year.” He also added that the development of the trade and tourism of the colony were contingent
upon having a medical head that published reports to reassure Britain but also the United States
along with any other country that sent visitors to the island.24 Boyce’s visit was part of imperial
efforts more broadly to improve colonial health in order to promote stability, economic activity,
and profitability in the empire, such as the establishment of institutes of tropical medicine and
agriculture in the late-nineteenth century.25 Both the Colonial Office and British merchants
worked to improve health conditions in the colonies because, as Boyce himself wrote in the
report, the study of tropical medicine brought “immense gain to humanity and commerce”.
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Advances in curbing mosquito-borne illnesses in particular lead not only to declining death rates
but also “health security, economy, and the progress of commerce.”26
The yellow fever epidemic and Boyce’s report finally pushed the Barbadian government
to do something to address public health administration. In 1913, the new position of Public
Health Inspector was created. The job of the Inspector was to gather information about health
and sanitary conditions throughout the island and prepare an annual report that would be
submitted to both the Barbadian government and the Colonial Office. However, as a 1921 report
would later reflect, the legislature was “terrified” by the possibilities of this initiative. Planter
power over taxation depended on control over the decentralized vestry system, and allowing a
central officer to direct policy could supersede elite hegemony over local affairs. The House of
Assembly enacted new legislation to restrict the power of the office. The Public Health Inspector
only had the power to write reports, which were rarely read by either the central government
officials or the vestries.27
Dr. John Hutson held this position from its inception until 1925. Hutson, a white
Barbadian doctor, worked tirelessly to draw attention to the many deficiencies of Barbadian
health and sanitation. Hutson often pointed out that it took a major epidemic before local
authorities would agree to reform the sanitary administration or health policies of the island. The
sanitary organization, he wrote during the war, was “crude, not up-to-date, and lacking in
thoroughness.” However, only “an epidemic of quarantinable disease has been necessary to wake
them up to defects of organisation and practice, and according to the usual working of the human
mind many lessons learned though toil and suffering are almost, if not wholly forgotten.”28
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Hutson’s reports from 1913-1925 painted a portrait of incredible administrative
dysfunction and widespread disease throughout the island. The first problem that he targeted was
the issue of sanitation and disposal of waste. In the country districts, the most common manner
of disposing of excreta was by “going out,” which meant dumping them in the nearest cane field
or gully. More than half of the homes of the laboring classes lacked any sort of sanitary facilities,
and the process of “going out” was “almost universal” in rural villages and plantation tenantries.
This made controlling the spread of typhoid, dysentery, and hookworm incredibly difficult.29
Urban districts fared no better. In Bridgetown, no water carriage system existed for sewage
disposal and sanitary authorities made no effort to remove excrement. The usual method of
sewage disposal in the city was that families had a privy of some sort with a cesspool dug into
the earth. According to Hutson’s 1923 report, the sides of these pits were “saturated with the
sewage of generations, and often offensive.” Every resident had to dispose of the family sewage
at their own expense, and the waste was removed from the cesspits in open buckets and carried
to the sea. Alternately, urban residents might use a “pail closet” in which a pail of some sort
would be used by the family and then dumped into the sea or nearest ditch. Hutson claimed that
the poorest residents lacked any privy or closet at all, using instead some sort of tin in the yard.30
With these conditions, it was no wonder that preventable disease became endemic.
Beginning in 1913, Hutson started urging the island’s authorities to act when it came to
disposing of sewage. In his first report as Public Health Inspector, he wrote that the city
desperately needed an organized system as the “present haphazard system is dangerous,
unscientific, and not in accordance with modern standards.” In addition, he noted, the
government needed to act if they wanted to call the island “a health resort and a centre for
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tourists.”31 In June 1914, the General Board of Health recommended that all homes should have
some sort of water closet, privy, or pit for the disposal of excrement. Yet, the parishes did little to
enforce such a measure. In St. Michael, the most populous parish on the island, 51.3 percent of
homes “were without sanitary conveniences,” but the vestry’s Commissioners of Health did not
think it was necessary to adopt the bye-laws.32 The refusal of St. Michael health commissioners
to adopt Board of Health initiatives points to one of the major frustrations of John Hutson and
other medical experts had with health administration in the island—it was completely up to
individual vestries whether sanitary reforms would be adopted.
In addition to the ineffective disposal of waste, overcrowded housing made it impossible
to prevent the spread of infectious disease. The spread of typhoid through human contact was a
particular problem in the colony, and struck the poor much more than it affected the rich or
middle classes. Since it was spread by insanitary conditions in Barbados and not by water, the
poorest Barbadians were most susceptible to the disease. As John Hutson noted in 1916, “The
cases chiefly occur amongst the lowest class of the population, living in small crowded houses,
without any proper provision for the disposal of excreta, while their habits and mode of life
readily favour the spread of any infectious disease.”33One parochial officer, for instance,
reported “that he found three children sleeping under a bed used by a typhoid patient and that the
excrement from the patient dripped through the bed clothing upon the bodies of those lying
below.”34 Not only did children often sleep under the bedsteads of ill family members in these
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homes, but the mother of the family would care for a sick child or husband while also preparing
food for the family with infected hands.35
Typhoid was a preventable illness, and Hutson worked to bring regulations to control the
disease before the legislature. Yet, the proposals would sit before the legislature for years
without recognition.36 In the parish of St. Michael, where overcrowding was most endemic and
typhoid spread rapidly, the parish delayed implementing prevention measures. One reason for
this indifference was that members of the middle and upper classes who decided policy were
unaffected by typhoid. Hutson noted that the disease was “relatively infrequent in the case of
persons in comfortable circumstances,” as individuals with access to medical care and advice on
sanitation were better able to prevent the spread of the illness.37 Furthermore, as with most
efforts to improve sanitation and prevent illness, elites who controlled the vestry did not want to
spend money on disease control, which would raise their property taxes.38 Health was just one of
the many forms that inequality took in Barbados, and one that revealed itself visibly on poor
Barbadian bodies.
Poor conditions in Barbados coincided with new attention to international cooperation in
managing health amongst poor populations. As part of increasing U.S. involvement in
humanitarian and public health efforts overseas, the Rockefeller Foundation’s International
Health Commission began working to treat hookworm in Central America and the Caribbean
since 1914. The Commission began in places like British Guiana, Trinidad, Nicaragua, and
Panama, each “a laboratory for discovering and testing the elements of a global health system for
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the twentieth century.”39 When working in the British Caribbean, physicians within the
Rockefeller Foundation had to secure the permission of the Colonial Office. While British
officials were happy to accept free assistance for the hookworm problem that ravaged its colonial
laborers, U.S. doctors had to work in a subordinate capacity to the British medical administration
in each colony.40
From September to November 1916, the Barbados public health system came under
outside scrutiny when George Paul of the Rockefeller Foundation International Health Board
visited the island to survey hookworm incidence. Paul was scornful of both the Barbadian health
system, as well as Barbadian themselves. In a private letter, he criticized white Barbadians for
their conservatism and opposition to change. While he recognized the problems with sanitation
in the colony, he also blamed black Barbadians for their own poor health. According to Paul,
“Blacks as a rule have no sense of responsibility, dignity, or honor.”41 Paul found significant
rates of infection throughout the island, but the highest rates were in the eastern parts of the
colony. St. Andrew, St. Joseph, and St. John had infection rates as high as 65 percent due to
unsanitary disposal of excrement.42 Two years later, Dr. Howard, the head of the Rockefeller
Anti-Hookworm Campaign, visited Barbados in an attempt to address the hookworm problems
in the island. The Rockefeller Foundation offered to help free of charge if the government made
moderate sanitary improvements to help prevent recurrence. Like with other reform attempts,
though, none of the parishes agreed to cooperate because they did not want to pay for the
improvements.43
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One of the worst, and most tragic, problems that plagued Barbados was the staggering
rate of infant mortality, which, according to the new acting Public Health Inspector, L. C. Hutson,
was “probably the highest in the British Empire.”44 The number of children who perished under
the age of two was shocking. From 1916-1925, Barbados averaged 292 infant deaths per
thousand. In contrast, Trinidad averaged 142, and Great Britain 83.45 The rate during some years
was over 400 for every 1,000 births. As with typhoid, the incredible infant mortality rate in the
island affected the poorest classes most severely. As Hutson noted, economic conditions forced
many mothers to return to their house work “in from three to seven days after confinement” and
put their infants on a diet of “bush teas”. If the child survived this diet, they were then left in the
“unskilled care of a ‘guardian’ or child of tender years” once the mother went back to work,
again decreasing its chances of surviving. Tragically, most infants died from entirely preventable
diseases like fatal dysentery and other intestinal disorders. According to Hutson, “the sanitation
of the working man’s house is primitive in the extreme,” making the deterrence of such diseases
impossible. Furthermore, because treatments were expensive and most workers could not afford
to take a day off work to travel to a clinic, children were often born with inherited venereal
diseases. In 1925 alone, 406 infants died of congenital syphilis.46
Previous governors had made some attempts to address the problem. In 1911, alarmed by
medical reports that relayed the bleak statistics, the governor appointed a committee to look at
the problem of infant mortality. The committee, finding that the death rates were mostly caused
by lack of food, proposed several solutions, such as providing free milk to poor mothers and
instituting a system of parish nurses to assist families with infant care. However, as usual when it
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came to health reform, local authorities refused to pay for the materials and staff needed to
undertake such a scheme, and the governor had to give up his efforts.47 In addition to
malnutrition, the sanitary deficiencies in the colony contributed to the high number of infant
deaths. In his capacity as Public Health Inspector, John Hutson noted that infant mortality rates
in Barbados were peculiar because they changed quite dramatically from year to year, while in
other West Indian colonies the numbers remained steady over time. He “discovered that these
sudden rises were due to epidemic disease.”48 Again, though, the local government in Barbados
remained indifferent to the health problems that were plaguing the island and causing such
heartbreaking consequences.
Yet, the infant mortality rates in Barbados, in addition to the high rates of epidemic
disease, overcrowding, and unsanitary conditions, were beginning to cause alarm among imperial
officials. In the eyes of metropolitan policymakers, infant mortality rates were a key measure of
a colony’s overall health, and Barbados fared particularly badly. More broadly, anxieties over
infant health were linked to concerns over the “fitness” of populations and fears of national and
imperial decline.49 The high infant mortality rate in Barbados, then, triggered official fears not
only about the ability of Caribbean laborers to work, but also how much desperate Barbadians
would withstand in a new era of anti-colonial nationalism. These miserable conditions attracted
increasing imperial attention as social disorder spread throughout the West Indies following the
war, and when the unrest subsided, the metropolitan government focused on putting its colonial
affairs in order with a new focus on knowledge-gathering and improvement.
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Commissions on West Indian health
As part of these concerns, the Colonial Office sent two commissions to the West Indies in
the early 1920s. The Wood Commission, which visited the region for three months beginning in
December 1921, looked at the constitutional and political organization of the region. The Wood
Commission focused on politics due to growing West Indian demands for representative
government, particularly in Trinidad and Guyana.50 The Crown Colony system had come under
increasing scrutiny by pan-Africanists and labor leaders in Trinidad following the war, and the
Wood Commission promised to promote broader electoral representation in the region. In
Barbados, radical papers praised the announcement of the commission as a signal that the
Colonial Office was ready to spearhead meaningful change in the West Indies. One editorial
noted that the commission “indicates an increased breadth of vision in Colonial Office outlook,
and an awakening, however late, to the claims of the West Indies to some recognition by the
British Government.”51 Another editorial expressed hope that “the long period of parental
neglect or perfunctory discharge of responsibilities is drawing to a close”. It was a pity, the
author continued, that thousands of West Indian laborers had to “seek livelihoods under a foreign
flag when the investment of British Capital could have established in their own lands thriving
homes and an ever-present horn-of-plenty.”52 Barbadians who believed in the promises of
trusteeship were urging the British government to take a greater role in developing the region,
both politically and economically.
Since Barbados already had a form of representative government, the most active
criticisms of the Crown Colony system did not directly apply to it. Yet Barbadians were quick to
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point to the rampant inequalities within the supposedly ‘representative’ Barbadian system. A
letter to the editor of the Barbados Weekly Herald newspaper warned neighboring Crown
Colonies that they should not desire representative government if it resembled the structure in
Barbados, where “a selfish and dominant minority succeeds in controlling political transactions
in this colony.” In fact, the author argued, laborers in Crown Colony governments were given
more protection, since Barbadian elites kept wages low to prevent workers from qualifying for
the franchise. If the Wood Commission truly investigated the colony, it would find that “the
political system of this colony is a Government by the few for the few, that it is an anachronism
and an anomaly under which fair treatment for all classes seems impossible.”53 Indeed, the Wood
Commission acknowledged the problems with Barbados in its report. Noting the monopoly held
by the planter and merchant elites in the island, the Commissioners wrote, “it is in fact in the
hands of the House of Assembly that political power lies.”54 Nevertheless, the commission did
not recommend changes to the property and income requirements that restricted the system.
When the Wood Commission concluded its investigation, it argued that withdrawing
from direct imperial oversight in the region would violate principles of British trusteeship. Yet,
unlike the Barbadian perspective that focused on the obligation of Britain to invest in West
Indian economic development, the Wood commissioners took a more paternalistic and political
view of trusteeship. While they recommended some minor concessions to pacify the black and
colored middle classes and allow some additional elected members of the legislature in these
colonies, they concluded that self-government was out of the question for the Caribbean.
According to the commissioners, West Indian colonies should not be granted representative
government because the populations were too racially mixed, poor, and uneducated to govern
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themselves. The British government, they argued, had “a responsibility of which it cannot
morally divest itself” to care for such subjects.55 Following the postwar protests, the British
Empire had no intention of allowing significant black West Indian participation in the political
processes of their home colonies.
The other commission that came to the Caribbean in 1921 was sponsored by the National
Council for Combating Venereal Diseases (NCCVD). The NCCVD had heretofore served as a
domestic organization for dealing with venereal disease in Great Britain, but the focus on
colonial problems after the war prompted the Council to tour parts of the British Empire as well.
In particular, the movement of troops and seamen during the war had drawn attention to the vast
problem of venereal disease in the empire. When colonial troops were recruited for war service,
in the Caribbean and elsewhere, many were found unfit for service due to gonorrhea or syphilis.
The Colonial Office grew increasingly concerned with the “unfitness” of colonial populations,
and sent the NCCVD inspectors throughout its colonies.56
In January of 1921, the representatives Dr. Wright and Dr. Fairfield traveled to Barbados.
The Barbadian government supported the arrival of the commission, setting aside £500 to aid the
commissioners in their work on the island. According to John Hutson, during their two weeks on
the island, the doctors conducted “an energetic campaign” to raise awareness about venereal
diseases and addressed all classes of the community at advertised meetings.57 During their first
meeting, Governor O’Brien welcomed the commissioners with a speech that stressed the
importance of addressing venereal diseases in the colony. He expressed his hopes that the visit
would awaken the public’s awareness and pressure legislative action and public funds “to make
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our people present and future healthier happier and more capable of serving their God, their King
and Empire with a sound body and sound mind.”58
During their time in Barbados, Wright and Fairfield combined inspections of condition in
the parishes with meeting with a range of groups and organizations across the island. They met
with teachers, friendly and mutual aid societies, medical personnel, local health inspectors and,
more generally, with non-specific groups of men and women. The local press welcomed the
arrival of the physicians and followed the commission’s activity eagerly. As with Governor
O’Brien, the commission’s publications addressed venereal disease as a threat to “the vitality of
the nation.”59 This attention to the strength of the community was a common thread in reporting
about the commission. Publications fretted that “the virility of the manhood of the nation” was
being threatened by “loose morals.” Venereal disease, the column maintained, led to “the
diminution of the population and the sterility of the race.”60 According to another column, it was
“the value of our man-power that stand to benefit by the work of this Commission.”61 Barbadian
concerns regarding the “fitness” of the population echoed broader British fears about national
and imperial decline during the postwar years.
The findings of the NCCVD commission in Barbados were some of the most shocking in
the British West Indies. In particular, the commissioners encountered horrific conditions in the
parish almshouses, which tended to the poorest sectors of Barbadian society. In St. Peter, the
commissioners described a row of “night stools” in the exercise yard. “Tiny children were sitting
out on these and it was perfectly patent that they were left there for most of the day to look after
themselves. The pans under the stools were not emptied, and the poor mites were covered with
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septic sores from 'jiggers', in some cases without any dressing on them.” The rooms were also
severely overcrowded. One ward, which had only four beds, housed three women and fifteen
children, most of whom slept on the floor. To make matters worse, the sick and healthy were
lodged together, which did little to prevent the spread of disease.62 The commissioners were so
struck by the wretched conditions in the almshouses that they called special attention in their
initial report to the condition of the children. “This is for the most part unsatisfactory even when
judged by the normal standard of living and upbringing of the negro child; in the worst cases it is
disgraceful. It is no hardship for these little ones to wear scanty garments and to sleep on the
floor, but they should not be herded with typhoids, labour cases, foul smelling ulcers, dying
pellagrins, etc., nor is it good training for children of any colour to grow up in contact only with
the wreckage of life.” 63 The colony desperately needed not only proper orphanages, but also
separate wards for the sick and the healthy in parish almshouses.
In addition to exposing the state of poor relief in the colony, like Hutson and the
Rockefeller Foundation had done before, the NCCVD drew attention to the problems with
hookworm, typhoid, high infant mortality, and other preventable diseases. The commissioners
reserved their greatest criticism for the legislature and the vestry councils, which had refused the
help of the Rockefeller Foundation in 1918 and neglected to take any action regarding the high
infant mortality rate. The legislature’s indifference to typhoid, they wrote, was “scandalous.” As
the commission concluded, “No concerted action is being taken by the Island against this disease,
which is apparently regarded with perfect equanimity.”64 The report from Barbados was so
damning that the Colonial Office would not allow it to become public. West Indian Department
62

TNA, CO 323/880/34, Dr. A.F. Wright and Dr. L. Fairfield, Confidential Report made by the West Indies
Commission to the National Council for Combating Venereal Diseases.
63
Ibid.
64
TNA, CO 28/302/29, Confidential extract from report of West Indies Commission to National Council for
Combating Venereal Disease.

	
  

92

clerk Edward Darnley called it “an able and scathing document, and even when edited will
probably have to go out in a secret desp[atch]."65 Gilbert Grindle agreed that “The Barbados
conf[idential] report reveals a disgraceful state of affairs.”66 The situation presented a dilemma
for the office. As another clerk wrote, the report revealed “the disgusting conditions of the
Institutions under the local Vestries in Barbados” which were “too revolting to be allowed to
pass without action.” However, the Colonial Office had little leeway in the situation, as it would
“have to deal not only with the House of Assembly but also the Local Vestries, over neither of
which has the Secretary of State the slightest vestige of control.”67 The unique constitutional
position of Barbados posed a particular problem to officials contemplating reform.
In its official report, the NCCVD shed light upon some of the constitutional and cultural
particularities of Barbados that would make change difficult. The House of Assembly, the
commissioner wrote, “is probably the most solidly conservative and reactionary body in the
world.” More than anything, they noted, the legislature feared imposing an income tax and “all
public considerations are subordinated to the need of keeping within such a revenue as can be
raised by taxing the necessities of life.”68 The local press in Barbados, while not privy to the
information in the confidential report, recognized similar problems. The Herald also drew
attention to the Assembly’s heated opposition to the income tax bill, and wrote that the
legislature was pursuing a “policy of defeatism, and obstruction” to block any new legislation
from passing. The Assembly’s strategy was to show that there was no need for extra funds, and
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thus no need for an income tax. “Meanwhile the public body denied several essentials is starved
and wasted.”69
The work of the NCCVD had attracted widespread Barbadian attention not only to the
problems with public health in the colony, but also to the unwillingness of local elites to make
meaningful reforms that might utilize public funds. Political cartoons depicted Drs. Wright and
Fairfield consulting with O’Brien and warning that “our labours will be in vain unless you spend
freely from your purse”, to which O’Brien replied “I must wait on the generosity of the House of
Assembly.”70 The Herald worried that the work of the VD commission would be unsuccessful
because of these government conditions, and pointed out the classed nature of the Assembly’s
priorities. “In the first place, the people who stand to benefit most are not thought to be worth the
expenditure of public money. Secondly every penny of extra money spent on objects however
justifiable, however desirable, will be denied by the opponents of the Income Tax.” When it
came time to fund any of the commission’s initiatives, the government would likely maintain
that addressing venereal disease was a low priority since Barbados “got along in the past and
shall do so for the future.”71
The Herald’s words were prophetic. By the end of 1921, Barbadian finances were in dire
straits and the government no longer had funds to ensure even basic public services, including
the salaries of civil servants. Yet, the House of Assembly continued to refuse to institute an
income tax to support essential government services. Instead, the legislature continued to
drastically cut all public spending and instituted a severe austerity regime. According to an
exasperated Governor O’Brien, white elites would “escape taxation as far as possible by
reducing expenditure almost without regard to consequences.” Their drastic cuts to the police
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force and fire brigade, in particular, demonstrated “what lengths certain sections are prepared to
go to escape the unpleasant necessity of taxing themselves to maintain the Administration.”72
The extent to which Assembly members would go in order to prevent the creation of an income
tax and protect their own personal wealth suggests how strongly they opposed spending public
money on health services.
This willingness to forego public welfare for the sake of preventing an income tax made
the situation difficult for reformers, both in Barbados as well as from the British government. As
Hutson had observed over his tenure as Poor Law Inspector and Public Health Inspector, the
decentralized nature of the public health administration made affecting meaningful change
impossible. Following the NCCVD’s damning report about the colony, the Colonial Office
consulted W.E.F. Jackson, the new Colonial Secretary of Barbados, about how to proceed.
Jackson suggested that the CO “send as stiff a despatch as possible with the idea that the Gov
might communicate it to the Legislature—and that their consciences might be roused.”73
Jackson’s suggestion, along with the testimony of John Hutson, would eventually result in a
notorious 1923 dispatch to the Barbadian legislature that reflected the Colonial Office’s
particular vision of trusteeship during the early 1920s. It would take the efforts of a Barbadian
doctor to pressure the imperial government to make such a forceful move.
John Hutson and parliamentary pressure
The new awareness of the problems with Barbadian public health posed difficulties for
the official mind and complex culture of the Colonial Office. Throughout the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, the Colonial Office expected the colonies to support and take care of
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themselves, largely without the financial help of the metropole.74 As the CO official Kenneth
Blackburne later remembered, “power in many matters rested with Colonial Governors and
legislatures and not in London.”75 Yet, this historic structure clashed with new appeals to take
direct involvement with colonial development in the early 1920s. It would take pressure from
several sources to force the Colonial Office to take a more direct role in the internal affairs of
Barbados.
One source of pressure to improve the health of colonial populations more broadly came
from the Rockefeller Foundation’s International Health Board (IHB). During a meeting with
Colonial Office officials at the House of Commons in 1921, the director of the IHB, Dr.
Wickliffe Rose, urged the British government to found a Central Institute of Hygiene and Public
Health to manage health and hygiene for the entire empire. Controlling disease, he argued,
required centralized administration and permanent agencies to collaborate and manage epidemics
across national boundaries. Centralized control of public health had wider implications in the
minds of the IHB. As Dr. Rose stated, it was “not only for the sake of the British Colonies in the
British Empire, but for the sake of public health the world over that the Board was particularly
interested in what may be done in London.”76 The IHB emphasized to the British government
that public health problems in the colonies did not occur in isolation, but affected the entire
world. The post-World War I emphasis on internationalism and cooperation placed British
colonial policy under scrutiny, as international bodies urged the Colonial Office to take action in
the empire.
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Another major source of pressure for reform and centralization came from the local level
in Barbados. John Hutson, the long-serving Public Health Inspector of Barbados, was growing
exasperated with local reticence to change. 1921 was an especially miserable period for
Barbadian health, with the death rate rising thirty percent over the previous year. The increased
mortality was due to a typhoid epidemic, with over 3,000 reported cases.77 In May of that year,
Hutson sent an urgent memo to the government, the General Board of Health, and parish sanitary
authorities urging a number of changes to prevent the further spread of typhoid. This time, due to
the severity of the outbreak, the government listened and sanitary inspectors began visiting
infected districts twice a week and quarantining serious cases. These measures helped to slow the
spread of the epidemic by the end of the year. While Hutson was pleased that the legislature had
acted, he lamented that once again “a severe epidemic had been required to secure some advance
in sanitary control.”78 Hutson feared that the health administration of the island would return to
its typical state of inertia and dysfunction as soon as the epidemic ceased.
In January 1922, Hutson’s frustration led him to submit a detailed memo to the Colonial
Office relating the many problems with public health administration in the island. Believing that
the House of Assembly would never adopt meaningful and permanent reform, Hutson begged the
British government to step in and help to improve conditions. His main complaints focused on
the lack of coordination between the central Board of Health, an advisory body made up of local
experts, and parochial medical officers, who had primary responsibility for overseeing public
health locally. These medical officers typically refused to heed the advice and warnings of the
Board of Health, as they “resent any infringement on their powers.” Hutson gave a list of
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recommended reforms such as registering causes of death, regulating the milk supply, and
introducing measures to control venereal disease.79
The NCCVD report and Hutson’s correspondence coincided with greater parliamentary
attention to colonial development, which provided a second source of pressure on the Colonial
Office to instigate reform. In postwar parliamentary discussions about the West Indies,
discussions about development took on a different tenor because of the region’s proximity to the
United States. The U.S. had taken very aggressive measures to develop both the economy and
infrastructure of its Caribbean possessions. Cuba and Puerto Rico served as constant contrasts
with the British West Indies as a different and more proactive example of trusteeship, and British
officials came to believe that they needed to act along U.S. lines or risk losing the respect and
loyalty of West Indians as well as the regard of the rest of the world. During the summer of 1922,
pro-empire conservatives within the British government became particularly concerned with the
state of neglect of British colonial possessions in the Caribbean.
A parliamentary debate in July drew attention to British official concerns about West
Indian conditions and the growing influence of the United States in developing the region.
William Ormsby-Gore, the conservative Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, spoke
passionately about the need to develop British West Indian territories. Recently returned from
accompanying the Wood Commission’s tour of the West Indies, Ormsby-Gore stated that “the
West Indian people feel that this country has not done all it might do to help the British West
Indies economically. They look at what America is doing for Cuba and Porto [sic] Rico. They
see the energy and interest exercised by America in the development of those Colonies.” Great
Britain, he argued, must also work to develop the British Caribbean. He warned that the West
Indian colonies were increasing their trade with the United States, and warned that the British
79
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Empire was under threat in the region. Americans, he declared, had their eye on the Caribbean
and felt that Britain was not utilizing the area properly. To guard against this, it was “the duty of
this country and of this Parliament to do everything in its power to stimulate and encourage the
development of those vast tracts of the Empire.”80 Others echoed his sentiment. Percy Hurd, a
conservative MP, also pointed to “the advantages that the preferential system of the United
States is bringing to the American colonies,” and urged the British Empire to follow this
example.81 Developing the economic and trading capacity of the colonies was still at the
forefront of colonial development initiatives in the early 1920s.
However, concerns over health and welfare also became central to increasing British
attention to colonial development plans. During the same debate, Ormsby-Gore spoke
passionately about conditions in the region, stating that “there is no subject on which the West
Indies want more help, more encouragement and more push than on the question of public
health.” He recounted the high mortality rates, rampant numbers of tropical diseases, and
underpaid medical staff that he encountered during his travels.82 Here again, comparisons to the
United States caused no small amount of anxiety, referring to the Rockefeller Foundation’s
campaigns to curb hookworm in several British West Indian colonies. Conservative MP Francis
Fremantle fretted during the July debate “that we are not doing nearly as much as America is
doing for her Colonies” and that they had to “rely on America for some of the best work that is
done in our own Colonies” as the U.S.-based development projects took an increasingly
prominent role in the welfare of the region.83
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The CAMSC and clashing development models
Parliamentary concerns with developing economies and social services coincided with
the information gathered by the Wood Commission and the NCCVD. Yet, British attempts to
articulate a colonial development agenda faced a number of problems during this time period.
The British Treasury, for its part, typically balked at financing any projects in the colonies that
did not directly benefit the British economy. As a result, when it came to improving health in the
empire, the British government often resorted to “advisory” development, in which the Colonial
Office would pressure colonial states to reform public health and welfare, but not provide the
financial resources to back these efforts. By the interwar period, however, the scientific and
medical experts that became increasingly important in shaping colonial policy began to grow
dissatisfied with this approach. Experts advocated a more “active” form of colonial development,
in which the British government would aggressively finance reform schemes in the colonies to
achieve concrete change. Clashes over both the political and financial implications of these two
approaches to colonial development would create tensions between various members of the
British government.
As part of British efforts to organize colonial health services in the 1920s, an advisory
committee for colonies in Africa was extended to oversee the medical and sanitary services of all
British colonies. The resulting Colonial Advisory Medical and Sanitary Committee (CAMSC)
worked to coordinate medical services across the empire, believing that a policy of centralization
was the best method to reform health and sanitation.84 Yet the actions of the CAMSC regarding
Caribbean health in the mid-1920s would demonstrate how the struggle over implementing
development policies occurred not only between colonial elites and imperial officials, but also
between the Colonial Office and its hired experts. The professional members of the committee
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had long used their official knowledge to recommend reforms in Africa, but after only two years
of studying the West Indies, they had come to realize the serious nature of deficiencies with
sanitary and medical services in the region.85 The CAMSC began to press the Colonial Office to
take urgent action to ameliorate the poor health conditions suffered by poor West Indians.
When it came time to take official action, the Colonial Office usually sent a cautious
memo or secret dispatch to colonial governments outlining its advice. Yet, this strategy caused
serious division between CO staff and the medical experts employed by the British government.
As the CAMSC learned more and more about the miserable health conditions in the West Indies,
committee members grew increasingly frustrated with the health problems of the region and felt
that more drastic measures needed to be taken. Calling the conditions there “deplorable and
discreditable to the British Empire,” they complained of the resistance of local officials to public
health projects. Furthermore, the CAMSC expressed frustration with how West Indian
governments blocked reform efforts due to a lack of funds and shortage in medical staff. By
early 1925, the doctors and scientists on the committee began to argue that the only way to
improve the appalling conditions in the region was by allotting Imperial funds to assist the
sanitation needs of the colonies, and threatened Colonial Office staff that they would circumvent
their moderate efforts by appealing to the new Secretary of States for the Colonies, Leo Amery,
directly.86
The experts on the committee, such as the pulmonologist James Kingston Fowler, saw
colonial development more broadly as intrinsically linked to health. He considered it “useless to
talk of developing the resources of the Empire unless proper measures were taken to safeguard
the health of the native populations” and urged using British funds for development. However,
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permanent Colonial Office staff members were reticent to take such direct action and resisted
calls to use British money to fund medical efforts in the colonies. Edward Darnley, the principal
clerk of the West Indies Department, resisted any effort that threatened to “sap the independence
of Colonial Governments” and argued that the West Indian states would need to find “their own
medical and sanitary salvation.” Fowler and Darnley bickered continuously about how to act in
the Caribbean, with Fowler advocating for direct imperial assistance while Darnley remained
firm that British funds and direct intervention were “far removed from practical politics” as a
policy endeavor.87
The Colonial Office staff was hamstrung by both Treasury constraints and a culture of
stasis within the office itself. Permanent staff members agreed with the CAMSC that “serious
evils continue to exist” in the West Indies but felt that British taxpayers could not be expected to
pay for sanitary improvements in the area. They tended to believe that the Colonial Office should
pursue a strategy of persuasion and education, rather than to impose a top-down policy. As
Darnley argued, “We shall not get very far with sanitation in the West Indies as long as it is
imposed by regulation from above on an indifferent or hostile community.”88 Gilbert Grindle
summed up the attitudes of the Colonial Office by remarking that the British government should
only advise the colonial governments about what kind of reforms they needed. According to
Grindle, in the West Indies, good could only be done by “pegging away” in a place that was
“roused from time to time by special missions” only to “plunge in sleep again.” Thus he thought
that the committee should specify the problems and propose remedies.89 The Colonial Office
usually pursued this strategy of advisory development throughout the 1920s and 1930s.
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However, the warnings of the CAMSC found a sympathetic ear with Leo Amery and
William Ormsby-Gore, conservative imperialists who were resolutely in favor of financing
colonial development projects in order to broaden the economic value of the empire. OrmsbyGore, who met with the professional members of the CAMSC in response to their pleas, agreed
that the British government should persuade the Treasury to give the region an imperial grant.90
Yet, Amery was only able to finagle imperial funds for the Windward and Leeward Islands.
While Amery and Orsmby-Gore wished to pursue more aggressive measures in the Caribbean,
they faced resistance both from the Colonial Office permanent staff and the British treasury.
Colonial Office clerks took a cautious path, reluctant to interfere in the colonies, while the
Treasury typically declined to use domestic funds to pay for the problems of the far-flung empire,
especially economically stagnant colonies like the West Indies. Nevertheless, the damning
reports that continued pouring into Britain from the Caribbean as well as other parts of the
empire demonstrated problems of medical and sanitary administration that could not be ignored.
Hutson’s visit to London
The tension between CAMSC experts and permanent CO staff remained constant
throughout the early 1920s. Yet, the case of Barbados would eventually lead the two departments
to join together in pursuit of a more aggressive tactic to encourage health reform. Because of the
NCCVD commission and Hutson’s urgent memos, in 1923 the CAMSC turned its attention to
Barbados, which had done little to address the conditions exposed by the NCCVD report. The
committee was shocked by health conditions in the colony.91 The members invited Dr. Hutson to
testify at the August 1923 CAMSC meeting. Officials at the Colonial Office supported the action
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but privately worried that “the prospect of inducing Barbadians to mend their ways seems
remote.”92
During Hutson’s subsequent testimony, he reprised his longstanding indictment of the
dysfunction and disorganization that marked the public health administration in the island. As he
had been arguing for many years, Hutson attested to the ineffectiveness of the fragmented system,
and complained that he did not have any control over parochial health or sanitary inspectors.
According to Hutson, public health in Barbados intersected with elite concerns over local
hegemony.93 Barbadian elites refused to change the ancient vestry system in place in the colony,
which gave planter and merchant elites great leeway in deciding local policy. Indeed, this issue
of local control became the most apparent during his visit, and is one that would come to
dominate any imperial efforts to develop health and welfare in Barbados.
The CAMSC questioned Hutson about the familiar Barbadian problems of infant
mortality, hookworm, and typhoid. As they questioned the doctor, the power dynamics of
Barbadian politics became even more apparent. When a committee member noted the increasing
rates of typhoid in the island, Hutson conceded that most parishes had refused to carry out
improvements and warned that the House of Assembly was likely to reject any attempts at
regulation. Similarly, when the committee questioned him about the Rockefeller hookworm
campaign, he affirmed that “it was perfectly true that the majority of the parishes had refused to
carry out the Commissions [sic] recommendations.”94 The CAMSC were scandalized that there
had been no medical or sanitary advances in the colony in the last decade, but learned from
Hutson’s interview that the local government would likely refuse regulation.
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Hutson reviewed the many recommendations to centralize medical and sanitary
administration that he had been urging since 1913. The biggest problem, he relayed, was that the
local authorities who controlled the medical staff “could not be persuaded to give up their
ancient privileges.”95 The Colonial Secretary of Barbados, W.E.F. Jackson, attended the meeting
as well and added that the root of the problem was the apathy of the local government, “who did
not seem to realise that Barbados was the most unhealthy of the West Indian Colonies.”96 The
CAMSC took these warnings into consideration, and debated the best way to proceed in the face
of such legislative hurdles. The particularities of the Barbadian constitution, the policy of
colonial self-sufficiency, and the Treasury’s aversion to diverting domestic resources to the
empire restricted the nature of British intervention in the Caribbean, so the committee concluded
that a stiff dispatch from the Colonial Office might persuade the Barbadian legislature to act on
their own. They accordingly sent their concerns and recommendations to the West Indies
Department.
Devonshire’s dispatch 1923
The combination of two years of pressure from the NCCVD report, Hutson’s activism,
Parliamentary concerns, and the attention of the CAMSC finally prompted the Colonial Office to
take more direct action in Barbados. The West Indies Department agreed that the best course of
action would be to exert great pressure on the governor of the island to persuade the legislature
to institute reforms. Colonial Office clerks drafted a memo over the course of several months,
and the resulting dispatch, which the Colonial Office sent to Governor O’Brien in September
1923, was deprecating. Signed by the Duke of Devonshire, the Secretary of State for the
Colonies, the memo related the impressions of both John Hutson and the CAMSC towards the
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Barbadian health system. Referring to Hutson’s detailed testimony before the committee, the
memo called Barbados one of the least health colonies in the British Empire. Devonshire
admonished the Barbadian government for the island’s “grievous and sad” high infant mortality
rate and instances of epidemic diseases that were “the inevitable outcome of inadequate sanitary
control.” Indeed, referring to the infant mortality rate, the memo explained that it was “higher
than any which they have yet encountered in dealing with the medical reports of the Colonies
and Protectorates, and must in their opinion be put down not only to depressed economic
conditions but also to defective sanitation and to the absence of a widely-organised system of
education for mothers.”97
Calling upon the supposed Britishness of the colony, Devonshire revealed that the
committee was “surprised to learn that, in a Colony with such an ancient history of British
influence and settlement as Barbados, there should be so scanty an appreciation of the vital
importance of good sanitation to the health and welfare of the community.” According to these
metropolitan experts, it was imperative that the Barbadian government should “place the control
of sanitation in the hands of a properly qualified and organised central body with powers and
funds adequate to its purpose.” This emphasis on centralization was the crux of the memo. As
part of its increasing faith in scientific expertise and modernized medical organization, the
Colonial Office urged the Barbadian government to reduce high disease and mortality rates
through “preventative sanitary work” and centralized control.98 Additionally, by aligning medical
reform with seemingly “British” values of sanitation and hygiene, Devonshire hoped to appeal to
the “Little England” mentality of Barbadian elites.
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The memo was uncharacteristically severe for colonial correspondence. Most dispatches
to Barbados from the Colonial Office were exceedingly polite and worked very hard not to
offend Barbadian elites. In this way, the severity of the Devonshire dispatch revealed the
frustration of colonial officials with the horrible conditions in Barbados. At the same time, it
exposed the inability of the Colonial Office to take effective action even when conditions were
desperate. Devonshire had little power, or desire, to intervene directly in Barbadian affairs. The
Colonial Office had to rely on Governor O’Brien to impress the views of the Committee on the
legislature and parochial authorities, so that they understood the importance of improving public
hygiene to bring it to a comparable level as that of other British Colonies.
Pressure to reform public health administration came from local and metropolitan circles
as well as from medical experts and policymakers. John Hutson had long been pressing for
reform locally, and appealed for help from the Colonial Office after years of frustration at home.
The Rockefeller Foundation had also noted the problems with the Barbadian health
administration, as well as Rupert Boyce’s yellow fever investigation prior to the war. The
NCCVD report and Hutson’s visit to the CO coincided with the postwar emphasis on trusteeship,
which prompted the Colonial Office to send the memo. Yet, the dispatch, for all of its new
severity, still exemplified the traditional Colonial Office tactic of advisory development that
privileged colonial self-sufficiency. Despite the emphasis placed upon colonial trusteeship and
development in the years following the war, in many ways colonial policy had not changed in
practice.
When the dispatch arrived in Barbados, it became public knowledge when O’Brien
placed the memo before the legislature. However, as with all legislative activity in Barbados, it
took some time to generate any movement. When acting governor W.E.F. Jackson forwarded the
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reports of the Public Health inspector in July of the following year, the legislature had not yet
dealt with the recommendations of the dispatch.99 As time passed and the Barbados government
continued to take no action about health conditions in the colony, Colonial Office staff continued
to read medical reports about the horrible conditions in Barbados. One official noted in late 1924
that health reports were “depressing” and “the fault for the sad conditions revealed does not lie
with the local medical service but is a result of the decentralization of medical and sanitary work
and its partial control by local lay sanitary boards or councils.” Growing increasingly frustrated
with the government’s slow action, the CO once again sent an enquiry to the Barbados
government in an attempt to stimulate the legislature, but received nothing back.100
Electoral shifts and radical organization
The need for reform became more urgent as working- and middle-class black Barbadians
became more involved in grassroots political organizations and radical movements. Nascent
political movements received steady backing from the most long-lasting radical paper in
Barbados, The Barbados Weekly Herald. Established in 1919 by the black liberal journalist
Clement Inniss, the Herald initially focused on urging democratic changes in Barbados, such as
expanding the franchise and other liberal reforms. Soon, though, the paper began advocating
more leftist views with the addition of a new journalist. Clennell Wickham, a black Barbadian
who had served in the British West Indies Regiment, returned from the war embracing panAfrican and socialist ideas. As an editorialist for the Herald, Wickham was relentless in his
attacks on the local white oligarchy, and worked to expose the economic and political constraints
that sustained the entrenched class inequalities in Barbados. By the mid-1920s, the paper had
become one of the most influential weeklies amongst non-elite, politically active Barbadians, and
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helped to raise awareness and support for nascent grassroots political movements in the
colony.101
In 1924, the Barbadian-born physician Charles Duncan O’Neal spearheaded a new
populist political organization called the Democratic League. O’Neal, who had been born into a
black, middle-class family, went to Edinburgh University to study medicine. While in Scotland,
O’Neal became involved in leftist politics and joined the Independent Labour Party. Upon his
return to the Caribbean in 1910, O’Neal practiced medicine in Trinidad and worked with the
labor organizer A.A. Cipriani. He returned to Barbados permanently in 1924, and began to
advocate for the interests of Barbadian laborers. Working with Clennell Wickham to identify
other Barbadian reformers, O’Neal’s Democratic League began to register new voters and urge
them to participate in elections. The League also identified and supported potential “progressive”
candidates to run for the House of Assembly, campaigning for populist reforms like free
education and medical care. During a bye-election in 1924, the first Democratic League
candidate, Chrissie Brathwaite, won the seat for St. Michael in a sweeping victory that appeared
to signal a popular awakening in Barbadian electoral politics.102
The League benefited from the influence of “Panama money” in Barbados. Remittances
from migrants allowed many Barbadian families to purchase their own land for the first time.
Between 1897 and 1929, the number of small proprietors more than doubled as cash-strapped
planters sold off pieces of land to aspiring Barbadians eager to invest remittances from the Canal
Zone.103 Slowly, more black Barbadians became eligible for the franchise through property
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ownership, and the Democratic League worked vigorously to identify and recruit these new
voters for progressive causes.
In 1926, the new governor of Barbados, William Robertson, wrote a dispatch to London
expressing his concerns. He warned that O’Neal was “doing much harm, particularly by raising
the colour question.” Yet, Robertson sympathized with the overall aims of the Democratic
League, which he summarized as “improved wages and conditions of life for the labouring class,
proper sanitation, compulsory education and matters of that kind.” Like the Colonial Office,
Robertson recognized the danger of radicalism due to the squalid social conditions in the island.
Discussing the condition of Barbadian laborers, he observed, “it is hard to understand how
existence is maintained with wages at their present level, it is easy to see why overcrowding,
squalor and disease are so common.” According to the governor, it was “imperative that
something should be done to improve conditions of life among the working classes.” As workers
became more educated, there would come the “desire for reasonable comfort, followed by
discontent. There will then be ready material for the agitator.” It was no wonder that the
Democratic League was gaining membership. Robertson warned that, “Unless employers and
Government come to realise that conditions must be improved and reasonable demand satisfied,
adherence to this or perhaps other more revolutionary societies, may become more general, and
discontent more menacing,” he wrote to Amery.104
Robertson recognized the role that poor social conditions had on political organization in
the island, as the health problems identified by the NCCVD and CAMSC affected Barbadian
workers most prominently. Year after miserable year, poor Barbadian laborers who could not
afford health care, expensive sanitary facilities, or child care helplessly watched their children
die while wealthy Barbadian families thrived. It is thus no surprise that O’Neal, a socialist
104

	
  

TNA, CO 28/305/13, Robertson to Amery, June 21, 1926.

110

physician who expressed great sympathy to the plight of the working poor, would amass such a
following.
By 1927, O’Neal expanded his activism by founding a branch of the Workingmen’s
Association (WMA) in Barbados. The WMA was a fraternal organization for laborers, first
established in the West Indies in Trinidad during the late nineteenth century. Based on English
labor organizations like the London Workingmen’s Association, the Trinidad WMA posed
challenges to the Crown Colony system of government and advocated for improved working
conditions.105 The Barbadian association received inspiration and financial assistance from the
Trinidad WMA, which had a robust following.106 In Barbados, the WMA aimed to instill a sense
of self-help amongst workers and promote social reforms such as ending child labor and clearing
slums. During marches in Barbados, members carried signs with wording that revealed the
concerns of the working classes, such as “One meal a day for all hungry school children”,
“Better hospital treatment for the poor,” and “Take the babies from out of the fields.”107 By 1928,
the organization had 1,800 members from around the colony. The WMA spread its message
through open-air meetings, during which the leaders of the movement attacked planter and
merchant exploitation of black Barbadians and urged Barbadian workers to unite against elite
control over the island.108 The meetings were inspired by the message of Marcus Garvey, and
attracted UNIA members who blended pan-African messages with principles of labor
organization.
Speakers at the meetings decried the obvious class and racial disparities that
characterized Barbados. Black Barbadians had “no house but the almshouse and Glendairy,”
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referring to the notorious prison, while wealthy whites were “living in luxury having electric
light all through his house even in his kitchen.”109 Throughout the course of the meetings,
O’Neal and other speakers unpacked the power structure of the colony. Relating the tenets of
socialism, O’Neal explained to his followers that wealthy Barbadians owned the wealth that the
lower classes produced with their labor. He also exposed the various cultural mechanisms
employed by the wealthy to keep Barbadian laborers subservient, in particular the Anglican
Church. In one meeting, he argued “that the preachers are always telling the poor people not to
mind being poor as the Bible says that they…must not store up their treasures on earth,” but this
was only “to keep them down while the upper class ‘make this earth their heaven.’”110 Yet,
similar to the problem faced by UNIA organizers, the only way to attract Barbadian workers to
the meetings was to incorporate religious messages and teachings, and all meetings included
prayers and hymns. Barbadian radical meetings often included this unique mix of socialism, panAfricanism, and Christianity.
Despite the revolutionary potential of WMA messages, the meetings also revealed the
fact that both the organizers and workers who attended the meetings viewed themselves as firmly
ensconced within the British Empire. Similar to UNIA meetings, WMA speakers proclaimed
their loyalty to King George, and remembered how “Queen Victoria and others have freed us”
from slavery.111 Furthermore, the Barbadian WMA saw itself as an internationalist organization
in league with British laborers, expressing their rights as English workers. Speakers often
discussed the efforts of trade unions in Great Britain, and gave impassioned speeches when the
Labour Party won British elections, proclaiming that it would “come to our rescue.”112 Many
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spoke of Labour Party leader Ramsay MacDonald as working not only for British workers, but
also for laborers across the empire. This connection was a deeply personal one. Speakers
proclaimed the Labour leader’s speeches as if they had been given to the Barbados WMA
members directly, relaying how MacDonald “said we must demand fair wages, he didn’t tell us
to knock down any body building.”113
This combination of radical critique with expressions of Britishness characterized both
UNIA and WMA meetings throughout the 1920s. Activists and speakers rarely condemned the
British Empire, instead reserving their criticism for white Barbadian elites, local power structures,
and the broader system of capitalism. At this juncture, Barbadian activists did not want to escape
the British imperial system, but rather to carve out a greater sphere of rights and liberties within
it. In general, the WMA meetings show how Barbadian activists and workers utilized a
multiplicity of discourses ranging from socialism to imperial loyalty to address systemic
inequality in Barbados and claim for themselves the privileges of British imperial citizenship.
Furthermore, imagined ties to labor organizations in other islands as well as England evoked a
powerful imagined linkage between Barbadian workers and laborers the world over that
transcended the geographical isolation of the island colony.
While WMA meetings attracted large crowds, the organizers faced difficulty expanding
membership rolls due to employer intimidation. The autocratic elites who controlled the island
worked to maintain working-class powerlessness and ensure that participating in political
organizations came at a high cost. Estate managers often threatened to dismiss laborers who were
members of the association, and used other forms of coercion to preclude political activism.114
As one former WMA president later recalled, “the people were not free to join the Association,
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because, if they did so, they were victimized. Whenever we went anywhere to hold meetings,
certain persons would send representatives to see whether any of their labourers or servants were
there, and, if so, they were dismissed as once.”115 As WMA leaders worked to unite working
class Barbadians against economic and racial exploitation, the local oligarchy used its economic
and political power in the island to intimidate potential members and undercut the movement.
Yet, the appeal of race- and class-based organizations remained a powerful force in an unequal
society like Barbados.
Colonial officials continued to receive dispatches about O’Neal and the WMA, and
worried about the appeal that such an organization had for disenfranchised, poor, and sick black
workers. They were relieved, then, when the Barbadian legislature finally agreed to a local
Public Health Commission to consider the problems with Barbadian public health in 1925. The
Colonial Office hoped that the Public Health Commission could help “fix” some of the
grievances of poor Barbadians and therefore remove the incentive to join radical organizations. It
seemed that the “development cure” for colonial unrest and disorder would finally come to
fruition in the British Empire’s most unhealthy colony.
Conclusion
By the mid-1920s, as Barbadian political activists mounted increasing challenges to the
squalid conditions endured by the working classes, both metropolitan medical experts and
government officials came to believe that preventing diseases and improving the general wellbeing of colonial subjects would pacify popular discontent in the colonies. Most Barbadians did
not join radical groups, due to fear, colonial loyalty, the culture of respectability, and autocratic
white rule. Yet, the revolutionary potential of radical movements frightened colonial rulers, and
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the tactics of welfare were meant to alleviate the conditions of poor, black Barbadian workers
and cultivate peace. The British government’s pursuit of health reform in Barbados came as a
result of a series of negotiations that occurred both at the official, elite level between the British
government and its expert advisors and at the local level as creole physicians like John Hutson
used intimate knowledge of Barbadian health to lobby for change. Rather than a simple attempt
to exert power over the bodies of the colonized through medicine or make the tropics “safe” for
Europeans to live, public health policies became a way for Britain to convince both its subjects
and the wider world that colonial peoples benefitted from European trusteeship. Pressuring the
Barbados government to reform its public health administration reflected Britain’s faith in
knowledge and science to fix colonial problems.
At the same time, this articulation of trusteeship was not a significant departure from
previous understandings of British responsibility for the colonies. The Colonial Office still
expected Barbados to tend to its own affairs, and finance its own reforms. The Treasury would
not pay for development initiatives, nor did the Colonial Office wish to get involved. Despite the
horrors contained within the NCCVD reports, the British government firmly believed in colonial
self-sufficiency. Trusteeship was not about intervention, but about cultivating Britain’s
reputation as a benevolent colonial power.
The British government’s policy on trusteeship was outlined by the Devonshire
Declaration of 1923, in which the Colonial Office expressed its mission in Kenya “as the
protection and advancement of the native races” in which “the interests of the African natives
must be paramount.” In doing so, the Colonial Office aligned itself against the settler population
in Kenya. Yet, it was difficult to “make trusteeship stick” when it meant having to use force

	
  

115

against stubborn white populations in Africa.116 The tensions in native versus settler policy
would cause continual problems and headaches in the African colonies, and the same would
occur in Barbados. When the Barbadian government agreed to investigate the public health
administration in 1925, it seemed like the policy of exerting pressure and allowing colonies to
“fix” themselves would work. The Public Health Commission’s recommendations would align
satisfactorily with the British Government’s increasing faith in the use of scientific knowledge
and “modern” medicine to navigate colonial tensions. As new imperial initiatives to address the
health and sanitation of the empire emerged in the mid-1920s, however, trouble was brewing on
the ground. In Barbados, the longstanding ties between health administration and anxieties over
white creole rule would uniquely complicate efforts to convince Barbadian laborers that the
British Empire was on their side. The battle over health and welfare in Barbados was only
beginning.
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Chapter Four
Public Health and Elite Power in Barbados

Introduction
Over the course of the early 1920s, the miserable conditions exposed by public health
surveys combined with agitation on the ground led British officials to believe that reforming the
health and sanitation of Barbados would relieve the misery of Barbadian laborers, reinforce elite
control of the island, and restore Barbados as one of the most stable colonies in the British West
Indies. As nascent political movements like the Democratic League gained traction in the colony,
colonial officials hoped that Barbadian elites would adopt the “development cure” as a pacifying
effort. Despite longstanding problems with white Barbadian rule, and notwithstanding the
European-descended elites’ disregard for the interest of the colony’s laboring classes, members
of the British government were confident that Barbadian elites shared a common commitment to
preventing unrest on the island. Colonial authorities in London assumed that creole legislators
would see the value of ameliorating health conditions, and take action to prevent the disorders of
the immediate postwar years and protect peace in the island. Instead, British pressure to reform
the public health administration of Barbados would lead to sustained opposition on the part of
white Barbadian elites during the late 1920s.
For the British government, the point of public health reform was to strengthen imperial
hegemony overseas. As Lenore Manderson has argued, “there were immediate political benefits
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of public health, as they both justified the extension of control—embodied by the doctors, judges,
district officers, police and sanitary workers—over the population, and took these authoritarian
figures into people’s homes.” In an age of trusteeship, particularly, improving colonial welfare
“had the political consequence of providing the moral and intellectual basis of colonial rule.” 1
Colonial officials saw medical departments as crucial to any plan to “ameliorate social
conditions” and assure the stability of imperial power.2 According to this logic, investing in
health reform would not only allow colonial governments to extend and justify state intervention,
but also produce subjects that were peaceful and unlikely to resist imperial oversight. Thus,
efforts to develop the medical and sanitary infrastructure became central to, in the words of
David Scott, “the politico-ethical project of producing subjects and governing their conduct.”3
Nonetheless, metropolitan officials overestimated the wider appeal of state-sponsored
development initiatives as a pacifying measure.
The relative independence of Barbadian elites from direct British rule and its
geographical isolation meant that the local government’s interests and worldview remained
detached from the priorities and reasoning of the metropolitan government. The relationship
between white Barbadian elites and the British government had many similarities to imperial
dynamics with British settler colonies in Africa. Increasingly during the interwar period, in
particular once the British government made protecting “native interests” a centerpiece of its
policy under the Dual Mandate, settlers and government officials clashed over how to administer
the colonies. In Kenya, for example, white settlers and colonial officials distrusted each other’s
motives, and had conflicting views when it came to local policy. Even though the British
government and settlers “shared a racially negative view of African capabilities”, the two groups
1
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had contrasting ideas of “racial paternalism produced different solutions.”4 Similarly, in
Barbados, the British government and local elites differed in their approaches to managing black
laborers, even though both groups viewed black Barbadians in similarly contemptuous ways. The
manner in which Barbadian oligarchs and vestry members responded to public health reform
shows that understandings of health, disease, and governmentality differed dramatically between
them and imperial authorities in London.
White Barbadian elites shared other characteristics with British settlers in Africa, such as
a profuse attachment to English identity. In African settler colonies, Dane Kennedy has shown
that Europeans felt vulnerable, disjointed, and threatened in an alien land in which they were a
minority.5 As a result, settlers in Kenya and Rhodesia constructed a defensive culture that was
designed to protect their tenuous hold on white prestige and separate themselves from indigenous
Africans. According to Barbara Bush, in settler societies, “the exaggerated Englishness of
expatriate culture” pointed to a “threatened society” trying to defend itself.6 Similarly, despite
their power, the Barbadian upper classes were a mostly-white minority group living amongst a
large population of desperate and impoverished African-descended laborers. Elite white
Barbadians adopted an inflated sense of Englishness to separate themselves from the black
masses. Upper-class white Barbadian identity remained intertwined with the romantic notion that
they were free English people who had preserved an outpost of Englishness in the Caribbean.
At the same time that Barbadian whites continually reaffirmed their attachment to
Englishness, they often resisted British oversight and advice. Barbadian elites shared this
contradictory identity with other colonial whites, such as settlers in the Dominions. For instance,
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according to Alison Bashford’s analysis of white Australians, there existed simultaneously “the
nationalism of white Australians partially separating themselves from British rule, but at the
same time thoroughly identifying as Britons.”7 In Barbados, contradictory identity politics had a
long and specific purpose of defending local rule. According to Mary Chamberlain, Barbadian
whites “were both proud and protective of their identity as Barbadians,” even when declaring an
attachment to English culture 8 As David Lambert has shown for the decades leading to
emancipation, white creoles employed conflicting discourses to stake a claim for local control
and resistance to abolition. White Barbadians struggled against metropolitan abolitionists who
portrayed slaveowners as degenerate and, therefore, un-English. In response, white Barbadians
portrayed themselves as loyal Britons living in a “Little England.” On the other hand, white
Barbadians employed oppositional discourses portraying themselves as besieged colonists
suffering under British dominion.9 Similarly, in the 1920s, white Barbadians used contradictory
identity politics to oppose British health policy due to different understandings of the best way to
administer the colony.
Policies to reform health administration threatened local elites in a far more profound
way than reluctance to increase public expenditure on sanitation. When white Barbadian elites
embarked on a campaign to oppose public health reform in the late 1920s, their resistance to
change shed further light on the structures of white Barbadian power. Similar to white planters in
rural Georgia, Barbadian elites worked to keep the local government small so that “that little
power would be delegated to the public sphere; most power would remain as personal wealth,
personal connections, and personal capacity for violence.”10 Within this context, British
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intervention in a decentralized and hierarchical society such as Barbados threatened to
undermine the colony’s tenuous social and political order. White resistance to health reform went
beyond identity politics; impersonal, expert-influenced, metropolitan directives were foreign and
dangerous to the localized rule of Barbadian elites. The resistance of white Barbadian elites to
health reform thus reveals both the ways in which they maintained control in the colony, as well
as the anxieties and tensions inherent in that power.
Additionally, unlike the British, Barbadian upper classes did not have confidence that
improving health conditions would appease and pacify the restive working populations of the
island. Rather, as the Barbadian journalist Clennel Wickham would later charge, local elites
believed that “the Barbadian labourer will not work if he is not a pauper.”11 One of the main
bases of elite power in Barbados rested in keeping the black laboring masses poor, uneducated,
and unhealthy. White elites believed that if Barbadian laborers remained sick, illiterate, and
impoverished, they would be less likely to resist the violence and inequality that marked their
lives under local elite control. As the Colonial Office pushed to reform public health in Barbados,
it would continually find that the House of Assembly would sacrifice the welfare of the colony’s
population in order to preserve their hold on power in the island. Health policy ultimately
became a prism through which the ruling elites of Barbados made the case for their continued
control over the government, a struggle that would expose not only anxieties over local rule, but
also the tensions that marked British colonial power more widely during the interwar period as
colonial subjects posed challenges to imperial rule.
The 1925 commission
When the acting governor, W.E.F. Jackson, appointed the Barbados Public Health
Commission in 1925, he did so as a direct response to Devonshire’s harsh 1923 dispatch. The
11
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Public Health Commission differed significantly from the Wood and NCCVD commissions of
1921. Comprised primarily of Barbadian doctors and members of the legislature, it was the first
locally formed and sanctioned investigation into social conditions in the island. Jackson appealed
to the practical effects of health reform in his address to the members, urging the commissioners
to heed the advice of the CAMSC in order to prevent “the economic waste caused by insanitary
conditions.”12 The commission selected Dr. J.T.C. Johnson to advise the Public Health
Commission as it investigated health conditions in the island. Johnson, a Barbadian physician
who had served in the Colonial Service as Principle Medical Officer in Hong Kong, appeared to
provide a perfect symbolic liaison between the British government and the elites of the island as
he used both his local and imperial knowledge to make suggestions about ways to reform the
health administration of the colony.
The Public Health Commission conducted its investigations over the course of a year,
beginning in October 1925. In the final report, the commissioners concluded that the main
problems with public health in Barbados lay in the fragmented nature of health administration.
The Commission had three major complaints about the island’s medical and sanitary
organization. First, it criticized the fact that the General Board of Health, the medical body that
oversaw health and sanitation within the colony, had no powers to enforce health policies for the
entire island. Instead, the power to determine medical and sanitary practices resided completely
with individual parishes. Second, the Commission censured the widespread use by the parishes
of untrained sanitary commissioners with little medical knowledge to address serious epidemics
and sanitation problems. Finally, the Commission lamented the strictly advisory role of current
medical and sanitary inspectors in Barbados who had no power to direct or enforce policy. Thus
when the Public Health Commission published its report and recommendations in early 1927,
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their recommendations aimed to make it easier to coordinate health and sanitation policies
amongst the various vestries under the direction of expert knowledge.
The Public Health Commission recommended three main changes to health
administration in Barbados. First, the Commission advocated remaking the Board of Health into
an authoritative body that had executive powers to direct and enforce centralized regulations and
preventative measures. Second, the Commission suggested that the Board should be allowed to
replace lay parish officials with professional Sanitary Officers. Finally, the Commission
endorsed the appointment of a Principal Medical Officer and a Sanitary Officer who would work
with the Board of Health to implement preventative measures in the case of an epidemic and
make decisions regarding health policy for all of the island’s parishes.13 With its emphasis on
professionalization and centralization of medical services, the Commission’s findings aligned
with the recommendations of the CAMSC, and the Colonial Office expressed satisfaction with
the conclusions. In particular, as the continued activism of Charles Duncan O’Neal and local
UNIA branches threatened to undermine political stability in the island, British officials hoped
that the local government in Barbados would adopt the measures to pacify its restive population.
Conflicts over health policy
Rather than leading to quick reform, the recommendations of the Public Health
Commission instead unleashed a concentrated backlash by the planter and merchant elites of the
colony. While the Public Health Commission consisted of members of the legislature, the views
of the commissioners did not align with those of all elite Barbadians. In fact, the conflicts that
would unfold over the issue of medical reform were apparent within the publication of the final
recommendations. In a Minority Report on the recommendations, the physician J.W. Hawkins
and Assembly member A.J. Hanschell strongly objected to efforts to centralize medical services
13
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in the island. The opinion of the dissenting members illustrates a number of problems that the
Colonial Office would face in its efforts to urge state-centered reform policies on the ground in
Barbados.
The dissenting commissioners used several tactics to articulate their case against public
health reform. The first argument rested on the contradictory identity politics that characterized
white elite culture in Barbados. White elites had long claimed to be “more British than the
British” in order to combat metropolitan assertions that white West Indians had “lost” their
Englishness in the tropics.14 In a contradictory fashion, white elites used the mythology of their
essential Englishness not only to defend themselves against critics in the metropole, but also to
resist British intervention in local affairs. The ability of Barbadians to decide their own policies
made the colony relatively independent, and elites lived in continual fear of losing that
independence. White creole elites claimed rights as free-born Englishmen, who intimately
understood British law and culture. According to elite logic, it was their duty to protect their
quintessentially English institutions. Paradoxically, then, Hanschell and Hawkins used the
language of British identity and loyalty to the mother country to defy the reforms urged by the
metropolitan government.
The dissenting commissioners focused first on one proposed reform, which would replace
lay Sanitary Commissioners with expert medical inspectors in order to improve the filthy
conditions endured by much of the island’s poor. The proposed reform threatened the island’s
vestry structure, which assured elite control over local affairs. The vestry system was based on
an early modern English system, and many Barbadian elites viewed this as integral to what made
Barbados “Little England.” Hawkins and Hanschell warned that employing expert professionals
14
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would undermine the historically “English” vestries that relied upon volunteers, not paid
professionals. In their view, removing parish control over medical services would damage the
administrative system of “an ever British colony like Barbados.”15 Thus, the commissioners
contradictorily used their British identity to oppose British-backed reforms. The opposition of
Hawkins and Hanschell to vestry reform was also based on material concerns. Replacing lay
inspectors with expert advisors could potentially lead to greater public expenditure, and the
dissenting commissioners wanted to prevent increased taxes for wealthy landowners.
While fiscal responsibility and protecting control over local affairs were important, there
were other more ominous components to Barbadian elite logic that were central to the
ideological foundations of upper-class attitudes toward health reforms. Hawkins and Hanschell
adopted a horrific rationale to explain and excuse the problems with health conditions in the
colony. The two commissioners used Malthusian and social Darwinist reasoning to justify high
mortality rates as a natural solution for overpopulation. According to Hawkins and Hanschell,
“the death-rate must be high in proportion to the high birth-rate, in order to keep the population
down to its present saturated point.”16 This callous explanation reflected the logic of Barbadian
elite power. While the Colonial Office believed that reforming health services would alleviate
the misery of poor black workers and prevent unrest, the elites of Barbados relied on keeping a
high mortality rate and low standard of living to retain their power over Barbadian labor.
Hawkins and Hanschell borrowed from wider ideas of eugenics to advance their
arguments against reforming the health administration in the colony. Indicating the attitude of the
Barbadian upper classes, they argued that fighting against high infant mortality rates went
against the laws of natural selection. Even if the legislature reformed health services in the
15
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colony, the “universal law of nature, ‘The survival of the fittest,’ will, in spite of good sanitation
send to the wall as many of the weakest as will nearly equal the number of births.” Using
pseudo-scientific theories to dispute the expert medical advice represented in the
recommendations, the commissioners made the case that reform would be a fruitless effort. This
led to their conclusion that those who died were expendable. “The weakest are mostly the infants
and particularly the illegitimates,” they argued. Thus, “this law must act more rigidly in
Barbados than in countries not so saturated and where there is room for increase.”17 Like many
other members of the Barbadian elite, Hawkins and Hanschell found the high death rate
acceptable as it mostly affected the poorest and, therefore in their opinion, the most unfit
members of society. Instead of viewing the high infant mortality rate as an indicator of state
neglect or a degenerating labor force, some members of the upper class welcomed the infant
mortality rate as a natural cure for overpopulation.
British officials found these suggestions troubling. While Britain had its own record of
using theories of Social Darwinism and eugenics in its colonial empire, as Helen Tilley has
argued, by the 1920s imperial officials were trying to distance themselves from the explicit use
of these ideas in their policies.18 Colonial officers called the rhetoric old-fashioned and resonant
with discredited late-nineteenth-century ideas.19 The governor of Barbados, W.C.F. Robertson,
wrote to Secretary of State for the Colonies Leo Amery that “it is curious that in this or any
country it should be suggested by two leading citizens that a Government should deliberately
adopt as a solution of any such problems, a system under which the majority of its inhabitants
should be required to acquiesce in the sacrifice of their offspring in order to satisfy economic
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conditions.”20 Two years later, when the former governor of Jamaica, Sydney Olivier, was in
Barbados to investigate economic problems in the island, he referred darkly back to these ideas
by commenting to the recalcitrant Assembly that Barbadians had “infant mortality as a substitute
for emigration.”21 As Britain attempted to prove to its colonies that it prioritized their health and
welfare, the cruel policies of Barbadian elites threatened to sabotage British efforts to repair its
relationship with its poor black subjects.
When the House of Assembly received the recommendations of the Public Health
Commission, the legislature did everything possible to delay implementing the reforms. Despite
the Assembly’s great power in the colony, it was not in a position to reject the measures outright.
The Commission’s recommendations received widespread support not only from the Barbadian
laboring population, but also the black and colored middle classes of the island who would found
the moderate reforms proposed by the Commission as necessary measures to correct the
appalling conditions in the colony. While the restricted franchise typically assured upper-class
control over the legislature, Assembly members still had to remain sensitive to the interests of
the small number of middle-class Barbadian voters or risk losing a seat in the legislature to a
middling candidate. The legislature’s first tactic, then, was to postpone acting on the
recommendations until the Assembly’s own Special Committee deliberated on the proposals. In
the process, Assembly members hoped that the public would forget about the proposed
legislation and they could quietly dispose of the legislation a year later.
As the Assembly delayed acting on the Public Health Commission’s recommendations,
the legislature’s debates over other proposed health legislation revealed that the elite members
would never accept even minor reform to health conditions in the colony. In mid-1927, a debate
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over a bill to increase the number of notifiable diseases underscored the tactics used by
Barbadian elites to protect their power. The bill, which would require physicians to report cases
of dysentery and typhoid to the General Board of Health in order to prevent epidemics, faced
widespread opposition within the legislature. Assembly members adopted the tactic of pointing
to the most extreme possibilities of the legislation. H. Graham Yearwood, one of the most
conservative members of the Assembly, decried the bill as “drastic” and warned that, if passed,
any person could be suspected of having a disease and forcibly quarantined. As he stated, “It
might be a Crown Colony method of doing business but there is no free country where such a
proposition would be made into law.”22 His reference to Crown Colony rule preyed upon some
of the deepest fears of Barbadian elites, who valued their historic independence from direct
British oversight.
More than fear of losing their independence from Britain, however, elite rhetoric
reflected a fear of losing the freedom to exploit Barbadian labor and maintain white upper-class
political power in the colony. Yearwood and his allies used the most extreme language possible
to browbeat the rest of the legislature into refusing all concessions. The conservative members
cautioned that the legislation gave physicians a foothold for “an abuse of power” while
predicting that it would “reduce the liberty of the subject to practically nothing.” These
references to the threats to Barbadian freedom and fears of abuses were coded warnings to the
legislature that if it allowed any other groups to have a say in how the island was administered,
from the British government to physicians, it would undermine the elites’ extensive system of
control over Barbadian labor and politics. This tactic prevailed, as the Assembly decided not to
adopt the bill.23 Nevertheless, as the legislature and other local officials in the colony continued
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to fight any efforts of reform, their indifference to the problems of health administration in the
island began to attract increasing criticism not only from the Colonial Office and their scientific
experts, but also from the Barbadian public.
These tensions came to light when the Assembly’s Select Committee, appointed to
consider the Public Health Commission’s recommendations, finally finished its deliberations in
early 1928. The committee, chaired by Yearwood, ultimately objected to most of the reforms in
some way. Fearing that the reforms would circumvent elite control over the workings of the
vestries, the committee opposed restructuring the Board of Health to give it executive powers
over health policy in the parishes. Additionally, the committee voted that the Principal Medical
Officer should only be allowed to have advisory duties, robbing the position of its power. Finally,
it simply ignored the stipulation that professional inspectors should replace local Sanitary
Officers.24 Under the committee’s advice, the administration of health and sanitation in Barbados
would remain the same. While this tactic meant to protect elite hegemony over local affairs, the
resulting criticism and backlash from the Barbadian public that threatened their hold on power
nonetheless.
The actions of the Select Committee faced widespread backlash from the Barbadian press
of all political persuasions, indicating increasing popular opposition towards the House of
Assembly. When the Public Health Commission carried out its investigations, local newspapers
had followed and debated their actions and recommendations eagerly. Thus when the Select
Committee rejected most of the reforms, local news outlets were outraged. The Herald, under
Clennell Wickham’s editorship, followed the Committee’s discussions with disgust and placed
the debate within the context of the class struggles in the colony. Pointing to the reticence of the
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Assembly to allow the appointment of a Principal Medical Officer with some powers of
administration, the paper condemned the “diehard Tories” who would do anything to prevent
reform, even “shed the last drop of blood of the working classes if necessary.”25 The attitude of
the Select Committee signaled to the writers of the Herald and the Barbadian laborers who read
the paper that the House of Assembly cared only for their own personal power in the island. It
became increasingly apparent to the Barbadian public that the legislature was willing to sacrifice
the health and lives of the masses to maintain their political dominance.
This attitude was not confined to the more radical writers and readers of the Herald,
either, as the normally moderate Barbados Advocate, read by the black and colored middle
classes, published a blistering attack of the Select Committee’s conclusions. The Advocate had
also praised the findings of the Public Health Commission, lauding the expert advice of Dr.
Johnson and the “strong hand of the Colonial Office” in urging the reform of health and
sanitation in the colony. For that reason, the Select Committee’s refusal to implement most of the
reforms brought the Advocate’s ire. Labeling the report a “valueless and pernicious document”, it
accused Yearwood and the other members of having no regard for the interest of the public. “The
deep prejudice against changing a system within which nepotism and wire-pulling flourish
luxuriantly is only too apparent,” they wrote, and predicted that if left to the House of Assembly,
“the reform of the medical and sanitary services of the island will never be carried out.”26 While
the Assembly members refused to pass health reform legislation to protect their position in the
colony, their refusal to comply was stirring increasing public backlash and criticism—an
outcome that the Colonial Office had tried to prevent by reforming public health in the island.
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Nevertheless, the House of Assembly pressed on in their refusal to adopt reform. Despite
public outcry, Barbadian elites still viewed the centralization of medical services as a greater
threat to their power than popular discontent. When the legislature voted on the
recommendations of both the Public Health Commission and the Select Committee, it sided with
the latter. While the legislature created the posts of Principal Medical Officer and Sanitation
Officer, it removed any power that these positions had under the Commission’s
recommendations and restricted the duties as inspecting, reporting, and advising without
executive authority. Should local parish authorities choose to ignore the recommendations of the
officers, the officials could do nothing to enforce their own policies, even in the case of a severe
epidemic.27 Under the direction of the House of Assembly, public health and sanitary
administration in Barbados remained essentially unchanged.
As disputes over public health policies brought increasing awareness of the extent of the
House of Assembly’s indifference to the public, it led more to take the side of the governor and
colonial officials while blaming the local state. This aspect made Barbados unique in the context
of wider efforts to implement health reform policies following the war. In many other locales,
struggles over policies of health, welfare, and development occurred between imperial officials
and resistant indigenous populations.28 However, as the Barbadian House of Assembly continued
to curtail and block the measures, British-backed efforts to restructure health and sanitation were
met with popular support. British reform policies demonstrated to many in the Barbadian middle
and lower classes that the local state was indifferent to the needs of the population while
metropolitan colonial authorities were willing to help. As Wickham wrote in the Herald, “This is
why Governor after Governor has had to give up in despair the attempt to hustle Barbados into
27
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line. There is no response.”29 As the conflicts continued, the Barbadian public would continue to
see the contradictions of local elite rule while looking to the British government for aid.
Malaria and popular backlash
As the House of Assembly continued to postpone its consideration of the Public Health
Commission’s recommendations, a severe malaria epidemic broke out in the parish of St. James
in the marshy west coast of the island. This event made the problems of Barbadian health
administration even more apparent. Malaria was not an illness endemic to Barbados, as the
anopheles mosquitos that carry the illness are not native to the island. However, in 1927 some
anopheles eggs were accidentally carried to Barbados on the clothing of workers returning from
Cuba. During the resulting epidemic, as thousands of Barbadians suffered from illness and death,
local elites refused to concede to the direction of medical experts and the British government for
fear that any compromise would diminish their hold on local power. Their callous attitude came
under increasing scrutiny not only within the island, but also internationally as the epidemic
worsened.
Mosquito-borne diseases, such as yellow fever, had long been a fraught issue in Barbados.
The malaria epidemic was no exception to this historical trend. Medical experts and the vestries
quarreled over the responsibility of local parishes to pay for mosquito treatment, which could
potentially cause the parishes to increase local taxes. The planter and merchant elites who
controlled local vestry politics usually refused to pay for initiatives that did not directly benefit
their economic and political interests. In the case of malaria, while the disease affected everyone
in the island, like most other epidemic illnesses, it disproportionately affected the poorest classes.
Thus, when in 1927 the Board of Health found widespread evidence of malaria-carrying
anopheles mosquitoes in St. James, the parochial commissioners made no effort to treat
29
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mosquito-breeding locations. As a result a severe epidemic ensued, which infected at least 1,250
people by the end of 1927.30
With malaria in the colony at epidemic levels, the Colonial Office became increasingly
frustrated with the indifference of colonial elites to the distress of the colony’s laboring
population. In a series of dispatches, British officials pressured the House of Assembly to act and
allow the metropolitan government to send help. The House reluctantly agreed to appoint Dr.
J.T.C. Johnson, the consultant for the Public Health Commission, as a special adviser to the
Board of Health to organize ways to combat the disease. Nevertheless, this concession remained
limited by the problems of health administration in the island. Both the Board and Dr. Johnson
had no power to enforce their proposed policies, so the two could only give advice. With no
incentive to follow the Board and Dr. Johnson’s requests, the St. James Commissioners rejected
the proposals, ostensibly for financial reasons.31 Because local elites believed that the only way
to protect their privileged position was to keep the black masses as poor and helpless as possible,
local officials refused to expend parish resources on malaria prevention.
As the epidemic worsened and both local and imperial pressure mounted, the House of
Assembly tried to shift the blame to Dr. Johnson. When the doctor directed the parish
commissioners to treat standing water sources, the legislature decried his efforts as an assault on
its freedom to direct local affairs as it wished. The members worked to frame him as a powerhungry saboteur of the colony’s historic independence in the hopes that other Barbadian elites
and the aspiring middle classes would view his efforts as a threat to their economic and political
power. Recounting the criticisms of the doctor, the leftist columnist Wickham at the Herald
wrote that “One lusty representative has called him a Czar, which is as every one knows, one
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degree farinheit above a bolshevik [sic].”32 This rhetoric made it appear that the House of
Assembly and parish authorities, by refusing to comply with his orders, were actually protecting
Barbados from the doctor’s overreach. By using this loaded language that suggested centralized
absolute authority, the legislature played upon the fears of the colony’s elite and professional
classes while deflecting attention away from their own failure to address local problems.
As Assembly members railed against Dr. Johnson’s efforts, more and more of the public
came to see the legislature as more concerned with their own positions than with the lives of
most Barbadians. The moderate Advocate, for instance, pointed to the Assembly’s indifference to
the malaria outbreak as evidence that the legislators would rather preserve their own power than
come to public aid.33 Wickham at the Herald agreed, condemning their bald efforts to protect
their own political interests over the obvious suffering of the colony’s population. He became
especially incensed when, after the doctor took pity on the starving and malaria-infected
residents of St. James and provided food, the legislature accused him of “wasting” public money
on food distribution. To him, their callous actions undermined “the value of representative
institutions” in the colony. He proposed that “some other method of governing Barbados must be
devised” if political power were to “remain in the hands of a narrow and oligarchical landed
‘aristocracy.’”34 While the upper classes of Barbados continually referenced direct British rule
and Crown Colony government as a political bogeyman in contrast to the benefits of local
elected rule, their refusal to address the worst problems of the colony exposed the farce of the
existing “representative” government.
The scandal over the malaria epidemic and struggles over health policy unfolded both
within and outside of the colony, as the inaction of parish officials and the House of Assembly
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also attracted international attention. Foreign news outlets followed the devastating epidemic
closely, blaming the incompetence of the House of Assembly and the existing public health
administration in the colony for the death and misery that characterized Barbados. Referring to
legislative efforts to build a casino in the colony to attract tourists, the Herald scoffed that the
malaria outbreak was bringing more publicity to Barbados “and will do more harm to her
reputation all over the world than half a hundred Casinos” could repair. Indeed, newspapers from
Trinidad to New York carried stories not about the Barbadian climate and tourist attractions, but
about the disease that marked the island.35 Headlines such as “Over two thousand cases in Six
Weeks” and “Mosquito Plague in Barbados” depicted the colony as a destination of horrors,
warning that “scores are reported as dying weekly.”36 Even as backlash over the epidemic
threatened the island’s tourism industry, colonial elites refused to compromise.
Black newspapers in the United States were particularly vocal regarding the problems in
Barbados highlighted by the malaria epidemic. Their interest, which was due both to the high
number of West Indian migrants who lived in the United States as well as pan-African concerns
in colonies with large black populations, brought the problems of Barbados into the center of
diasporic interchanges. The editor of the African-American paper The Philadelphia Tribune,
himself of Barbadian descent, derided the conditions in the colony as well as the local
government structure. As he wrote, “the governmental authorities have just allowed themselves
to be advertised rather extensively as the most unhealthy island in the West Indies, as a place
where people are ‘dying like flies’” from a disease.”37 As the international press published
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damning reports about the condition of the island, it broadcast not only the incompetence of local
officials, but also cast a shadow upon British trusteeship in the colony.
As the scope of the crisis moved from the local to the international arena, the Colonial
Office became anxious to stave off the epidemic and prevent further damage. From London, the
Secretary of State for the Colonies sent a heated dispatch to the House of Assembly,
admonishing them regarding the malaria problem. The communication sparked hope amongst the
Barbadian laborers that the British government would intervene directly. The indifference of the
legislature to the problems of the community led large sectors of the Barbadian public to support
British intervention over local jurisdiction. The left-wing Herald, for instance, criticized the
legislature for “acting on the principle that we are masters in our own House” rather than
submitting to imperial directives. Expressing great confidence in the capabilities of the British
Empire, the paper warned that the Colonial Office “possesses reserves of power of which the
average representative is unaware” and cautioned that “Barbados cannot expect to receive
‘suggestions’ from the Colonial Office” forever, and the British government would surely
intervene soon to save the masses.”38 As conflicts over public health reform and the malaria
epidemics continued to expose the problems of local rule, some Barbadians looked to the British
government to fulfill its supposed duty to subject populations.
Despite imperial pressure, Barbadian officials remained reluctant to spend local resources
on the epidemic. However, the attention of international presses to malaria in Barbados began to
affect trade and tourism on the island. Local business interests began to voice their concerns for
the epidemic’s economic implications, and the St. James commissioners relented in their
resistance to Dr. Johnson’s suggestions. The commissioners took more aggressive measures that
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helped to finally combat a more serious epidemic. Nevertheless, in spite of the affect on tourism
and the threat to the island’s economic and business interests that the epidemic exposed, the
legislature continued to stall every other effort to reform health conditions in the colony. Its
defiance pointed to the deeper reasons behind their resistance to health reform that went beyond
simply refusing to spend money on issues that did not benefit elites. Instead, it pointed to the
ideology of white rule in Barbados. Unlike the British government, Barbadian upper classes
believed that the solution to the radicalism and instability of the interwar years was not change
and reform, but retrenchment.
Two years later, when another malaria outbreak threatened Christ Church parish, the
Barbadian government once again declined to take immediate action. Despite the international
and local backlash to the epidemic of 1927, when health inspectors found large numbers of
malaria-carrying mosquito larvae in mid-1929, the Christ Church commissioners of health
declined to spend parish funds on sanitary work.39 Once again, the attitude of local authorities
demonstrated to the Barbadian public the contradictions and failures of elite rule. Responding to
the statement of one Assembly member, who claimed that the commissioners’ actions were
justified because the Christ Church vestry was “a free body representing the free electors of the
parish” that did not have to answer to the Board of Health. Wickham scoffed at the reasoning of
the ruling elite. He pointed to the paradox that while the commissioners spoke of their freedom
and independence, they also begged for money from the central government and relied upon
outside help for the running of local affairs.40 The politics of public health exposed and
undermined the logic of elite rule.
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This time, the Board of Health decided to take more drastic measures and appealed to the
governor for help. Governor Robertson, who agreed with the Board’s fears about Christ Church,
helped to introduce a bill into the House of Assembly that would grant the Board emergency
powers over the local commissioners to prevent the epidemic. When the House received the bill,
the few members that were on the Board of Health backed the legislation. While stating their
reluctance to resort to aggressive measures, the members argued that the actions of the Christ
Church commissioners were “dangerous to the community” and made drastic measures
necessary.41 Members of the Assembly who were physicians, or worked closely with the medical
community, saw the dangers of malaria and understood the effect that unchecked epidemics had
on the Barbadian population.
The rest of the House of Assembly, however, reacted furiously to this supposed threat to
their authority. C.L. Elder, one of the Christ Church commissioners, condemned the bill and
warned that if the House passed it the legislature would be setting a precedent “and one of these
days you will come here and suddenly find a Bill before you to abolish the constitution of the
colony.”42 As usual, conservative Assembly members used the most extreme logic possible to
rally others to their side. This link between reforming public health administration and losing
local power was a common rhetorical tactic used by members of the Barbadian government.
Additionally, the controversy over the Board of Health and the malaria epidemic
demonstrates how the two Assembly members of African descent protected their tenuous
position amongst the Barbadian power elite by embracing conservative and reactionary rhetoric.
As Anne Spry Rush has argued about middle-class black West Indians, embracing a respectable
“British” identity allowed black creoles to establish that they had an important role to play within
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the British Empire and thus had the power to negotiate the terms of their political and cultural
participation within it.43 Middle-class black Barbadians occupied a tenuous position with the
colony’s racial and economic structure, and class interests usually trumped alliances of race.
Middle-class black Barbadians often used their grasp of British culture to jockey for a place in
the local government and earn the favor of elites. In this instance, resistance to health reform
became one of the many lenses through which some middle-class Barbadians of color made a
case for wider inclusion into the social and political order.
H.W. Reece and C.A. Brathwaite were at the forefront of the opposition to the bill.
Despite the fact that malaria epidemics disproportionately affected the black population of the
island, the two legislators adopted the same language as white Assembly members to oppose the
bill. Reece, borrowing from conservative tactics, warned that if they allowed the Christ Church
commissioners to be superseded, the House of Assembly could be next.44 This association
between compromise and losing all control over local affairs worked as political currency for
Assembly members of African descent. C.A. Brathwaite took it a step further by drawing upon
elite tropes of ancient privileges and a historic English identity. According to him, the measure
was “an insidious attack upon the ancient rights and privileges” of Barbados. “We who boast of
being Little Englanders, let us show that we are made of better stuff than that which the
Executive expects us to be.” By embracing the invented traditions of elite rule, Brathwaite was
able to frame himself as English and protect his position within the historically white
legislature.45 The attitudes of the two black legislators show that while white elites resisted
health reform to protect their power in the colony, some nonwhite Barbadians resisted reform to
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make a claim for belonging in the upper classes. Despite differing motivations, these class
interests united the legislature in opposition to change.
When the House of Assembly refused to grant the Board emergency powers, Governor
Robertson grew exasperated with the legislature. He met with the Board of Health and the Christ
Church commissioners and, after much persuasion, the commissioners agreed to look after water
treatment in their parish. Nevertheless, the House of Assembly was embittered with the
governor’s initial attempt to supersede local control by giving emergency powers to the Board of
Health. Even though the commissioners agreed to treat the affected water sources, the legislature
rejected the original order of the Board of Health to treat the water in the parish, which undercut
the ability of the commissioners to act.46 The debacle brought Robertson to a fury as he
complained that the House could reject the bill, but it could not “hope for any successful Health
administration if they tacitly sanction disobedience to directions of an authority constituted by
the Legislature.” To him, elite efforts against reform meant that they could no longer defend
themselves against charges of indifference to the health of the people that they govern.47 The
House of Assembly would not only sacrifice the lives of thousands of people but also their own
legitimacy to show the governor and the British government that it had the power in Barbados.
The threat of constitutional crisis
The struggles over health reforms and malaria epidemics unleashed continual conflict in
Barbados between 1927 and 1929, both within and outside the colony. As the Barbadian public,
the Colonial Office, and the governor of Barbados became increasingly frustrated with the
obstinate legislature, it appeared likely that the local rule in Barbados had reached a breaking
point. Beginning in early 1928, as international attention to the 1927 malaria epidemic escalated,
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rumors began circulating that the British government was on the verge of revoking the island’s
constitution after 300 years of salutary neglect. The struggles that ensued brought Barbados to a
place that horrified the British government. While Colonial Officials had assumed that Barbadian
elites would go along with their plans to centralize the island’s medical services in an attempt to
pacify the colony’s restive working populations, the policies and concurrent epidemics had
instead turned Barbadian elites against Britain and exposed the savagery of local rule to the
Barbadian public as well as to the world. Over the next year, the imperial government would be
forced to choose whether it would step in on behalf of the island’s suffering population or forfeit
the battle over public health in order to appease colonial elites.
By February 1928, tensions over the malaria epidemic and disputes over the Public
Health Commission led Wickham at the Herald to speculate that the legislative gridlock would
force Barbados to fight to keep its independence from direct British rule. As he recounted reports
in the foreign press, there was “an uneasy feeling abroad that a constitutional crisis is
threatening.” He placed the blame for this squarely upon local elected officials. Not only did the
House of Assembly remain “aligned against the Colonial Office” when it came to policies over
health administration, it also set itself against Governor Robertson. Should a constitutional crisis
result, Wickham warned that he and his black laboring audience would not fight to maintain a
system that kept them under the power of a small elite. “Could the general mass of people be
expected to rise in support of the Constitution?”48 Once again, his words showed how elite
refusal to accept public health reform was leading the Barbadian public to prefer direct British
rule to local governance.
Tensions over the Barbadian constitution came to a fever pitch when, in March 1928, the
British Parliament revoked nearby British Guiana’s constitution. British Guiana, in which
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governmental power was divided between an executive branch controlled by the planter elite and
an elected legislative branch comprised of black and Indian middle classes, had been locked in a
state of governmental gridlock for several years. Opposing class interests within the government
had brought the production and export of the colony’s major raw materials almost to a standstill.
The British government, exasperated with the effect that internal disputes were having on British
Guiana’s economic output, abolished the colony’s elected legislature to make it a true Crown
Colony government under direct British control.49 This overhaul represented the greatest fears of
the Barbadian elite.
Because of the historic control that the upper classes of Barbados had over the House of
Assembly, they were able to direct affairs in Barbados without a lot of interference from either
the British government or the disenfranchised Barbadian masses. Elites feared that if they
budged and allowed the constitution to be overridden as well, it meant that the governor and the
British state could step in and undermine their political power as well as their control over
Barbadian labor. Additionally, the revocation of the British Guiana constitution seemed to
validate the warnings that Barbadian elites had been making since the health reforms were first
proposed. Whether the upper classes believed that constitutional overhaul was a reality or not, it
became a convenient and real threat to use against more moderate voices within the legislature
who wanted to compromise. The most conservative members of the House of Assembly became
even firmer in their opposition to health reform, which they continued to frame as a covert
attempt to make Barbados a Crown Colony.
While in the midst of their own dramatic constitutional changes, observers in British
Guiana noticed the tensions unfolding in Barbados. The New Daily Chronicle, published in
British Guiana, reported that friction was growing between the legislature and the governor, and
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“various factions are already beginning to line up on one side or the other, in what may yet
develop into a first class constitutional struggle.” Pointing out the hysteria that characterized
recent House of Assembly debates, one article commented that a showdown over the constitution
would not be surprising due to the severe inequality that characterized the island’s political and
social structure. It condemned the fact that the House of Assembly represented “a class; not
Barbados” and pointed out that Barbados had the lowest level of representation of any British
colony that had representative institutions.50 As the House of Assembly continued to thwart all
efforts to reform health and sanitation in the island, the dysfunction of Barbadian local rule
became more apparent to observers both within and outside the colony.
As criticism of the Barbadian government mounted, Governor Robertson became even
more frustrated at the legislature’s efforts to thwart medical and sanitary reform. As he related in
a critical dispatch to the Colonial Office, “Progress and improvement in any direction is slow in
Barbados with its oligarchical government, disguised as democratic, intensely conservative,
steeped in the tradition of objection to dictation and suspicious of suggestion.” Because of these
characteristics, he wrote, House of Assembly members equated health reform with the end of
parochial control and the constitution as they knew it. To Robertson, this theory defied logic. “To
a stranger, and to any body of experts it must seem inconceivable that in a small Island like
Barbados… there should be any hesitation in adopting a system of Central administration of
Sanitary and Medical Services as being more efficient than the present method of parochial
control,” he wrote. Robertson complained that these problems made Barbados a very difficult
place to govern, and he wrote that he had less power and respect in Barbados than other colonies
in which he had served. Instead of having the power to implement policy directly as a
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representative of the British government, in Barbados he could only use “patience and persuasion”
to affect any change.51
These disputes between the governor and the House of Assembly persisted as the
legislature and local sanitary commissioners continued to refuse to address the problems of
public health in the island. Unlike in British Guiana, where the British government chose to
support white colonial elites over the colored middle classes, the governmental gridlock that was
unfolding in Barbados would ultimately force the Colonial Office to choose between supporting
their appointed imperial representative in the colony or the recalcitrant colonial elites who
determined policy. Colonial officials still wished to reform the health services of Barbados, a
measure supported by Governor Robertson, but were unsure how to coerce their supposed allies
within the colonial upper classes into doing their will. The continued debates over health policy
in Barbados would reveal the strains of British rule in Barbados, as metropolitan policymakers
weighed their attempts to reform health administration with their desire to avoid actual
intervention in the colony. This contradiction would make the Colonial Office as well as
Governor Robertson appear incompetent in their management of Barbados, and eventually
undermine the confidence that the poor black Barbadian had in Britain’s legitimacy as an
imperial trustee.
By early 1929, tensions in Barbados remained high over issues of health and sanitary
reform. When Assembly members and nominees campaigned for office, their rhetoric centered
on whether Barbados would implement any of the proposed policies, which colonial elites
continued to portray to the public as a threat to the constitution. During the vestry nominations in
the parish of St. Michael, the nominees labeled the three-year effort to reform sanitary
administration in Barbados as “the insertion of the thin edge of the wedge of Crown Colony
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Government.” Using health policy as a tool to rally fears and gain political support, candidates
pointed to the “awful condition” of British Guiana “as a warning to Barbados,” calling British
Guiana’s experience under direct British rule as the worst in its history.52 This rhetoric was
effective when it came to the black middle classes of the colony, who looked to the loss of
political power to colored professionals in British Guiana as a warning against British oversight.
Nevertheless, Wickham, commenting on the nominations, continued to point out the
hyperbolic nature of the debates. As he noted, the candidates tried to convince the public that
“one of the most priceless gems in the Crown of our Constitution is the right of local Boards in
eleven parishes to raise and spend money on the roads and on sanitation.” Wickham, however,
did not share in the Assembly members’ fear of direct British rule. For, as he pointed out, Crown
Colony rule would only affect the power of the elites. He urged the working populations of
Barbados not to join in on the calls against Crown Colony rule until they could “strike a bargain”
with the ruling class to get a share in the present system.53 While Barbadian middle classes were
growing suspicious of British overreach, Barbadian laborers still saw no benefit to local rule
Struggles between the Barbadian government and the Colonial Office reached new
heights as the imperial government worked to fill the post of Chief Medical Officer (CMO), the
only reform suggested by the original Public Health Commission adopted in any form. While the
House of Assembly had removed any executive power that the position could have, it also
restricted the post as much as possible to make it difficult to fill. First, the Assembly stipulated
that the appointment could last for only three years. This made the position temporary, meaning
that anyone who accepted the post would not be eligible to draw a pension later from the British
government. Second, the legislature excluded officers above the age of 45, an age restriction that
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would prevent experienced officers from taking the post.54 The Colonial Office reacted to the
stipulations with dismay, complaining that the restrictions ruled out most physicians within the
colonial service.55 As British officials searched for months to fill the post, the Barbadian
legislature succeeded in its efforts to thwart any sort of reform or imperial oversight in the
colony.
When the Colonial Office still had not found a suitable candidate by early 1929, it
decided to fill the position temporarily with Dr. Rice, a retired English medical officer who had
worked in West Africa. While he was too old according to the restrictions of the Barbados
legislature, the Colonial Office was desperate to fill the post and hoped that Dr. Rice would
ingratiate himself in Barbados and persuade the Assembly to change the age restriction.
Wickham sympathized with the position of the Colonial Office and recognized the problems that
the legislature had created in its attempt to preserve political power. Broadcasting to his readers
that the House of Assembly was incompetent, he scoffed at their tendency to “imagine they can
fight the Secretary of State for the Colonies without brains… We can imagine the junior clerks at
the Colonial Office laughing over the efforts of these Colonial planters of Barbados to have a go
at Mr Amery.”56 If it came down to a contest between the Barbadian legislature and the British
Empire, Wickham and his sympathizers appeared confident that the mother country would
prevail.
The House of Assembly members did try to “have a go” at the Colonial Office as it
received the appointment of Dr. Rice with fury. Directing his anger to the British government,
Yearwood charged the Colonial Office with neglecting its duties by thinking that “a retired
Medical Officer would be quite good enough for this colony,” while S.C. Thorne accused the CO
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of compelling the Barbados government to do its bidding. To him, the Colonial Office was trying
to force “any man down our throats.”57 For the House of Assembly, the appointment of Dr. Rice
against their wishes indicated the imperial overreach against which it continually warned. As the
debate continued, Yearwood and Thorne took the opportunity to attack the power of the Colonial
Office and caution against British aggression. According to Yearwood, the CO expected them
“to bow submissively to whatever the authorities at Downing Street say about these
appointments” while Thorne warned that they would “not have our hands forced by the Colonial
Office or anybody else.”58
The extreme rhetoric of Yearwood and Thorne pointed to the tactics and logic of the most
conservative elements of the legislature. They trapped the Colonial Office by restricting the
CMO so severely that the British government would not be able to find a suitable candidate.
Imperial officials had the choice of keeping the post vacant or filling it with someone who did
not meet the restrictions—both options that would bring the British government under fire. Some
members of the House of Assembly saw this and objected to Yearwood and Thorne, pointing to
their own restrictions as the reason for the appointment. However, the majority of the House of
Assembly placed the blame directly with colonial officials rather than their own policy.
Reactionary members played upon elite fears of losing their power and their sense of inferiority
within the empire by disparaging the move as evidence of “how lightly they think of Barbados.”
The members used Dr. Rice’s appointment as evidence that Britain neglected Barbados because
it saw the colony as a backwater compared to large colonies like Nigeria.59 As the debates
intensified, the Assembly members made it clear how little they thought of British intervention
into the established social and political customs of the island.
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Furthermore, in order to gain support from the colony’s middle classes, white elites
embarked on a propaganda campaign to portray the British government as a tyrannical power
that was trying to use health reform as an excuse to turn Barbados into a Crown Colony. While
middle-class Barbadians had supported British intervention during the worst of the 1927 malaria
epidemic, the revocation of British Guiana’s constitution in favor of local elites had convinced
many within the black and colored professional classes of Barbados that the British Empire
would not protect their interests. Even though local rule in Barbados was unequal and
dysfunctional, the middle classes still had the hope of one day participating if they worked hard
enough to achieve the right to vote. Barbadian upper classes played on these beliefs and fears
with their constant warnings against Crown Colony government, British treachery, and imperial
mismanagement. When the middle-class Advocate commented upon the debates, it seemed to
agree with the Assembly’s warning against British mismanagement. Accusing the Assembly
members who defended Dr. Rice’s appointment of siding “the mandarins at Whitehall,” the
paper speculated that if the conservative members’ accusations about Colonial Office neglect and
manipulation were true, then Barbados should not stand for it. “Up to a point we are our own
rulers and it is both unfair and unwise for the Colonial Office to make encroachments upon our
privileges and to seek to curtail our rights to self-government.”60 While the debates over
implementing health reform had brought the Advocate against the Assembly, doubts about the
empire’s respect for colonial middle classes brought them back to the legislature’s side.
The imperial government reacted with dismay to the attitude of the Barbadian legislature
and the Advocate. The accusations towards the Colonial Office demonstrated the level of
alienation that existed between the metropolitan government and white elite Barbadians. While
imperial officers had hoped that Barbadian officials would help them to implement moderate
60
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health reform in the colony, their reaction to all British initiatives revealed the great gulf that
existed between the prerogatives of the empire and those of local elites. Nevertheless, opposing
the House of Assembly had its political drawbacks. The British government was unwilling to go
through another government overhaul as it had done with British Guiana, a move that had
garnered great criticism within the West Indian colonies. More importantly, though, if the British
government revoked the Barbadian constitution and removed power from local white elites, it
would signal to other colonial upper classes that they did not have the support of the British
government and would undermine the relatively stable systems of indirect rule that existed in
many areas. Finally, if metropolitan authorities disrupted white elite power in Barbados, it might
lead to further radicalism and even revolt from the colony’s miserable black poor.
Instead of taking these risks, the Colonial Office began to place the blame for the nonimplementation of its policies upon the governor and the other appointed officials in the island,
not the legislature. Lord Passfield, the new Secretary of State for the Colonies, reflected the
views of Colonial Office staff in a severe dispatch that implicitly blamed Governor Robertson for
the feelings of the House of Assembly. Writing to Robertson, he excused the attitude of the
legislature towards the appointment of Dr. Rice as “neither surprising nor altogether
unreasonable” since the governor had failed to explain the issue to them. Miffed that the CO was
being blamed for not appointing an officer, he took Robertson to task for not using his powers of
persuasion more effectively and expressed his disappointment in the governor’s inability to
convey imperial decisions in a way that the House of Assembly would accept. According to the
Colonial Office, in Barbados it was the governor’s job to cajole and entice illogical white
Barbadian elites, so it was Robertson’s fault for not communicating to the House “that no
medical man of the requisite standing and qualifications would be likely to throw up his practice
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and prospects in this country for a three years appointment in Barbados.” He ordered the
governor to try harder in convincing the legislature about the difficulties in finding an officer
under their existing stipulations.61 Passfield and the other colonial officers saw the role of the
governor in Barbados as a persuader and a soother, and blamed him even when the Assembly
acted irrationally. These disputes reveal the divisions at the heart of colonial rule, as the British
government had to rely on public relations to enforce their own polices.
Conflicts over Dr. Rice’s appointment, combined with frustration concerning the
Assembly’s handling of the malaria crisis, led Robertson to take a severe step. He decided that
persuasion and pleading were not enough in the face of the House of Assembly’s power in the
island. Clearly, he believed, the legislature would never act to improve the miserable health
conditions in the colony. In a secret dispatch to Passfield, he urged drastic measures. Explaining
his difficult position, Robertson wrote: “In an independent elected House, with no parties, no
Ministers and no leaders, my only means of influencing opinion are personal influence,
persuasion and education.” This was not enough to implement colonial policies, as he had no
power to affect change in the colony. Further, he wrote, while many even amongst the white elite
wanted improvement in the House of Assembly, no one had the courage to vote for reforms.
White upper classes all feared “the argument advanced by the opponents that this will mean
submission to the views of the Colonial Office, the introduction of Crown Colony Government,
curtailment of the powers of the Vestries, with consequent peril to their own privileges.” The
climate of reaction and hostility to change in colonial administration brought all legislation to a
standstill. He wrote that there was only one way to improve administration, which was the direct
intervention of the Secretary of State to amend the constitution.62
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The governor’s radical request seemed to fulfill the predictions that had been swirling
around Barbados since the health reforms were first introduced. However, the Colonial Office
regarded the prospect of direct intervention and constitutional change with distaste. As Gilbert
Grindle communicated to the rest of the staff, “Barbados would not surrender the present
constitution without a big fight.”63 While officials like E.R. Darnley sympathized with
Robertson’s contention that constitutional change would be justified due to the terrible public
health conditions in the colony, he hesitated taking drastic action. He expressed hope that
Barbados would, in a year or so, recognize “the inability of certain of the Colony's ancient
institutions to grapple satisfactorily with modern problems” and make changes itself.64 In general,
the British government preferred taking no action, relying instead on the possibility that Dr.
Rice’s educational and advisory work would eventually sway the legislature. The permanent
staff at the Colonial Office was unwilling to expend the financial and political resources to
implement their reforms in the colony or take the risks that direct control would lead to greater
instability.
In his dispatch to Robertson, Lord Passfield relayed the conclusions of the Colonial
Office to the frustrated governor. He maintained that the British government did not have the
grounds to intercede and change the constitution, and encouraged the governor to take every
chance to “bring to public notice the advantages” of centralization and expert advice,
supplementing the educational initiatives of Dr. Rice in spreading awareness throughout the
colony. Once again framing the role of imperial representatives in Barbados as persuaders, not
executives, he wrote that their combined educational efforts would eventually make Barbadians
realize that their institutions had to change. Passfield instead expressed his hope that “some
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move in the direction of simplification of control may possibly originate with the local
authorities concerned.”65 Rather than alleviate some of the misery in the colony and regain the
support of its colonial subjects, the health reforms had only served to expose the dysfunction of
the Barbadian government and bring the colony to the brink of a constitutional crisis. While the
Colonial Office desired to fulfill its promise of trusteeship, British officials would only
implement reform if it required little cost and effort. The struggles surrounding the malaria
epidemic caused the Colonial Office to lose confidence in the use of development policies to
solve Barbadian problems, and metropolitan officials retreated from pressing for health reform.
Ultimately, the dispute over these health reforms revealed that policymakers in London valued
the stability of elite rule over the welfare of colonial subjects.
Conclusion: Imperial retreat
By the late 1920s, the governmental structures of Barbados had started to chip away at
the Colonial Office’s confidence in adopting health and welfare measures to solve colonial
problems. When a West Indies Conference met in Barbados in early 1929, conference attendees
requested that the Secretary of the State for the Colonies send experts to all West Indian colonies
in order to advise local governments on how to improve existing sanitary conditions.66 Dr.
Stanton at the Colonial Office scoffed at their request. Citing the CO’s recent attempt to send a
malaria expert to Barbados to investigate the disease there, he wrote that their proposals “were
coldly received and in the event nothing happened.” In general, tours of “the kind contemplated
by the resolution are not likely to result in any great benefit.” He predicted that the issues in the
medical and sanitary conditions of many of the West Indian colonies could not be quickly
remedied by expert advice. According to the Colonial Office, West Indian public health issues
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had “their origin in faulty methods of government”.67 In contrast to the confidence in expert
knowledge and commissions of inquiry in the early 1920s, this feeling of defeat reflected the
problems of colonial rule in the Caribbean.
The British government would only go so far when it came to urging health and welfare
reform. Similar to vaccination campaigns in nineteenth-century India, in which fears of popular
resistance prevented the British state from taking a more aggressive approach to medical
intervention, colonial officials would eventually retreat from public health reform in Barbados in
favor of what David Arnold calls “a gradualist approach to social change” based in persuasion.68
This approach caused disillusionment for Barbadians who trusted in the capability of Britain to
supersede indifferent local elites on behalf of reforms that would benefit the masses. Clennell
Wickham, despite his long-enduring praise of British administration over local rule,
communicated to his readers his disappointment in British inaction. According to Wickham,
Barbadians were proud of their connection to Britain and wished to remain within the empire.
Sentiment alone, however, was not enough to sustain these imperial ties. Wickham urged Britain
to invest “in the development of these colonies” rather than continue with their neglect. As he
wrote, “America is casting longing eyes in our direction, and we can’t deny our dependence
upon her.” Although U.S. racism and “lynching” prevented most Barbadians from desiring to be
ruled by the power to the north, they also felt overlooked by their mother country.69 Barbadian
laborers believed in promises of British protection, and wanted imperial officials to intervene.
Yet, as the metropolitan government remained unwilling to get involved in local affairs,
Barbadian laborers began to lose faith in the idea of imperial trusteeship. The efforts to regain
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the loyalty of West Indian subjects were beginning to fray as the financially and politically
strained empire grappled with the tensions of colonial administration.
Even some members of the House of Assembly started to see the writing on the wall. In
what would be a prophetic warning, Chrissie Brathwaite urged the legislature to alleviate the
conditions of the Barbadian poor to engineer social order. During a debate in late 1929, he
declared “I say the time has come when works of public utility should be resorted to in order that
many of our people who are half-starved today through the lack of employment should be able to
get employment in their own country and become even more law-abiding than they have hitherto
been. I suggest here from my seat in this House that unless something is done this law-abiding
and peaceful people of Barbados must as the result of starvation resort to acts of disturbance in
order to satisfy their hunger”. Despite great objection from other Assembly members, Brathwaite
maintained that the legislature needed to attend to the needs of suffering Barbadians so that they
remained “good citizens not only of Barbados but of the British Empire to which we all feel
proud to belong.”70
The struggles over health reform in Barbados reveal some of the key factors that defined
tensions of late colonialism. First, the aims and outlook of the metropolitan government often
clashed with those of local colonial leaders. While British administrators had come to believe in
the need to ameliorate poor health conditions to prevent disorder, white Barbadians saw any type
of reform as a threat to their power in the island. The conflicting views of colonial officials and
white Barbadian elites about preventing black revolt reveal the limitations of colonial knowledge.
Metropolitan officials had underestimated the power dynamics of Barbadian society, in particular
those of the upper classes. British officials did not realize that metropolitan ideas about how to
prevent popular upheaval were essentially at odds with the ideology of the Barbadian
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government. While the Colonial Office believed that reforming health services would alleviate
the misery of poor black workers and prevent unrest, the elites of Barbados relied on keeping a
high mortality rate and low standard of living to retain their power over Barbadian labor. Rather
than improve colonial relations, British efforts to reform public health in Barbados did little more
than unleash a series of conflicts that undermined the faith of West Indian subjects in imperial
trusteeship.
Second, the concentrated efforts of the Barbadian upper classes to resist all reform efforts
reveal the extent of elite power in the colony. When officials in London urged the Barbadian
state to centralize medical services, the upper classes that controlled the government used their
sense of identity as being “very English”, or members of a “Little England,” as a rhetorical tactic
to justify their resistance both to British oversight as well as to health reform. This paradoxical
refusal to take British orders because Barbadians were “English” was the language that local
elites used to defend their power. By exploiting the British government’s reluctance to get
involved in colonial conflicts, Barbadian elites made implementing reforms as difficult as
possible and defied British attempts to enact change in the colony. The legislature’s resistance
undermined imperial efforts to regain the loyalty of Britain’s black subjects and, by maintaining
the vestry system intact, reinforced local elite power over every aspect of the lives of poor black
Barbadians. Nevertheless, the suspicion and anxiety that marked Barbadian elite rhetoric
illustrates upper-class anxieties about the tumult of the interwar period and growing labor unrest.
As the legislature’s efforts to block health reform and its indifference to devastating epidemics
laid bare the horrific reality that its power rested on keeping the Barbadian masses destitute,
miserable, and sick, the resulting public outcry and criticism at their handling of health policy
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underscored the fractures that marked local rule. Though Barbadian elites prevailed in preventing
health reform, the cracks that these conflicts exposed were permanent.
Third, the conflicts between British governor Robertson and the Barbadian legislature
over health reform also demonstrate the limitations of imperial power. Due the policy of colonial
self-sufficiency and the unique Barbados constitution, the Colonial Office could only pressure
the Barbados government, not enforce policy. The structure of the Barbadian colonial state was
particularly problematic for British administrators. Colonial states in general were “incomplete
and undeveloped,” and required “a complex of shifting alliances with local rulers.” Because of
this, colonialism was a process “of adjustment to conditions it could not dictate.”71 British
negotiation with local elites was common throughout the empire, yet in Barbados, the “local
rulers” were not indigenous populations, but white creoles who claimed for themselves an
exceptional “English” identity. Governors of Barbados, then, faced unique challenges as the
planters and merchants who controlled the legislature and vestries used claims of Englishness to
refuse British orders. The inability of Governor Robertson to persuade white Barbadians to adopt
health reform shows a local manifestation of the wider problems with British power overseas.
Lastly, Britain’s reluctance to intervene on behalf of distressed Barbadian subjects
demonstrates the contradictory aims of British colonialism following the war. While the imperial
government wished to preserve its position in the Western Hemisphere and prove to the world
that it was the best trustee of colonized peoples, it also wanted to keep its role indirect and avoid
expending human and economic resources. Additionally, while the British government wanted to
regain the loyalty of its black subjects and prevent revolution and unrest, colonial officials also
desired to preserve white elite power. These aims were ultimately incompatible. The indecision
and indifference that marked British development efforts in Barbados reveals the conflicted
71
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nature of interwar colonialism, as imperial officials and their representatives disagreed over the
purpose of the colonial mission and the responsibility of the imperial government to its subjects.
By the early 1930s, the fissures exposed by failed public health policies in Barbados made the
uncertainty of British rule even more apparent.
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Chapter Five
Warning from the West Indies

Introduction
The struggle over public health reform in Barbados laid bare the ambivalence of British
trusteeship, as post-war claims to imperial responsibility clashed with the longstanding official
belief in colonial self-sufficiency. The Colonial Office was both unable and unwilling to make
the political and fiscal commitment necessary to truly alleviate the miserable health conditions in
Barbados. Rather than resolve these tensions, the Colonial Office adopted a policy of
retrenchment, withdrawing from trying to intervene in Barbadian affairs any further. This
attitude was reinforced as Europe faced an unprecedented economic crisis. When the Great
Depression began in late 1929, the already struggling British economy suffered as global trade
and industrial output plummeted and unemployment and poverty throughout Britain
skyrocketed.1 The severity of the economic crisis meant that the British government became
even less willing to expend already scarce monetary resources in nebulous ideas of colonial
development, and official attention turned inwards to deal with domestic affairs.2
Yet, as hard as the Great Depression years were on the metropole, the effects of the
economic crisis were even more shattering for British colonial subjects. The Caribbean, in
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particular, suffered as sugar prices fell and the price of imports increased, putting further strain
on already economically desperate West Indian populations.3 Both the United States and the
wider circum-Caribbean implemented immigration restrictions in the early 1920s, devastating
West Indians who relied on emigration and remittances from abroad to survive.4 During this
period of great economic and social need in the Caribbean, concerns with colonial welfare lost
priority. The few development initiatives pursued by the Colonial Office were only adopted if
they were expected to alleviate unemployment in Britain. The post-World War I emphasis on
trusteeship had fallen to the wayside, as the Colonial Office instead followed a policy of inaction.
During the first part of the 1930s, colonial issues were relegated to the background of British
policy as the government remained absorbed with domestic problems as well as with increasing
diplomatic tensions in Europe.5 In the mid-1930s, strikes in African and Caribbean colonies
prompted the Colonial Office to make inquiries into colonial health and welfare. Yet, while
colonial officials expressed statements regarding what Lenore Manderson calls “the moral
obligations of the colonial state,” little action backed these new imperatives.6 The ambivalence
of British trusteeship increasingly created space for anti-imperial criticism as reality did not
match up to its promises.7
In Barbados, continued neglect had major consequences. Barbadian economic problems
predated the Great Depression itself. By 1928, the sugar industry was on the verge of collapse,
and a rushed Royal Commission to inquire into the causes of the crisis revealed a colony on the
verge of insolvency. As the global economic situation worsened, Barbadian social conditions
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deteriorated as the health problems that had received so much attention in the 1920s continued.
The numerous commissions, which had amassed a wealth of expert knowledge as an attempt to
shore up British colonial power, were instead leading to its dismantling.8 In Barbados, the Public
Health Commission had produced new information and spread awareness of the problems with
health conditions on the island, yet the local government’s subsequent inaction undermined the
legitimacy of the House of Assembly. Furthermore, the fact that the British government did
nothing to improve health conditions led to widespread dissatisfaction with imperial rule on the
part of working- and middle-class Barbadians. As black Barbadians began to increase their
demands for political representation and social services, the problems for British colonial rule in
the Caribbean mounted.
Increasing awareness of Britain’s broken promises to care for its colonial populations
coincided with shifting political conditions in Barbados. Beginning in 1930, growing numbers of
black politicians sought and gained seats in the House of Assembly. It was the beginning of the
end for white political power. While the effects of these slow changes were hard to detect at first,
the continued effect of the depression, bleak social conditions, increasing unrest in the wider
Caribbean, and the spread of transnational radical thought began to be felt in the island. When
Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1935 and Britain stood by, it signaled to the people of Barbados as well
as to black colonial subjects throughout the empire that the British government would never
intervene on behalf of African-descended peoples. Pan-African critiques of empire, which the
British government had fought to suppress following the First World War, now found renewed
energy in the midst of international economic and political crises. The struggles of the 1930s
would deepen and eventually expose the implications of Britain’s long policy of imperial neglect
in the West Indies.
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British attitudes towards colonial welfare in 1929
By the end of the 1920s, even though the Colonial Office had backed away from urging
further reform in Barbados, the British government was in the midst of passing new development
legislation for the empire. In 1929, in an attempt to urge the colonies to purchase domestic
materials to stimulate the British economy, the British government passed the Colonial
Development Act (CDA). The CDA set up a Colonial Development Fund (CDF) in London,
which received proposals from the colonies both to fund infrastructure projects and provide
social services. The CDF did not make available free assistance to colonies, but rather provided
loans that colonial governments were then obliged to repay. The new act reflected the old view
on colonial development that had prevailed since the late nineteenth century: if the British
government became involved in developing colonial resources, it would only do so if this action
benefitted the metropole.9
The CDA indicated that the purpose of colonial development at the dawn of the
depression was not due to concern for the welfare of colonial subjects, but instead to relieve
economic pressures in the metropole. As one colonial official, Kenneth Blackburne, recalled
about the CDF, “no need was seen to assist the colonial development in the interests of the
colonial peoples themselves; the Act was in fact primarily designed to alleviate unemployment at
home.”10 The fact that relieving British unemployment was the basis of the 1929 Act points to
why the British government had retreated so hastily from health reform in Barbados.
Development initiatives could not cost anything to the British state, and policies of colonial
welfare could only go forward if funded by the individual colony.
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The effects of the CDA were disappointing to metropolitan officials, who hoped that
colonial governments would use the fund to spearhead lavish development projects that would
utilize British resources and stimulate colonial exports. Instead, reluctant to take on onerous
loans, colonial governments did not apply for the amount of funding for development programs
anticipated by the British state.11 This was the case for the entire colonial empire, but in
particular for the already overburdened West Indies. In March 1930, S.H. Wilson at the Colonial
Office wrote to the West Indian governors, experiencing frustration that the colonies were not
making full use of the fund. Wilson wrote that he understood how West Indian governments felt
they could not bear the burden of interest payments and repayment at the end of the loan period.
However, he attempted to reason with the governors and push, in particular, projects that worked
towards health development schemes. Wilson stressed that the CDF Committee was prepared “to
give liberal assistance towards schemes of public health and research, which are not the less
important because they involve a smaller outlay.” In particular, he noted that the “economic
importance” of health measures is appreciated in Britain, and that grants had been given towards
drainage, water supply, and hospitals. All of these schemes, he noted, would contribute to the
economic development of the empire.12 As it had in the past, the Colonial Office would still use
health reforms to pacify West Indian populations, but only if Caribbean governments agreed to
bear the expense.
Barbados provides an example of the reluctance of colonial governments to utilize the
new development act. The Barbados government submitted three modest proposals, but refused
to submit any more. Like other colonies around the empire, the Barbadian government could not
afford to take out loans to pay for expensive infrastructure projects. Additionally, Barbadian
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elites were as hesitant as always to accept outside interference, and seemed offended with the
idea that Barbados needed help in the first place. As S.C. Thorne scoffed during the Assembly
debates on the legislation, development schemes were only needed for colonies like Kenya, not
Barbados.13 Proud white Barbadian elites viewed themselves as true Englishmen presiding over
an established English government in the Caribbean, and therefore superior to African colonies
acquired in the late-nineteenth century. Yet, the limited effect of the CDF in Barbados was also
connected to the apprehensions of the British government.
The Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, who approved development loans, saw the
island as a shaky investment in a time of great economic uncertainty. Of the three proposals that
Barbados sent, the Treasury approved only the least expensive schemes. The most costly
proposal, to improve the water supply of the island, was rejected, even though it was the project
that would most significantly benefit and “develop” the island. This rejection was related to the
conflicts that had characterized the public health disputes of the 1920s. The Treasury found the
decentralized vestry system of the island to be inefficient, and declared that a colony must prove
that it used its resources responsibly. Thus, the Treasury would not authorize CDF funds “so
long as the system of parochial Boards, which is characterised as ‘wasteful’, continues.”14 The
failure of reform thus came both from elite Barbadian reluctance to spend money on
development projects as well as the British government’s indifference to colonial welfare that
did not directly benefit Britain by alleviating unemployment in the metropole.
Lord Olivier’s commission
The other reason the Barbadian government was reluctant to utilize the CDF for
development schemes was because of crisis in the West Indian sugar industry, caused by the
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availability of inexpensive sugar from U.S. client states like Cuba and falling prices on the
oversupplied world sugar market. The industry had been in depression since 1928, and both debt
and unemployment skyrocketed throughout the region even before the onset of the Great
Depression. Sugar prices fell dramatically from US$73.20 a ton in 1927 to $41.52 in 1931.15 The
situation for Barbados was particularly dire, since the island depended so heavily on sugar for its
economic wellbeing. In contrast to Jamaica and Trinidad where sugar accounted for 20 percent
of total exports, in Barbados sugar comprised a staggering 95 percent of the island’s exports.16
Continued decline in the sugar industry increased the burden of the poor on public resources and
intensified the misery of the laboring classes. Additionally, if the British government lifted its
preference on West Indian sugar, the Barbadian state would be in such debt that it would it
would no longer be able to operate independently.17 If the Barbadian economy collapsed, the
British government would be forced to take financial responsibility for the colony’s affairs.
In 1929, as a response to the West Indian sugar crisis, the newly-elected Labour
government in Britain sent a royal commission to investigate how to resuscitate the ailing
industry. This was the first official British inquiry to investigate the West Indian sugar industry
since the 1897 West India Royal Commission, whose recommendations to develop peasant
smallholdings had been adopted only sporadically.18 During the earlier depression of the latenineteenth century, plantation laborers had starved in Barbados due to low wages and high food
prices. Indeed, when leaving Barbados in 1897, commissioner Sir Edward Grey remarked “One
of these days Barbados will blow up.”19 When the 1929 commission, headed by the Fabian
15
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socialist Lord Sydney Olivier, visited most of the West Indian colonies, the commissioners found
that many of the same problems with low wages and high food prices uncovered by the 1897
investigation still remained and, in some cases, had even worsened.
During the course of their travels throughout the Caribbean, Olivier and other British
officials heard testimony from government officials, planters, and laborers regarding the
economy, wages, and costs of running sugar plantations. The commission arrived in Barbados in
October of 1929. Olivier and the other commissioners found that the sugar industry struggled
because it used outmoded and inefficient modes of production, received paltry sums for sugar
yields, and remained subject to the whims of drought, market values, and competition from
American sugar producers. The planters who testified before the commission complained about
the prices they received for their crops, and argued that they paid Barbadian laborers the
maximum wage possible. If employers increased wages, according to the planters, the sugar
industry would go bankrupt.
A deputation of laborers that testified before the commission painted a different picture
of plantation work. Representatives from the WMA argued that wages for laborers were almost
half of what planters had testified before the commission, and presented had numerous letters
from laborers “in their own handwriting” stating that the wages were very low. The WMA also
told the commissioners about the draconian Masters and Servants laws that tied laborers to their
plantations through contracts, making it difficult for desperate workers to move to another estate
in search of employment.20 At WMA meetings after the commission’s departure, organizers like
Louis Sebro expressed confidence that Lord Olivier would help, since he had seen how badly
Barbadian workers were treated. According to Sebro, “The government of England will give a
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million dollars to be divided among the Colonies in the West Indies for improvement of
conditions.”21
According to Clennell Wickham in the Herald, this testimony reflected the faith held by
many Barbadian laborers that the British government would bring them higher wages because
the Labour Party was now in power. Indeed, at both UNIA and WMA meetings in late 1929,
numerous speakers proclaimed that the Labour government would send help to look after the
interests of the working classes. As one activist claimed, the sugar commission understood “the
pangs of suffering” and would surely urge the British government to aid Barbadian workers.22
While Wickham was himself a socialist, he scoffed at how the Barbadian poor looked “toward
the Socialist Government from whence they expect their salvation.” Wickham believed that the
new administration had little more interest in colonial welfare than the conservative government
it had replaced.23
Indeed, in February 1930 when the commission published its final report, it appeared
more concerned with saving the reputation of the British Empire as colonial trustee than actually
alleviating West Indian suffering. Olivier’s report framed the recommendations in terms of
imperial responsibility that reflected the language of trusteeship popular during the interwar
period. The report urged the British government to intervene in order to save West Indian sugar
plantations, and recommended increasing the sugar preference to ensure that the industry
survived. If the sugar plantations failed, Lord Olivier wrote, already poor health conditions in the
Caribbean would worsen and the social conditions of the laborers would further deteriorate. The
suffering of black West Indian workers would severely undercut Britain’s imperial mission.
Additionally, the report reflected continued official fears of U.S. competition in the Caribbean as
21
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sugar from Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Haiti vied with West Indian output. Olivier warned that not
only would this lead to U.S. predominance in the sugar industry, but it also threatened to shift the
loyalty and “political affections” of West Indians to the United States.24 This could not happen,
as Britain had a “special obligation to the negro populations of the West Indies and British
Guiana.”25 The report shows how British officials saw the role of the Caribbean within the
empire, as black West Indian loyalty shored up Britain’s legitimacy as an imperial trustee.
Another incident in 1930 sheds further light on why the British government continued to
value the economically stagnant West Indies. Soon after the publication of the Commission’s
report, Charles Orr, the governor of the Bahamas, wrote to J.H. Thomas at the Colonial Office
urging that Canada be allowed to take over the island chain to help relieve the Colonial Office of
responsibility for “the management of the numerous scattered units, large and small” of the
empire.26 Colonial officials did not respond favorably to these suggestions, viewing it as a blow
to the mission of the British Empire. One memo claimed that ceding the Bahamas would expose
the British government “to the accusation that they were unable or unwilling to continue to
execute that trust, the creditable discharge of which has been the achievement of successive
British Governments.” Additionally, Canada did not display “any particular aptitude for dealing
with a coloured population.”27 Gilbert Grindle agreed, writing that “We have a special
responsibility for the black population of the West Indies, and I, for one, believe we should fail
grievously in our duty if we handed them over to be exploited as a pawn in Canadian politics.” 28
The Caribbean might not have been economically important for the struggling British Empire,
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but it was key to the ideological claim that the British were better equipped to manage black
populations, both in the Caribbean and in Africa, than anyone else.
Despite these lofty claims of caring for black subjects, the British government initially
refused to increase the preference recommended by the Sugar Commission’s report. Britain’s
own economic problems distracted from imperial issues, and the already overstretched British
treasury was unwilling to bail out struggling colonies while domestic unemployment continued
to climb. It was only after two years of continued lobbying that the British government
eventually increased the preference. Even then it was not enough to revive the industry or
improve Barbadian wages and social conditions, and while the British treasury stalled, conditions
in Barbados deteriorated further. Nine months after the Sugar Commission’s report, the Director
of Agriculture for Barbados, R.W.R. Miller, submitted his own report on the condition of the
sugar industry to the Colonial Office. Miller’s account was bleak, as the industry remained
stagnant. Agricultural laborers, he wrote, were “on the border line of starvation.”29 When Lord
Olivier returned to the region three months later, he found that conditions had worsened even
further. Barbados, Antigua, and St. Kitts were affected by a severe drought that caused “great
impoverishment.” In Barbados, wages had been reduced by 15-25 percent since the Commission
left the island. If wages in 1930 “barely provided sufficient maintenance for labourers and their
families,” now workers were “enduring extreme penury, for the profit of British sugar
consumers.” He painted a picture of high unemployment, severe overcrowding and
overpopulation, and a high death rate from malnutrition.30
The economic problems only worsened as the Great Depression continued. After 1929
trade from the United States was reduced, merchants increased the prices of staple imports like
29
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corn meal, flour, and oil. This higher cost of living further taxed the resources of estate laborers
whose wage rates remained depressed. Additionally, the population of the island swelled as
traditional locales for Barbadian emigrants closed. Between 1921 and 1938, as many as 43,000
laborers migrated back to Barbados, who often could not find work upon their return.31 Yet the
Colonial Office remained as reluctant as ever to get involved in colonial problems, and were
further restrained by a Treasury that would block any significant expenditure on colonial affairs.
The British Empire thus pursued its policy of “trusteeship” in name only, leaving the West Indies
to struggle alone.
Health in the 1930s
The effects of Britain’s official policy of colonial self-sufficiency would be meted out on
the bodies of Barbadian workers. Since the Barbados legislature had succeeded in resisting the
reforms of the Public Health Commission, conditions only further deteriorated during the
Depression. The consequences of official neglect and poverty became clear when the Sugar
Commission heard testimony regarding health conditions on the island. During the course of his
testimony before the commission, Dr. John Hutson testified that since 1921, 32.7 percent of the
entire population was on some sort of relief, either by Poor Law authorities or the General
Hospital.32 In Barbados, public expenditure on relief was meager and available to only the most
desperately poor individuals. According to Hutson, about 32 percent of the population was “on
the margin of destitution” and warned that “a severe retrenchment in the means of their
livelihood would tend to put at least that 32 percent out of existence.”33 The fact that nearly one-
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third of the island’s population would perish if economic conditions worsened showed the
neglected and tenuous position of the Barbadian poor.
Olivier found Hutson’s testimony compelling, and brought up “the enormous high death
rate” in the colony. In particular, he was concerned that half of all deaths in 1928 occurred
amongst children under three years of age. Hutson explained that the leading cause of death for
infants was diarrhea, a preventable illness related to malnutrition.34 The testimony of a local
shopkeeper, Alfred Goring, shed further light upon the high infant mortality rate. Infants were
malnourished, Goring stated, because laborers were unable to afford milk for their infants.
Instead, poor Barbadian mothers mixed flour with tea and called it milk. This comprised the diet
of many infants, since most laboring women had to go back to work shortly after birth and could
not breastfeed their children.
Goring’s portrait of the living conditions endured by many poor mothers and children
was appalling. Goring described the crowded and neglected dwellings of his neighbors, who
resided “in rooms 6 feet square or 6 feet by 8 feet and occupied by four or five of them.”
Furthermore, he observed, many poor women could not afford childcare for their children.
Working Barbadian mothers ultimately faced the choice of returning to work and leaving their
children behind, or staying home to starve. The babies left behind would “lie in their own mess
right through to their swaddling-bands.” Numerous children would “lie in the rooms and scream
and struggle and die. Nobody is left behind to care them.”35 The fact that so many Barbadian
infants died a slow, painful death through malnutrition and neglect made for horrifying testimony.
As had been the case since emancipation, however, Barbadian elites denied complicity in
an economic system that provided inadequate wages for a family to survive. Instead, the planter
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class placed blame for the problem on the immorality, selfishness, and neglect of black mothers.
Dr. Hawkins, who had notoriously espoused his eugenicist views in the 1927 Public Health
Commission report, also testified before the Sugar Commission about the infant death rate. He
agreed that most deaths occurred amongst the poor population of the island, yet, he did not blame
the economic hardships of these families for the high mortality rates. Instead, in a refrain
common to white local elites, Hawkins pointed to the deficient morality of single mothers. A
poor, single black mother, he argued, was “more inclined to let the child go to the wall than
allow herself to go to the wall. There is not that maternal instinct, on the part of that class of
mother, for preserving the child as there is with the woman in a regular home”.36 In making these
claims, Hawkins espoused a similar view to both British officials and colonial elites across the
empire. Poor women were viewed as “ignorant and indifferent mothers” who bore the primary
responsibility for “sickly infants and high rates of infant mortality.”37 Rather than inequality and
poverty, Hawkins too blamed the moral inadequacies of working-class women for the high infant
mortality rate.
The tone of elite discourse in Barbados about infant mortality also comprised a much
darker element than popularly expressed in other parts of the empire. As he had done in his
Minority Report to the 1927 Public Health Commission report, Hawkins once again argued that
the death of so many children was actually beneficial for the colony. This time, he repeated his
claims confidently, and publicly, before a British commissioner. As Hawkins reasoned, “Unless
we can have this very high infant mortality we would have a greater population than the island
could support… If you do not have this high infantile mortality the island would be over
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populated and would be poorer than it is at present.”38 The Darwinian argument that infant death
was necessary to control the population horrified Sydney Olivier, who maintained liberal,
paternalist views towards black West Indians. Laughing and incredulous, Olivier retorted, “As a
substitution for emigration, you have a high infantile mortality?”39 But Hawkins was unabashed
in his defense of this viewpoint. Poor infants needed to perish, he argued. “Like animals, there is
nowhere to pasture them and you may as well let them die when they come.”40 Again, the views
of white Barbadian elites demonstrated not only their lack of empathy for the struggles of poor
black workers, but their advocacy of a system that destroyed black lives without mercy.
At the same time, the testimony was also working to spread awareness of the problems of
elite rule amongst Barbadian workers. WMA and UNIA members, who followed the
Commission proceedings closely, pointed to Hawkins’s testimony as evidence of white elite
cruelty and indifference to black suffering in the colony. At one UNIA meeting, activists
lambasted the doctor’s statements as proof that white elites would never give up their power in
the island. Melville Inniss, a railway porter, accused Hawkins of trying to “reduce” the black
race through high infant mortality, and said he was like the pharaoh in Exodus who ordered
infants to be executed. Whites, Inniss argued, were fighting to “preserve their race” and black
Barbadians should do the same as “sons of Ethiopia.” Alexandra Gibbs, a prominent female
UNIA member, argued that black Barbadians should go to Africa because the testimony of
Hawkins showed that black subjects were unwanted in the colony. Yet, while these activists
criticized the cold statements of Hawkins and used them as a rallying cry for racial unity,
Barbadian radicals still seemed to believe in the principle of British trusteeship. Several members
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discussed their desire to approach the Colonial Office and the Prime Minister directly to make
their claims for reform, confident that the British government would intervene if only it
understood the extent of black suffering in the colony.41
The faith of Barbadian radicals in British oversight was misplaced. While the affect of
the sugar depression on West Indian health was a central part of Olivier’s report to the Colonial
Office, the British government did little to address the problem in Barbados while elites
remained opposed to reforming health services.42 Indeed, elites remained staunchly opposed to
enacting measures that would benefit the welfare of the poor. The issue of health reform and the
fallout from the 1927 recommendations remained heated even after the British government
retreated from pressing for reform. In December 1930, during a lengthy debate, Barbadian
Assembly members questioned whether the colony should retain a Chief Medical Officer.
Members of the government continued to deflect responsibility for medical reform onto the
British state. Even a progressive black Assembly member, Erskine Ward, blamed the Colonial
Office, who “resolutely refused to find such a man” that would meet the restrictive requirements
set by the Assembly.43 H.W. Reece went further and stated that having a CMO was no longer
necessary at all, since malaria was “a thing of the past.”44 As always, the Barbadian government
only allowed reform in the case of a major epidemic, and then retreated back into complacency.
In 1931, the Colonial Office finally located a physician willing to go to Barbados under
the onerous restrictions placed upon the CMO position by the Barbadian legislature. Dr. E.A.
Seagar, the new Chief Medical Officer, came to the island to encounter a dysfunctional health
administration over which he had no executive authority. Seagar’s power was feeble, as his
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reports and advice could “be entirely ignored” and it was “extremely rare” for them to have an
effect.45 The fragmented vestry system in the island was particularly formidable in blocking
change. The doctor complained that he had a “total lack of executive power or influence” over
the vestry health commissioners, rendering him helpless against “the complete conservatism and
independence of the separate localities which compose the polity of the Island.”46 Clearly,
nothing about the Barbadian public health system had really changed. His report could have been
written in 1925, before reform efforts had even begun. Within a few months, he resigned in
frustration.
Seagar’s final report revealed how the struggling sugar industry and high food prices had
affected the health of poor Barbadians during the Depression. Most Barbadian laborers, he
reported, continued to live in appalling conditions. In particular, housing and sanitation in the
crowded tenements of Bridgetown were “primitive and antiquated.” These tenantries had sprung
up around the capital in recent years as a result of unemployed sugar laborers flocking to town,
and the rapid influx of workers from the countryside resulted in overcrowded and shoddy
dwellings. Disease spread rapidly under these circumstances, in particular since few workers
were vaccinated against smallpox and typhoid. Additionally, the food supply was contaminated,
with an unregulated dairy industry that did not take adequate measures to prevent the spread of
foodborne illness. The hookworm problem also remained severe. Yet, while he wished to reinvite the Rockefeller Foundation to treat this epidemic, he realized that since “public health
matters are so involved in lay parochial politics and economics, and that there is such a complete
lack of reciprocity and co-ordination amongst the separate localities,” any attempt to invite the
Foundation “would not only prove barren, but also ultimately hopelessly embarrassing.” The
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effects of the inefficient health and sanitary administration were taking a drastic toll on the
wellbeing of Barbadian laborers. In what would become prophetic words, he concluded by
stating he did not believe that “the present system of local government could go on without
modification much longer.”47
Seagar realized that the state of health and poverty in the colony was unsustainable, and
would eventually lead to political crisis. Yet despite his warning the Colonial Office continued
its laissez-faire approach to colonial problems.48 In response to Seagar’s report, West Indies
Department officials expressed the benign hope that the next CMO would have more success.
According to the clerks in London, meaningful change would only occur through persuasion.
This tactic, they believed, was much less expensive and politically risky than direct intervention.
The responsibility for health reform in the colony, then, laid entirely with the CMO, whose
efforts should be “missionary in nature and persuade the Barbadians to do something in
sanitation.”49 Yet Seagar had been remarkably successful compared to other medical officers
before him. After Seagar left, Governor Robertson wrote that his resignation had caused
widespread disappointment. The doctor had had actually been able to persuade local authorities
to adopt some of his suggestions, even though he had little personal power.50 The fact that Seagar
still resigned in frustration and distress after making headway points to the inefficacy of
expecting a medical officer to enact real change through the force of his personality alone.
The next CMO, Dr. John Haslam, also expressed his frustration with a position that was
“no more than an unrelated, inspecting government official.” Yet, despite his lack of
administrative power to direct medical policy, prominent Barbadian planters and merchants
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portrayed his presence as proof of “the thin end of the wedge of Crown Colony Government.”
Barbadian elites continued to use this extreme logic to resist expanding the powers of the office
and resist any reforms that Haslam might suggest. Despite governmental constraints, however,
Haslam found that many local medical practitioners in the island were dedicated to helping the
sick and needy. He reported that local physicians and inspectors “have personally given me
every support and assistance” despite the incredible difficulty of coordinating health work in a
decentralized and underfunded system.51 The refusal of Barbadian elites to allow health reform
was clearly not the view of all Barbadians, and local health workers did what they could to
prevent epidemics and reduce the suffering of poor Barbadians who lacked access to a healthy
diet and basic sanitation.
Haslam focused on the problem of infant mortality during his tenure as CMO, as it
remained one of the most tragic effects of poverty, inequality, and official neglect in Barbados.
Yet, white Barbadian elites continued to espouse heartless theories of population control when
Haslam made proposals for reform, such as instituting a maternal and infant welfare organization.
In a dispatch to the Colonial Office, Haslam stated that “in Barbados one is very frequently
confronted by the statement, even from responsible public men, that there are too many people in
the Island already and that therefore efforts at saving child life are undesirable.” While
individuals like Dr. Hawkins voiced such claims boldly, most statements in support of eugenics
occurred in private. According to Haslam, many white elites who held this view would not
“publicly support a policy of letting the children die as a means of handling the problem.”52 The
acceptance of an informal eugenics policy made meaningful administrative change impossible.
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Haslam’s reflections on the state of almshouses and of the island’s General Hospital are
also revealing of how Barbadian officials saw public health administration in the 1930s. The
General Hospital, he explained, was supposed to service the entire island, but it contained only
170 beds and was severely understaffed. The lack of space created a dilemma for sick
Barbadians. When the hospital was full, which happened regularly, patients were forced to go to
parish almshouses. Yet, the almshouses were legally bound to “refuse any aid to any who are not
considered to be real paupers, and this restriction denies the benefits of the poor relief Acts to
many who are poor indeed.”53 This loophole meant that many ill, poor Barbadians had no access
to health care. This had dramatic economic consequences for a population that was on the brink
of destitution. As Haslam explained, “The level of subsistence of the labouring and even of the
artisan classes is such, however, that sickness quickly means de facto if not de jure pauperism,
and it is impossible to draw any effective line between the two. To my mind… one must think of
the whole of the labouring and artisan class as one.” For the poor who did not necessarily qualify
for pauper status, getting sick even once could easily push them into this category. Haslam, for
his part, thought it ridiculous that the almshouses were for “paupers” while the hospital was for
the “poor sick” when the line between the two was so vague and arbitrary.54
As the Colonial Office received these devastating reports, officials fretted about health
conditions in Barbados. In a dispatch to the new Governor of Barbados, Mark Young, Henry
Beckett, the head of the West Indies Department, wrote that “little real progress will be made
until the administration of public health is taken away from the parochial boards and vested in a
central authority.” This would be the only action that would allow “a comprehensive and modern
public health act” to be introduced. The British government had retained its faith in
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modernization, centralization, and expert direction that characterized interwar colonial
knowledge. Yet, the correspondence urging reform remained private between Beckett and the
governor. The Colonial Office had no plans to send an official dispatch as Devonshire had done
in 1923, for fear that it would cause too much backlash against the British government by the
Barbadian legislature. Instead, Beckett expressed the prevailing and naive hope for “a change in
public opinion” in Barbados that would spur the Barbados government to pass new legislation on
its own at some time in the future.55 Without public Colonial Office backing, the most that
Governor Young could do was place more pressure on John Haslam to convince Barbadian
officials to enact reforms piece by piece.56
Frustrated, Haslam privately expressed his opinion to the Colonial Secretary that such
efforts were useless. Again and again, the Barbadian government rejected measures to alter
health administration in the colony. In 1934, for example, Haslam proposed adding a general
supervisory duty to the functions of the Chief Medical Officer. The House of Assembly once
again struck down an attempt to allow the CMO to direct government medical officers. To
Haslam, these efforts seemed futile before the obstinate legislature.57 No amount of persuasion
would change the “traditional principle of social organisation in Barbados, namely, that all
responsibility for care of the poor whether sick or not shall devolve upon parochial authorities
and not upon the central authority.”58 In March 1935, like Seagar before him, Haslam departed
the colony to take a less restrictive position as the Director of Medical Services in Northern
Rhodesia. Barbadian health conditions mostly remained the same as before, with an infant
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mortality rate of 256 per 1,000 amidst a culture of official indifference to sanitation in the
colony.59
The British medical community had learned of the administrative dysfunction of the
colony’s health system. A year after Haslam’s departure, the CMO post remained vacant. As
Governor Young wrote in a heated dispatch to the Colonial Office, “Health administration is in
need of radical reform,” but it was impossible to do so without a CMO and with a legislature that
refused to accept change.60 However, the Colonial Office was unable to find a new Chief
Medical Officer, as the low pay, lack of pension, and restricted age range of the job made the
post extremely difficult to fill. In June of 1937, more than two years after the departure of John
Haslam, Henry Beckett at the Colonial Office responded to Young’s repeated requests about the
still-vacant post. Beckett wrote that the CO had advertised the post but received “no satisfactory
applications,” as the restrictions on the job continued to dissuade people from applying.61 Indeed,
the CMO post was not the only medical job in Barbados that stayed vacant due to miserable
working conditions and low pay. The British Medical Journal completely refused to solicit
surgeons to work at the Barbados General Hospital. According to the journal in June 1937, “The
salaries offered were considered to be inadequate and the general conditions of service to be poor.
The advertisements submitted have therefore been refused.” 62
Meanwhile, the poor of Barbados continued to suffer. In 1936, in response to an inquiry
made by the League of Nations, the British government requested information from colonial
governments about nutrition in individual colonies. The report from Barbados was disturbing. In
April 1937, when the Barbadian committee on nutrition concluded its investigation, they drew
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bleak conclusions about food accessibility for most Barbadians. The condition of children in
particular was troubling. From birth to early childhood, the diet of Barbadian children consisted
primarily of carbohydrates. As the report noted, “the vitamin content of the nourishment given is
practically ‘nil.’” Additionally, once children were old enough to go to school, they often did not
have adequate nutrition to function. Teachers reported that “listlessness and inattention” was due
to underfeeding. The weekly wages that most parents made were only adequate to feed a family
for four days of the week. Consequently, by Thursdays children often came to school very
hungry. This not only affected their health, but also their ability to receive an education.63
The Barbadian nutrition committee concluded that the health of Barbadian workers had
not improved since the 1920s. According to the committee, “the diet of the average worker can
be classed at the best only as a maintenance diet, and that the great shortage of milk, eggs and
fresh vegetables cannot be too strongly stressed, and there is no reason to doubt that many
households live on the borderland of extreme poverty.” 64 The housing situation reflected this
state as well, with 68 percent of the island’s population living in “cottages of less than three
rooms” and lacking “sanitary arrangements which can be considered even moderately
satisfactory.”65 The Depression years were taking their toll on Barbadian workers, and the
government made only feeble attempts to help. While the Barbadian legislature eventually
established an Employment Agency with partial help from the CDF, the agency helped just a
small number of Barbadians. From 1934-1938, of the 5,688 Barbadians registered with the
agency, only 1,611 found jobs.66
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These conditions were a direct result of the contradictory, conflicting policies of both the
Barbadian and the British states during the 1930s. Barbadian officials who turned a blind eye to
social conditions favored personal power over welfare, and some even advocated the high infant
mortality rate as a necessity for population control. At the same time, the British government
bickered with the governor and placed the blame for miserable social conditions on Barbadian
elites alone, paying little more than lip service to the idea of Barbadian trusteeship. While the
effects of the Great Depression both in England and in the colonies led to increasing “support for
state intervention to alleviate poverty,” the Colonial Office denied responsibility for Barbadian
welfare by claiming that their hands were tied.67 As Barbadian workers descended deeper into
economic distress, ate meals only four days a week, and faced the possibility that even one
illness could send them over the brink into pauperism, the warning of Dr. Seagar when he left
Barbados seemed ever more certain of fulfillment.
Electoral changes
In the midst of the continuing economic and health problem of the 1930s, slow political
transformation was unfolding in Barbados. Similar to some rural counties in the U.S. south
during the early twentieth century, the economic and legal security of Barbadian planters meant
that white elites allowed “a degree of black involvement in the ‘for whites-only’ political
process.”68 The franchise was so limited in Barbados that the few black candidates and voters
posed little threat to the existing order, and indeed could further white political power because it
appeared that since some black Barbadians could vote, others could also achieve this right if they
only worked hard enough. At the same time, the economic controls put in place by planters
meant that black voters were in a tenuous position should they embrace candidates that went
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against elite interests. For example, black smallholders who qualified to vote based on property
ownership usually borrowed money from factory owners and large estate owners. If it was
thought that he did not vote for a planter candidate, the black smallholder would not be able to
borrow money, or a sugar factory might not accept his canes.69
By the early 1930s, though, the electorate had slowly expanded. Since the establishment
of the Democratic League in 1924, the efforts of Charles Duncan O’Neale and other
“progressives” to identify, recruit, and rally new voters began to have a real influence at the polls.
While in the early 1920s, only two percent of the population was eligible to vote because of
income and property restrictions, O’Neale and other League members were instrumental in
identifying Barbadians that did not know they could be enfranchised. Between 1921 and 1937
the electorate grew by 186.52 percent, or 4 percent of the population, due to an increase in the
number of property owners.70 Franchise expansion coincided with the many scandals of the
1920s regarding the Public Health Commission, which had weakened the legitimacy of some
elites in the Assembly. Members of the black middle class used this public frustration to make an
unprecedented push for seats in the legislature. In February of 1930, these efforts were rewarded
when voters elected four black attorneys to the House of Assembly. The efforts of so-called
Barbadian “progressives” were having a meaningful effect amongst new black voters.
At the same time, members of the WMA and UNIA were making increasing claims for
political rights in the colony. At one 1931 WMA meeting, in which 200 attended, speakers
decried that a bill to extend the franchise even further had been struck down in the House.
According to some members, not only the Barbadian state, but also the British government owed
something to Barbadians. “In 1914 we fought for our King and Country, if that is so, why they
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want to prevent us from having a voice in our Government to say who shall represent us.”71 The
Depression, it seemed, had reprised the grievances and political claims of the post-World War I
years. Black candidates capitalized on these political movements to reach potential voters. At
another WMA meeting, in which 400 attended, the Assembly member Chrissie Brathwaite
campaigned for reelection by urging Barbadian workers to petition the Secretary of State for the
Colonies to overrule the House and expand the franchise. In addition to building upon the
suspicion held by many Barbadians for local elites, he also drew a link to international anticolonial movements. “Mr. Gandhi said we are human too, why should we not have our own
independence?”72 Similar to the appeal of UNIA, connecting the struggle of non-elite Barbadians
to Indian nationalism made poor, disenfranchised colonial subjects in a far-flung island colony
feel part of a wider and more powerful transnational movement.
The public campaigns of black progressives also drew enormous crowds, such as a
political rally for O’Neal in May of 1932. Some 900 members of the black middle and working
classes attended, and listened to O’Neal lay out his platform for black welfare and advancement.
In addition to his plans for free education and access to other social services, O’Neal attacked the
oligarchical nature of the planter elite. White planters, he argued, did not understand how black
Barbadians lived. “They are men who are not my colour,” he declared, and urged the crowd to
elect candidates who stood “for fairplay and justice.”73 The use of such racial rhetoric by the
candidates is evidence of the power of Garveyism and pan-African thought in black Barbadian
life. Black candidates capitalized on the promises of racial unity and black uplift popularized by
the UNIA and other proponents of black internationalism to make a case for their political
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leadership. These cases were becoming increasingly successful by the early 1930s; Charles
Duncan O’Neal himself was elected in March 1932.74
The electoral changes, and the racially charged rhetoric of the candidates, shook the
planter and merchant power elite of the island, as well as the governor. In his official dispatch to
the Colonial Office in 1930, Governor Robertson wrote that the election was “the result of a
definite campaign which has assumed some features of a racial contest.”75 Governor Young was
also suspicious of new non-white members of the House of Assembly, despite his reformist
tendencies. In 1934, when the conservative black attorney Grantley Adams was elected, Young
warned that the new member was “very bitter on the colour question. He is expected to be hostile
to the Government.”76 Even though Adams largely espoused views that aligned with elite
Barbadians, his blackness made him an object of suspicion. Even though both governors
constantly clashed with white elites throughout their respective tenures in Barbados, the despotic
rule of planter and merchant elites at least assured stability in the island, no matter how brutal.
These attitudes characterized British anxieties about black political inclusion since the postemancipation era, when British liberals began to view former slaves as “unfit” for liberal
citizenship and democratic participation.77
Despite the fears of the governors, legislation did not suddenly make a radical departure
with the election of more black members to the House of Assembly. The Legislative Council was
still comprised mostly of conservative elites, with John Hutson the only real voice for reform.
When the occasional welfare or reform initiative made it before the Council, it was swiftly
vetoed. Democratic League members remained the minority in the legislature, and their bills to
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alleviate unemployment, expand the franchise, and fund education initiatives usually failed to
attract enough votes to pass. Additionally, new members often succumbed to what Governor
Robertson called “yielding to the spirit of the Assembly” and drastically tempered formerly
progressive views.78 For example, Erskine Ward, who had been a vocal proponent of health
reform and expert medical direction while editing the Advocate, changed his views and lobbied
to reduce the CMO to a part-time post after only a few months in the legislature.79
Remarkably, despite this slow pace of change, black Assembly members, with the help of
Governor Young and a handful of liberal white reformers, succeeded in passing the first noncontributory Old Age Pension scheme in the British Empire in 1937. This coincided with
increasing legislative attention to welfare initiatives in the mid-1930s, notably the 1936
Bridgetown Housing Act, which focused on slum clearance, and the distribution of free milk and
biscuits to schoolchildren the following year. The reforms were driven by the harsh economic
and social effects of the Great Depression in Barbados, which both the governor and newly
elected Assembly members worked to address.80 However, the extent of political change in the
colony was always tempered by the personal and practical considerations of the candidates who
reached office. One reason that meaningful reform legislation failed to succeed is because the
goal of many newly elected black candidates was not to remain in the Assembly, something that
Barbadian elites exploited when dealing with members that seemed too progressive. The reason
for this was that becoming a barrister was one of the few accessible professional careers for
black middle-class men to pursue, meaning that there were too many attorneys in Barbados for
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the amount of legal work available.81 As a result, by the 1930s politics had become a stepping
stone for aspiring black lawyers to attain a more lucrative government job. For instance, when
Erskine Ward advocated for reform policies that would benefit the working classes, he was then
quickly offered a position as Police Magistrate. This more secure job convinced him to leave
politics, and he was replaced by the conservative planter H. Graham Yearwood in the
Assembly.82 This was one of the many ways in which traditional elites maintained hegemony in
Barbadian politics even in the midst of unprecedented electoral change.
The gap between the campaign promises of black candidates and the slow pace of change
led working-class Barbadians to voice frustration. During the elections, UNIA members had
expressed great hope for the possibility of black-led reform. In June 1932, for instance, when
Chrissie Brathwaite spoke at a meeting, Melville Inniss called him “one of the great sons of
Ethiopia” who would “stand up for us.” Similarly, Dr. H.G. Cummins, who had long worked for
health reform in the colony, praised the election of Charles Duncan O’Neale and said “thank God,
the time has come.”83 Yet, as black Assembly members made only tepid attempts at reform
initiatives or left politics for a more lucrative bureaucratic position, radical leaders angrily
denounced the class divisions that compromised the possibility of racial unity in the colony.
UNIA members like Melville Inniss complained that “the coloured men at the top” were doing
nothing to help black workers, instead focusing on their own careers or interests. The only thing
that black workers could do, then, was to “bind together.”84 As always, though, the planter elite
used their economic and social control over black workers to maintain hegemony over local
affairs.
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Continued radical activity
In the midst of these political shifts, Barbadian planters and merchants continued their
longstanding efforts to discipline members of the few existing Barbadian labor and radical
associations. The Workingmen’s Association, which had reached its height in 1929, struggled to
maintain its high numbers because of the harsh tactics of both planters and the state. During the
1929 Sugar Commission visit, WMA deputies testified that it was difficult to reach out to
laborers because “intimidation prevents them from getting information from the Association. If
anyone is seen coming for information he is victimized, and after victimization you know what
happens.” Additionally, the police always attended meetings and reported the proceedings to the
government, which scared laborers and members away from attending or speaking.85 In country
meetings, drivers of the estates would attend to see who was present, take their names, and report
them to the estate manager, who would forbid them to attend.86
These tactics had a real effect on the popularity of WMA and UNIA meetings in the
colony. UNIA meetings, which had attracted as many as 800 attendees in previous years, were
dwindling in numbers by the early 1930s. Yet despite the effectiveness of employer intimidation
and police surveillance, radical ideas and literature continued to circulate within the colony.
Visitors to the island reported instances of political meetings and discussions of international
ideas concerning black liberation from racism and colonialism. Leonora E. Pritchett, a black
American philanthropist who toured the West Indies, reported that Barbados was “raceconscious” and she “heard more discussion about Marcus Garvey in Barbados than anywhere
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else.”87 The Barbados government also actively banned publications that celebrated international
black achievement, such as Nancy Cunard’s 1934 book, Negro: An Anthology.88
Port officials now often seized Pan-African and socialist literature arriving from abroad,
but the pamphlets that they missed would appear at WMA and UNIA meetings. In September
1932, for example, the Barbadian police notified neighboring West Indian islands that they had
found a copy of the Negro Worker in the possession of a Barbadian UNIA member. The police
warned that the publication attempted “to stir up trouble amongst the black races of the world,
and contains several articles with particular reference to the West Indies.”89 The confiscated copy,
which included an article addressed to West Indians in particular, urged Caribbean workers to
take a more active role in “the building up of an anti-imperialist movement which will alone
enable them to meet the tyrants on an equal footing.” Sending petitions and deputations to the
British government was useless, it argued—West Indians should learn from India and Ireland
and demonstrate in the streets, not put their faith in the promises of British imperialists.90 While
most Barbadians remained overtly loyal to the British Empire, articles such as these threatened to
radicalize suffering Barbadian laborers who were seeing few benefits from British trusteeship of
the Caribbean.
In June 1933, the Barbadian government seized twelve copies of the West Indian
Organizer from a U.S. ship that arrived in Speightstown. The Organizer, which was published
by a West Indian group in Harlem, urged the masses in all of the British Caribbean to “unite,
organize and beat down the organized robbery of the white imperialists and their native com-
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patriots.”91 In general, the publication was influenced by Marxist thought and pointed to the
Soviet Union as the only country in the world in which workers had any freedom. In particular,
the pamphlet included a letter specifically to Barbadian workers that decried that malnutrition
and unemployment that marked black workers, and plantation laborers specifically. The author
argued that conditions in Barbados were approaching those in South Africa, due to the “racial
degradation” practiced by businesses in Barbados and discrimination of banks, steamship
companies, and stores in Bridgetown. “In this respect our Island has well earned the title of ‘The
Georgia of the West Indies.’ Such is the picture of the life of the masses after one hundred years
of wage slavery.” The author urged workers to organize and warned that praying to God alone
would not help, since the island’s power and wealth rested entirely in the hands of planters who
kept them enslaved.92 Likely written by a Barbadian migrant living in the U.S., the letter
exemplifies the kinds of ideas that were filtering into Barbados during the early 1930s.
Additionally, a new local newspaper began to pick up some of these ideas and circulate
them further. After Clennell Wickham was sued for libel in 1930 and forced to shut down the
Herald, Barbados lost its main radical paper. Yet in November 1934, the leftist Barbadian
journalist Wynter Crawford established the Barbados Observer, and stepped in where Wickham
left off. He soon had plenty of material to report. The effects of radical ideas circulating through
the Caribbean and the devastating economic and social effects of the Great Depression became
apparent when disturbances and strikes broke out in British Honduras, Trinidad, British Guiana,
St. Kitts, St. Vincent, and St. Lucia in 1934-1935. The labor unrest arose from the frustration of
Caribbean workers with the chronically low wages and high cost of living that would seemingly
never end. When combined with the legacy of labor organization and radical movements
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following the First World War, the stresses of the Depression years prompted West Indians to
launch a number of efforts for change in the mid-1930s.
In St. Kitts, both agricultural and factory workers in the sugar industry went on strike due
to decreases in their already miserably low wages in January 1935. The strike ended only when a
British warship arrived and soldiers were deployed to the colony, resulting in three deaths and
multiple injuries after troops fired into a crown of protestors. In St. Vincent, after the Governor
of the Windward Islands asked the legislature to increase taxes on commodities in October 1935,
protests broke out against measures that would only further raise the cost of living in the colony.
As tensions escalated into a riot, demonstrators attacked the court house and freed prisoners from
the jail as the unrest soon spread to other parts of the island. Once again, the arrival of a British
warship and troops brought a brutal end to the disorder. A similar pattern occurred in every
colony in which strikes and disturbances took place. British warships and troops would arrive
and, with the assistance of the local state and police, oversee a swift end to the unrest.93 The
Observer carried reports of the various disturbances on the front page. In early February 1935,
for instance, the paper reported that striking laborers had been gunned down by the military in St.
Kitts, while an editorial criticized the chronically low wages and appalling living conditions in
the colony. According to the pseudonymous writer Pertinax, the lack of relief by the government
meant that “Something was bound to happen sooner or later.”94 The poor wages and high cost of
living endured by striking workers in neighboring colonies would have sounded ominously
familiar to Barbadian readers in the mid-1930s.
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Ethiopia
The Caribbean disturbances worried colonial officials, but forceful state action caused the
strikes to dissipate by late 1935. However, during that year a conflict began overseas that would
have wide-ranging consequences for West Indian discontent with imperial rule. In the fall of
1935, when Benito Mussolini’s fascist forces invaded Ethiopia, the ensuing war became a
watershed in the development of pan-African politics and consciousness throughout the West
Indies as well as the wider African diaspora. Ethiopia held a special place in the imaginations of
many who lived in the diaspora as a symbol of national ambition, as well as religious and
cultural inspiration. The sole remaining African-led country had long been a prophetic symbol
for black thinkers who took the Biblical passage “Ethiopia shall soon stretch forth her hands unto
God” as a promise of black redemption worldwide.95 This remained a potent symbol throughout
the nineteenth century as the abolition of the slave trade, the emancipation of American slaves,
and the successful Ethiopian repulsion of on Italian invading army at Adwa in 1896 seemed to
mark the fulfillment of prophecy. For many across the diaspora, pro-Ethiopian solidarity
culminated when Haile Selassie was crowned the emperor of Ethiopia in 1930. Claiming lineage
to the Biblical figures Solomon and Sheba, for many he was a signal that black resurgence was
on its way.96 These hopes were challenged, however, as it seemed increasingly more likely that
Europe would once again strike against Africa.
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As Italy launched its war of aggression against the last independent African nation and
the League of Nations stood by, it appeared to black colonial subjects worldwide that Europe
would always aim to rule Africa and those of African descent. The invasion of Ethiopia became
a rallying cry for people of African descent worldwide. Because of widespread symbolic ties to
Ethiopia, many felt that Italian aggression in Africa was an attack against all people of African
descent. For instance, when as a traveler from Africa Kwame Nkrumah arrived in Liverpool and
saw headlines declaring Italy’s invasion, he felt “as if the whole of London had declared war on
me personally.”97 The idea of Ethiopia united such disparate areas as the American South, the
West Indies, and South Africa. Across the British Empire, African and African-descended
subjects clamored for Britain to help Ethiopia and expressed their desire to fight on the African
nation’s behalf.
London in particular churned with activity as African and West Indian activists like Jomo
Kenyatta, George Padmore, C.L.R. James, and Harold Moody came together to protest the
invasion. Many of these individuals had previously been divided, as residents of African colonies
formed separate organizations from West Indians, or moderate reformers like Moody clashed
with radicals like Padmore. However, outcry over the war prompted a sense that all people of
African descent shared similar experiences of oppression, betrayal, and racism that transcended
the boundaries of class and nationality. James and Padmore formed the International African
Service Bureau (IASB), which mobilized support for Selassie and demanded self-determination
in Africa and the Caribbean, especially influencing West African students and later national
liberation movements. Even the moderate League of Coloured Peoples (LCP) became
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increasingly politicized as the Ethiopian conflict intensified. Its normally subdued publication,
The Keys, wrote angrily that “Italian poison gas and British oil defeated the Abyssinians” in a
“shameless rape of a coloured Empire,” an injustice that “the world’s coloured population”
would not forget.”98 The conflict caused the LCP, which had previously been interested in
combating racism in Britain, to become more focused on colonial matters.
British policy in the conflict alienated more black activists as they came to relate British
hesitance to act in Ethiopia with the empire’s overall lack of concern for African-descended
people. The Trinidadian activist George Padmore wrote blistering editorials criticizing European
policy towards Africa. As he declared in 1937, “Throughout the history of predatory Imperialism
there has never been a case of such cynicism and treachery as the betrayal of Abyssinia by Great
Britain and France, the nations which are supposed to be the bulwarks of the League of Nations
and the defenders of ‘Collective Security.’”99 This perceived European betrayal of Africa
became a turning point in pan-African consciousness. As Guyanese-born Ras Makonnen later
remarked, the Ethiopian conflict “brought home to many black people the reality of colonialism,”
convincing them that it “was a force to be reckoned with, because here it was attacking the black
man’s last citadel.”100 Throughout 1935 and 1936, black colonial activist groups in London held
demonstrations in Hyde Park and Trafalgar Square, lobbied Parliament through Independent
Labour Party MPs, and published blistering editorials and pamphlets condemning British policy
towards the invasion of Ethiopia.
Despite continued censorship efforts by colonial governments, the publications of West
Indian activists in London circulated throughout the Caribbean, where black subjects conducted
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fundraisers, held prayer meetings and rallies, and petitioned the British government to allow
them to volunteer for military service against Italy. For instance, in February 1936 the Colonial
Office received a petition from the Jamaican UNIA for permission to send volunteers to fight the
Italians in Ethiopia, while in Dominica, the Government House blamed widespread unrest and
strikes on “ignorant criticism of the attitude adopted by England” towards Ethiopia.”101 The
London Times also linked West Indian disturbances to the conflict, warning that riots in St.
Vincent demonstrated that the Ethiopian war had “dangerous repercussions on the coloured
populations of our Empire” as “indignation, resentment, and distrust” swelled throughout the
Caribbean and Africa.102
The worldwide depression and widespread unemployment also led nascent West Indian
labor movements to merge their grievances with those of Ethiopia. In Trinidad, as Kevin
Yelvington has argued, Afro-Trinidadians involved in labor unions used the war to address local
issues of wages and political rights, using the language of “blackness” as an ideological
identification to back appeals for reform and independence.103 Additionally, the conflict aroused
more than just racial identifications in these areas. The Ethiopian War also amplified anticolonial feelings that involved issues of class, economic and political power, and identity
formation. The agitation became so widespread that the Colonial Office monitored West Indian
activity and kept branches in Africa appraised of the situation.
Like many other West Indians, Barbadians followed the events closely. In the months
leading up to war, the moderate Advocate covered the diplomatic tensions heavily, while
Crawford’s Observer printed headlines about the Ethiopian conflict alongside news of West
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Indian unrest. On the same day that the Observer reported about military violence against
laborers in St. Kitts, the paper also carried a lengthy story about how Mussolini was going
against the “Last African Monarch” while “European Nations Sit Calmly By.”104 Furthermore,
the paper began speaking out against British complicity in the conflict. A blistering editorial in
August 1935 pointed out the hypocrisy of Britain’s role in the peace negotiations since it was a
nation that had “conquered half the world.”105 When the war began in October, coverage of
Ethiopia eclipsed other stories, both international and local, in all of the major Barbadian
newspapers.
In addition to reports on Ethiopia, the Observer carried news of racial discrimination in
the U.S. and Britain, and reported on the increasing incidence of riots connected to the Ethiopian
conflict. On the front page of a September 1935 issue, the paper reported about a “race riot” in
Paris, in which black French colonial subjects marched through Paris and clashed with French
police over “the support which white France is rendering Mussolini.” According to the article,
“All coloured colonial subjects and citizens of France stand as one man behind Abyssinia.”106
The paper also carried reports of Ethiopia-related strikes and boycotts in the West Indies, such as
when activists in nearby St. Lucia appealed to the Colonial Office for permission to fight in
Ethiopia.107
The effects of so much coverage meant that the distant war became part of Barbadian
daily life. Reverends preached about the plight of Ethiopia during Sunday services, referring to
the place of Abyssinia in the Bible and calling upon Barbadians to pray for a resolution to the
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conflict.108 An editorialist for the Barbados Weekly Herald reported that the “Italo-Ethiopian
dispute was the subject preached at nearly all the churches” visited the previous Sunday.109 The
coverage was so effective that in July 1936, 3,000 Barbadians attended a meeting in Bridgetown
about the proposed lifting of sanctions against Italy. The participants passed a resolution in
opposition to “the threatened lifting of sanctions against Italy in the Italo-Ethiopian conflict and
urges upon His Majesty's Government the necessity and moral duty of maintaining the same.”110
The public mobilization for a far away African nation had profound consequences in Barbados.
Despite the color line and racial prejudice that marked Barbadian life, most Barbadians
considered discussions of race unrespectable. Yet, Grantley Adams would point to the Ethiopian
conflict as the first time he saw “any beginning of the people talking white as against black.”111
Discussions that were previously confined to UNIA meetings or other radical organizations now
became widespread and acceptable. As another commentator recalled, activists and aspiring
politicians “preached the colour question and took advantage of the Italo-Ethiopian war” to gain
votes.112 The war had stirred an unprecedented amount of pan-African consciousness, as
residents of Barbados and other isolated West Indian colonies came to identify the betrayal of
Ethiopians with the struggles of all black people.
The Labour Advisor for the Colonial Office would later blame the war for highlighting
“the clash of colour,” as the invasion of Ethiopia “attracted considerable attention in the West
Indies as an example of a deliberate attack by a white man upon a coloured race.”113 Furthermore,
the Ethiopian conflict affected how the historically loyal populations of the Caribbean saw the
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British Empire. As Lord Olivier later stated in Parliament, “the action of the Government in
regard to Abyssinia has produced a very serious effect of prejudice in the West Indies against the
good faith of the British Government. It has had a considerable effect on public opinion out
there.”114 By 1936, British reluctance to aid Ethiopia had become yet another chink in the
legitimacy of British trusteeship.
Warning from the West Indies
Criticism of British colonialism did not just come from colonial subjects, however. The
1930s also saw a surge in metropolitan condemnation of empire. The most blatant criticism came
from members of the British Left. Disillusioned officials within the Labour Party, such as
Sydney Olivier, criticized “trusteeship imperialism” and argued for “more energetic development”
on behalf of native welfare.115 British communists like Tommy Jackson had long been
circulating critiques of the patterns of capitalist expansion and exploitation of subject peoples
inherent to colonialism, and the Great Depression years only strengthened their arguments.116
The Independent Labour Party, working closely with colonial pan-Africanists like George
Padmore, began to argue that the liberation of British workers was tied to the emancipation of
colonial laborers worldwide.117 As anti-colonial activists and members of the British left
circulated evidence of the suffering endured by British subjects under colonialism, the empire
came under increasing metropolitan backlash.
British academics also joined this chorus of imperial criticism. When the Scottish
historian William Macmillan traveled to the West Indies in 1934-1935, he was shocked by the
neglect of the islands. A longstanding critic of colonialism, Macmillan published his perceptions
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about the British Caribbean in his 1936 book Warning from the West Indies. The book famously
recounted the many failings of British colonialism in the Caribbean, and became an indictment
of British trusteeship as a whole. Remarking on the region’s high mortality rates, epidemic
diseases, rampant malnutrition, poor education, low wages, harsh labor laws, and inefficient
local governments, Macmillan painted a dismal scene of imperial negligence. He called upon the
British government to take responsibility for this impoverished corner of the empire. “There is an
overwhelming case for the contention that the Mother Country owes it to her colonies to embark
on a considered policy of expenditure to make up for past neglect,” he wrote.118 Development, he
argued, could no longer be about benefitting the British economy, but about fulfilling Britain’s
special trust to help West Indian people achieve a better standard of life.
When the West Indies Department received the book, the clerks read the tract with much
interest and agreed that the West Indian colonies were in a dire state. In particular, Dr. A.J.H.
O’Brien, Chief Medical Advisor to the Colonial Office, agreed that Macmillan’s chapter on
health conditions was “a true statement of facts and in no way an exaggeration.” He, too,
condemned the policy that a colony had to “pay its own way and that funds for improvements
should come from local resources.” Indeed, he argued that such a strategy would not be possible
“if a decent standard of health is to be maintained.” Echoing the paternalistic intervention
espoused by Macmillan, O’Brien called upon the British government to fulfill its duty to West
Indian people and pursue a more aggressive development policy. “We are trustees of these
Islands, and while considerable help has been provided during the last five years from Colonial
Development Fund for health schemes we should continue to provide such help.”119
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Yet, despite these calls for a greater economic commitment to the floundering colonies,
West Indian Department officials continued to claim in private correspondence that the problems
were out of the control of the Colonial Office.120 They laid Warning from the West Indies aside
and maintained the strategy of colonial self-sufficiency, even as alarms continued to sound.
When Sir Edward Davson, a member of the Colonial Development Advisory Committee, visited
the West Indies in May 1936, he joined in the chorus of warnings about the political upheaval
brewing in the Caribbean. Discussing Barbados in particular, he warned that the “oligarchical”
constitution and government of the colony was in danger. As more of the black population
gained the right to vote and entered the legislature, he predicted that Barbadians would no longer
protect their “ancient Constitution.”121 His words would soon become prophetic.
The first sign of serious trouble came in June 1937, when Trinidadian oil workers led by
the labor organizer Tubal Uriah “Buzz” Butler initiated a peaceful sit-down strike to press for
higher wages and improved working conditions. Strikes and demonstrations had broken out in
Trinidad in 1934 and 1935, but had slowly petered out due to police action and disorganization.
The 1937 strike, however, was different. Butler’s labor movement benefited from the prior
organizing activities of groups like the Negro Welfare Cultural and Social Association
(NWCSA), a socialist and pan-Africanist group that had mobilized Trinidadian workers in large
numbers during the Ethiopian War and had a large network of activism in the north of the colony.
When this groundwork of agitation and organization merged with the devastating economic and
social consequences of the Depression, conditions were in place for a major disturbance.122
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After Butler organized his peaceful sit-down strike, the Trinidadian police responded
with typical repression and tried to arrest Butler. His hundreds of followers, frustrated with the
use of Trinidadian state force against peaceful labor organization, responded violently to the
police action and attacked the officers, killing two. Conflicts between laborers and the police
then spread throughout the entire colony as workers in all industries joined the strikes and
rebellions. As the disorders spread, the Trinidadian government dispatched volunteer forces and
called upon British naval ships to put down the strikes and demonstrations with force. Within
two weeks, British troops and Trinidadian police, combined with press censorship, succeeded in
breaking the general strike. Fourteen were killed, dozens wounded, and hundreds were arrested
by the end of the unprecedented disturbances.123 In Barbados, newspaper headlines carried
reports of the Trinidad disorders, but government business went on as usual. Surely, such
mayhem could never occur in “Little England.”
Conclusion
By the mid-1930s, the West Indies provided a bleak picture of imperial neglect and
mismanagement. Rudimentary development policies designed to benefit Britain required
colonies to repay onerous loans, an impossible undertaking for cash-strapped local governments.
Throughout the Caribbean, poor workers became increasingly desperate as wages stagnated, the
cost of living increased, and colonial states remained more focused on enforcing security than
providing aid. At the same time, as the British Empire continued making claims to colonial
trusteeship, it took no action to intervene on behalf of its miserable subjects. In Barbados, the
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1987).
123
W. Richard Jacobs, “The Politics of Protest in Trinidad: The Strikes and Disturbances of 1937,” Caribbean
Studies 17:1-2 (1977): 5-54; Howard Johnson, “Oil, imperial policy and the Trinidad disturbances, 1937,” The
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 4:1 (1975): 29-54; Bolland, On the March, 82-110; Martin Thomas,
Violence and Colonial Order: Police, Workers and Protest in the European Global Empires, 1918-1940
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 235-255.

	
  

200

consequences of the Depression, the indifference of the local state, and British neglect were
tragically displayed on the bodies of poor Barbadians. As destitute families lost their jobs,
crowded into unsanitary and disease-ridden homes, went to bed hungry, and watched their
children die, it became apparent that no one was going to help.
Yet, the despair of Barbadian workers coincided with dramatic changes on both the local
and international level. At home, the shifting electoral map meant that black politicians were
taking part in the government at an unprecedented rate. The health disputes of the 1920s had
starkly revealed the indifference of the Barbadian state to the welfare of the masses, and black
politicians capitalized on popular dissatisfaction during the early 1930s. Although class divisions
precluded more widespread political movements based on racial unity and economic liberation,
international ideas continued to filter in and offer alternatives to British colonialism for black
workers. This came at a crucial time. The depression years not only exposed again the
incompetence of white rule, but also the failure of the British government to intervene on behalf
of Barbadian welfare. The Ethiopian war showed that British officials were just as indifferent to
black suffering as white Barbadian oligarchs, and radical indictments of imperialism and racism
appeared more prescient than ever before to a desperate population. The Trinidad disturbances
were the first result of the legacy of imperial neglect, economic exploitation, and social malaise
in the West Indies. The others that followed would force the British government to radically
change the way that it managed the empire.
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Chapter Six
“A West Indian nation is in the process of birth”: Caribbean Riots and Policy Revolution

Introduction
In March 1937, an activist named Clement Osbourne Payne disembarked from a
passenger ship in Bridgetown. Payne, who had grown up in Barbados, had spent the previous
decade in Trinidad, where he became involved in the Marxist and pan-African Negro Welfare
Cultural and Social Association (NWCSA).1 In 1937, the NWCSA sent Payne to Barbados to
educate workers in revolutionary socialism and initiate strikes.2 Over the course of five months,
Payne recruited a number of local Garveyites and activists like Israel Lovell and Ulric Grant to
spread the message that Barbadian workers would only see an improvement in their conditions if
they organized. In a number of public meetings in Bridgetown between May and July, Payne and
his lieutenants articulated the grievances of the working classes and continuously broadcast the
argument that “the capitalists were oppressing the people” and ordinary Barbadians were being
“kept down by people at the top.”3 They urged growing crowds to “Remember your mother
country which is Africa,” arguing that white Barbadians had little regard for the struggles of
black workers.4 Using rhetoric drawn from socialism and black internationalism, Payne and his
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deputies energized the Barbadian masses by locating the sources of working-class distress and
charting a solution through racially based labor organization.
Payne’s message came at a crucial time. The Depression years had worsened the already
miserable economic conditions of Barbadian workers, many of whom suffered from destitution
and malnourishment. The Barbadian government had proven its continued indifference to the
problems of the struggling multitudes by refusing to implement health reforms and
unemployment plans. Additionally, the memory of Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia was fresh in
popular memory. This not only contributed to a rising racial consciousness, but also raised
concerns that just as the British government had not been willing to support Africans in their
struggle against Italian imperialism, now it would not come to the aid of its black subjects. These
factors, when combined with the news of protests and disturbances in Trinidad, made it clear that
black laborers in the Caribbean were on the verge of revolt. Using his extensive experience as an
agitator in Trinidad, Payne was able to organize Barbadian workers more effectively than
previous attempts by UNIA and Charles Duncan O’Neale. By July, his movement became so
popular that thousands of working class men and women attended Payne’s public meetings in
Bridgetown.
The scale of Payne’s movement alarmed Barbadian officials, who worked to find cause to
remove this powerful leader of the black working class. They found the cause in a technicality.
While Payne had been born in Trinidad, he had always believed himself to be Barbadian. Thus
when he initially disembarked on the island, he stated Barbados as his place of birth. In late July
he was arrested for making a false statement to immigration authorities. When Payne was
convicted on July 22, he led his followers on a peaceful protest march to Government House
while out on bail. In response, Payne and several of his followers were arrested. For the next
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three nights, protesters gathered in Bridgetown and threatened to release Payne from custody
themselves. As the crowds mounted, the Court of Appeals voted to overturn Payne’s initial
conviction, and his followers eagerly gathered outside the court on July 26 to greet their leader.
Yet, Payne was not released. Instead, the police secretly transported him to a ship for deportation
to Trinidad that evening.5 Payne’s followers would never see him again.
The Barbadian laborers who had been loyal to Payne saw his clandestine deportation as
further proof that justice was inaccessible in Barbados, where conditions had been so unfair for
so long.6 Many Barbadians pointed to Payne’s removal as evidence that the local government
would never allow black workers to seek better conditions. Amongst the crowds that continued
to gather throughout Bridgetown, a common phrase was “Because he opening we eyes they are
trying to lock him up.”7 On July 27, these frustrations came to a head when hundreds of
Barbadian workers rioted in the city. The unrest rocked the normally peaceful colony. Over the
course of three days, protestors overturned cars, burned and looted stores, and vandalized public
buildings throughout Bridgetown. The events took a dramatic and tragic turn when the police
began firing into the crowds. The ruthless response of the Barbadian state resulted in fourteen
deaths and dozens of injuries.8
Despite the violent reprisals, the rebellion spread from Bridgetown to the country districts
as estate laborers looted crops and set fires to cane fields. When black workers began their revolt
in the city, and news spread to the countryside, rural laborers followed as they came to
understand that all poor Barbadians shared the same experiences of malnutrition, poverty, and
5
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injustice. In the midst of the chaos, a Barbadian nation was forming.9 As unrest spread
throughout the colony, Governor Young called upon a British warship. The ship rapidly
deployed two platoons of British soldiers to enforce peace on the island. By the third day, the
actions of the Barbados police and British troops caused the riots in Bridgetown to subside,
though rural workers continued to raid fields for food throughout the countryside.10
While the unrest lasted only a few days, its scale astonished officials at the Colonial
Office and elsewhere in the Caribbean. White Barbadian elites, assured in their power over poor
Barbadians through land and wage monopolies and a punitive justice system, had underestimated
the effect of pan-African and socialist thought in Barbados when combined with the horrific
economic conditions of the Depression years. British colonial administrators worked to avoid the
same mistake. As the Barbados disturbances came to an end, the governor of Jamaica, Edward
Denham, wrote to the Colonial Office warning that the violence would spread. According to the
governor, “Conditions in the West Indies need watching and the recent happenings in Trinidad
and Barbados may have repercussions here- where there is plenty of material for a
conflagration.”11 Tensions remained high in London as government officers grappled with the
possibility of a Caribbean-wide revolution. The Barbados Advocate reported that “another far
flung unit of the British Empire had gone wrong,” and warned of more trouble to come.12 On the
heels of the recent Trinidad riots, the rebellion in Barbados indicated to an increasingly dismayed
Colonial Office that the “warning from the West Indies” had gone too long unheeded.
Initially, the Colonial Office continued its longstanding policy of waiting for colonial
governments to fix their own problems, rather than relying on imperial oversight and funding.
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Thus when a local commission in Barbados delivered a scathing report regarding the bleak social
and economic conditions in the island, colonial officials were satisfied to assign the blame for the
disturbances solely on West Indian elites, rather than also attributing the problems to British
neglect. However, the black radical community in London refused to allow the British
government to deny its culpability for the poverty and dysfunction of the Caribbean colonies.
Calling increasing public attention to the suffering and exploitation endured by black subjects
under British rule, pan-African groups in the metropole used their contacts within the British
Left to pressure the Colonial Office in Parliament and in the British press. Public discourse in
Britain increasingly focused on West Indian problems and the apparent failure of colonial
trusteeship in the region.13 In the United States, African-American journalists like A.M. Wendell
Malliet wrote that the arrival of warships to quell the unrest suggested that “Great Britain is
pursuing her traditional policy of tyranny- as is her wont with her colored colonials.”14 As
headlines from New York to London carried news of the disturbances, West Indian workers
made it plain to the world the deep failures of British trusteeship. By the time that serious riots
broke out in Jamaica in May 1938, colonial officials could no longer argue that colonial
governments bore sole responsibility for the economic and social problems of the West Indies.
The result would be a sea change in the relationship between Great Britain and its
colonies. While the Colonial Office had been reevaluating its position towards trusteeship and
colonial development since the mid-1930s, the Caribbean disturbances spurred the process
along.15 The riots had led to a growing awareness of the power of mass movements on the part of
poor Barbadians who joined together to protest their economic and political disenfranchisement.
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The disturbances also forced the British government to recognize that it could no longer pursue
the same policies, as the forces of ideological change had mobilized colonial populations en
masse. Ironically then, starting in 1937, exploited colonial workers on the one hand and imperial
officials on the other came to the same conclusion: “that poor black people were not
powerless.”16 The actions of frustrated Caribbean laborers would force the British government to
take an unprecedented step in its policy towards the empire.
At the same time, despite their influence, the riots did not herald a new era of
revolutionary change led by Barbadian working-class radicals. As Nigel Bolland has argued, in
political terms the result of the unrest was “the elimination through deportation and
imprisonment of the radical nationalists and the strengthening of the reformist progressives.”17
Following the riots, middle-class politicians who had also come to recognize the power of
working class support began to frame themselves as protectors of Barbadian workers. These
claims were articulated through promises of wages, health, and welfare, which the British
government had long failed to provide. In the aftermath of the riots, black politicians drew upon
the longstanding imperial language of trusteeship and development to make a case for their
leadership of the Barbadian government, attain greater access to the rights of imperial citizenship,
and restrain the threat of revolutionary activism. In addition to transforming late colonial policy,
the consequences of the disturbances would also change emerging understandings of West Indian
nations.
The Deane Commission
After several days of disturbances in the city and countryside, the forceful actions of the
police and British Marines caused the rioting and looting to subside in Barbados. In total, 666
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people were charged for offenses ranging from shop-breaking and theft to “riotous assembly”
and sedition following the unrest.18 The swift and brutal response of the Barbadian authorities
resulted in the highest number of fatalities and some of the harshest sentences in all of the West
Indian disturbances, with some rioters punished with as much as ten years of hard labor. Yet, the
scale of the unrest throughout the colony had made it clear that state-led repression alone would
not be enough to prevent further protest by Barbadian workers, who were now well aware of the
liberatory promises of socialism and pan-Africanism. Middle-class black politicians came to
recognize the organizing potential of the black masses, and immediately worked to frame
themselves as leaders, advocates, and spokespeople for Barbadian workers. On the third day of
the disturbances, five Assembly members, including Chrissie Brathwaite, Grantley Adams, and
H.A. Vaughan, met with Governor Young to urge rapid reform. They asked the governor to call
a commission to investigate the causes of the disturbances and make recommendations to
improve the standard of living of the working classes. Consequently, on July 29, Young, who
was eager to assuage the restive population, publicly announced a commission to inquire into the
difficulties of workers.19
The commission began hearing testimony within a mere two weeks after the disturbances
ended. Comprised of three Barbadians, the Deane Commission took its name from the chairman,
George Deane, a retired white judge. The second commissioner, M.A. Murphy, was a retired
Director of Public works. The appointment of two retired white officials hardly seemed to
promise meaningful reform in the racially divided island, but the proceedings were heavily
influenced by the third commissioner, Erskine Ward, a black liberal magistrate who had
advocated reforms to benefit the working classes during his brief tenure in the House of
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Assembly.20 For twenty days, the commissioners heard testimony from a wide swathe of the
colony’s population, ranging from sugar planters to estate laborers. Day after day, workers and
professionals from around the island testified about the low wages and high cost of living that
made life miserable for the majority of the island’s residents, while planters and merchants
scrambled to defend their actions and practices. The Barbadian press covered the proceedings
widely, which demonstrated the appalling conditions under which many Barbadians lived.
Laborers on sugar estates experienced the most miserable conditions. According to H.A.
Vaughan, a black barrister and member of the House of Assembly, wages for agricultural
workers had not improved since emancipation.21 A peasant farmer from St. Lucy, Fitzgerald
Greaves, testified that sugar laborers and their wives and children needed at least thirty cents a
day for food alone, but most made much less than that. Many lived in houses without flooring,
and stuffed holes in the roof or walls with paper.22 While many planters and merchants tried to
downplay the economic hardships experienced by so many workers, some shopkeepers
confirmed that the cost of living had skyrocketed while wages stagnated. Arnold Griffith, a
carpenter married to a shopkeeper in St. Lucy, explained that over the course of three years the
price of cornmeal had doubled and rice had increased by 50 percent.23 H.O. Emtage, a provision
merchant in Bridgetown, revealed that increased food prices meant the cost of living for the
working classes had gone up 25 percent in the last year alone.24 The dramatic increase in the cost
of staple products had drastic consequences for the island’s destitute residents.
The social consequences of this widespread inequality and poverty made for particularly
compelling testimony. Medical care remained out of reach for most Barbadians, who were forced
20
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to live with chronic illnesses. Hugh Gordon Cummins, a physician, testified that if working
people sought treatment for venereal disease, they lost “practically a half day’s pay” and often
went untreated.25 Reverend F. Godson, a Methodist minister who had been stationed in
Speightstown and St. Lucy since 1916, spoke about his personal experience with poor villagers.
He reported that during his initial work in St. Lucy the area of Crab Hill and neighboring villages
had “the worst poverty and destitution I ever saw.” Because of drought, poor wages, and the high
price of food, he saw “hunger, rags, dilapidated shacks, idling, and praedial larceny on an
exceptional scale.” Barbadians, he argued, needed “a fair share,” which he defined as food,
clothing, shelter, “a few of the comforts and pleasure they see so lavishly displayed around them,”
and provision for sickness and old age.26 Several of witnesses also testified that although the
British government had repeatedly promised to improve the quality of life for all its subjects
nothing had come of it.
As the proceedings continued, it became clear that a major cause of the unrest lay in the
mounting anger of poor Barbadians with class inequality in the colony. Assembly member
Grantley Adams explained that “there was a widespread feeling that the wealthy class ignored
the wishes of the people” who felt “they could not expect much from the wealthy class.”27 This
extended to distrust and dissatisfaction with the local state. F.A. Small, a former president of the
Workingmen’s Association, declared that the government had always neglected the welfare of all
but elite Barbadians. As he argued, “All Government exists for the well-being of the community,
for the protection of life and property and, as we saw that the masses of the people were being
neglected, we were sure that this riot was bound to come.”28 For years, the Barbadian
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government had broken this social contract to protect the masses. These sentiments were echoed
in the press. As Wynter Crawford wrote in the Observer, the disturbances showed that the
government had not acted to address the people’s grievances: “The fact emerges unmistakably
clear, that as a whole, the island cannot be enamoured of her elected representatives.”29 Clearly
many Barbadians were questioning the legitimacy of a government unwilling to implement
reforms that would meet the basic economic and social needs of most working and poor islanders.
Despite condemnation of elite rule in the island and sympathy for the hardship
experienced by laboring classes, most Barbadians who testified before the Deane Commission
were critical of the disturbances and distanced themselves from Clement Payne’s movement.30
Grantley Adams, who acted as Payne’s attorney when he was arrested, claimed that Payne “had
not been sincere” and was “a strange sort of bird” who was just trying to take money from his
followers. Additionally, while Adams portrayed himself as an advocate for the working classes,
he argued that those who rioted “were undisciplined, lawless young men; they were not bona fide
workingmen.”31 In general, the testimony reflected a dichotomy between “acceptable” and
“unacceptable” resistance to government power in Barbados. “Acceptable” resistance included
organizing into trade unions and electing reformist Assembly members, while mass protests,
radical political movements, and looting fell under the category of “unacceptable” resistance.
H.A. Vaughan, who defended strikes led by engineers in early July, made a clear distinction
between respectable, organized labor movements and Payne’s “extreme doctrines.”32 The
commissioners themselves concluded that participants in the riots were “lawless persons” and
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“young and irresponsible youths and young women,” not honorable Barbadians.33 While Payne’s
movement and the resulting unrest led to wider public awareness of the struggles of poor
Barbadians, they also led to the end of radical political activity in the island as more moderate
political leaders began to steer the course of reform.
When the Deane Commission published its final recommendations, the report was full of
indignation at the standard of living borne by so many Barbadians. The commissioners stated
that wages for many Barbadian workers were “definitely inadequate to provide the bare
necessities of existence,” and stated that “there can be no justification short of the bankruptcy of
trade and industry for the maintenance of so low a standard of wages.” Expressing rage at the
comfortable standard of living enjoyed by planters and merchants at the expense of workers, the
report called for an increase in wage rates to remove “hatred and bitterness” from “the majority
of employees.”34 The commissioners concluded that “the prisoner is better fed than the lowest
grade of agricultural laborer.” It was “essential that the daily dietary of the agricultural labourer
should be on a more generous scale than that of a convict.”35 Despite the condemnation of
economic and social conditions in the island, the reforms recommended by the Commission were
far from radical. In fact, the final recommendations echoed the moderate reform attempts made
by increasing numbers of black politicians in the House of Assembly in the mid-1930s.36 The
commissioners suggested that the legislature finance public works projects to provide jobs, begin
a housing program for the lower classes, establish a minimum wage, and appoint a Labour
Officer to negotiate between workers and employers. Critically, the commissioners also
supported stripping the vestries of control over sanitation, road maintenance, and public health
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and instead to place these responsibilities under the central government.37 Rather than creating a
revolutionary new program of social and economic equality, which Barbadian pan-Africanists
and Payne’s followers had urged, the disturbances instead worked to accelerate a set of moderate
changes long advocated by the British government and Barbadian reformers. Even these
restrained reforms, however, proceeded slowly in the colony, as white conservatives worked to
combat change, the government faced budgetary constraints, and aspiring politicians focused on
their own careers at the expense of public welfare.
Nevertheless, the report had important effects in terms of raising awareness about
conditions in the island and charting a path for eventual change. In particular, by urging
centralization and labor reform, the commissioners struck at the heart of local white political
power in the colony. In its defense of a broad program of economic reform and social welfare
legislation, the Deane Commission helped weaken white conservatives while bolstering the
platform of black reformers in the Assembly. Thus, the 1937 disturbances marked the beginning
of the end of white elite political power in the island, though this would take years to fully
realize. Furthermore, the Deane Commission report went further than any previous commission
in publicly exposing the heartless and exploitative practices that Barbadian oligarchs had long
used to maintain power over black labor in the colony. The testimony given before the
commissioners showed how white planters and merchants kept Barbadian labor in a state of
poverty and despondency to finance their own lavish lifestyles, and turned a blind eye to the
horrific social consequences of institutionalized poverty that affected most lower-class
Barbadians. It was clear that white elites bore the brunt of the responsibility for the miserable
conditions in the colony. However, the conditions exposed by the Deane Commission could not
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be blamed entirely upon the longstanding indifference of Barbadian authorities and elites to the
suffering of the colony’s poor. The miserable working and living conditions of Barbadians were
also the consequences of Britain’s policy of colonial self-sufficiency. The fact that colonial
officials had allowed these practices to continue for so long without intervention showed how
Great Britain had tragically neglected its mandate to look after the well-being of the Barbadian
people.
When the Colonial Office received the final report of the Deane Commission, however,
officials placed responsibility for the disturbances entirely on the shoulders of Barbadian elites
rather than viewing it also as a failure of British trusteeship. Colonial officers praised the
findings of the report, which several smugly interpreted as affirmation of longstanding CO
criticisms of the Barbados government. Mr. Beckett, for instance, expressed his hope that the
disturbances would force Barbados to change. If the Deane recommendations were carried out,
he wrote, it would “mean more progress in the direction of efficient Govt. than Barbados has
known in modern times.”38 British officials frustrated with the inertia of the Barbados
government seemed to take satisfaction that local authority structures would be forced to change.
Another colonial official praised the recommendation to centralize government services, and
anticipated an end to the vestry system. “The Parish councils will hold up their hands in horrorbut they ought to go.”39 Throughout CO discussions about the Barbados disturbances, there was
little awareness that the British government bore any responsibility for relieving the disastrous
conditions the colony. Despite the wake-up call of the riots, the CO continued its policy of
colonial self-sufficiency. This laissez-faire strategy, however, would come under increasing
scrutiny from anti-colonial critics in the metropole.
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Radical criticism
In London, associations of West Indian intellectuals and other black colonial subjects had
been growing in size and influence since the mid-1930s.40 While the Ethiopian war had initially
galvanized pan-African activity in the metropole, the focus of groups like the International
African Service Bureau (IASB) and the League of Coloured Peoples (LCP) increasingly turned
their attention to the West Indies as disturbances spread in Trinidad and Barbados during the
summer of 1937. These groups had long castigated West Indian planters and local governments
for the horrific conditions in the Caribbean, and continued to condemn the economic servitude
and poor health and nutrition endured by black colonial workers. However, the disturbances led
colonial radicals to stage an indictment of the entire British imperial system, and worked with
rising West Indian nationalists to expose the failures of British trusteeship to an international
audience. The LCP, for example, printed an editorial by Grantley Adams that accused imperial
policies for the “deplorable state of the vast majority of the people” in the Caribbean and urged
the British government to reform conditions in the region.41 It was time, these publications
argued, for the British Empire to fulfill its promises to subject populations.
The IASB in particular became even more vocal and drew increasing attention in
London’s public spaces to colonial problems. The group staged multiple demonstrations in
Trafalgar Square against the bad living and working conditions in the Caribbean. Yet, the
speakers did not see West Indian riots as a purely local issue, and placed Caribbean strikes and
demonstrations in within the global context of Spanish, Austrian, Czech, Chinese, and Ethiopian
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struggles against Fascist and Nazi expansionism as well as colonialism.42 Soon after the
disturbances in Barbados and Trinidad, over two hundred people gathered to listen to speakers in
Trafalgar Square. Addressing the crowd, George Padmore opened the meeting, calling upon
black and white workers to unite against “British imperialistic exploitation.” Other speakers, like
the Barbadian Chris Jones, discussed the conditions of labor in the West Indies and accused
British upper classes of living in luxury “obtained through the agony of black workers.”43
Linking the experiences of colonial workers to British life, black activists in London argued
continually that colonial policy was inexplicably linked to metropolitan conditions.
These activities were accompanied by a vociferous propaganda and newspaper campaign
in England as well as throughout the colonies.44 One of the most vocal West Indian writeractivists was George Padmore, who had spoken at the IASB rally in Trafalgar Square. Padmore
merged his Marxist background with pan-African thought to formulate wide-ranging critiques of
imperialism. He wrote scathing editorials and books that tracked the workings of the plantation
industry, the flow of capital between the Caribbean, Britain, and the United States, and the
inequality this system wrought upon the region’s workers. In their literature, Padmore and other
members of the IASB declared that the British government had proven itself incompetent to
govern the West Indies. As the pamphlet explained, “the battle of the West Indian people, in all
its daily changing phases, cannot be won in London; it must be fought and won in the West
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Indies by the people themselves.”45 Padmore’s writings were disseminated throughout the
Caribbean and reprinted in colonial publications, which threatened to further radicalize the
already restive region.
In addition to circulating critiques of British colonialism internationally, West Indian
radicals in London used their connections within the British Left to censure British policy in
Parliament. Padmore, in particular, drew upon his connections with the Independent Labour
Party and from his earlier work as a communist. The efforts of West Indian activists in London
also found sympathetic ears within the Labour Party, in particular with the Labour MP Arthur
Creech Jones. Creech Jones was a trade unionist with a longstanding interest in colonial affairs.
During his tenure in the House of Commons, he became known as the “unofficial member of the
Kikuyu at Westminster” for his interest in and advocacy for African colonies. Following the
West Indies disturbances, Creech Jones corresponded regularly with Padmore, the Barbadian
activist Peter Blackman, and other black activists in London about the severe problems facing
the West Indies.46 In particular, activists drew attention to the fact that conditions in the West
Indies had not changed in the months since the disturbances. By early 1938, the West Indian riots
became a continual topic of discussion in the House of Commons. The debates were followed
closely by West Indian radical papers, in particular by the Observer, which also published
critiques of British colonialism written by Padmore and other pan-African activists.47
In Parliament, Arthur Creech Jones took the lead in calling attention to West Indian
problems, and directed his criticism at the Secretary of State for the Colonies, William OrmsbyGore. In one debate in February, Creech Jones interrogated Ormsby-Gore about why the
Colonial Office had taken so little action in the West Indies following the disturbances. Ormsby45
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Gore repeated the Colonial Office denial of any direct responsibility for the problems, arguing
that the British government had little power in the Caribbean. In particular, he claimed that he
could not force the Barbadian government to enact the recommendations of the Deane
Commission. As he argued, “the Barbados constitution provides for representative selfgovernment... I have no power.”48 This would become a common refrain over the following
months. Colonial advocates repeatedly brought up the West Indies during debates, to which
Ormsby-Gore would abdicate British responsibility in the region.
Yet, this reasoning did not abate the sustained Parliamentary criticism of the Colonial
Office. In the House of Lords, Lord Sydney Olivier, who had long worked for reform in the West
Indies, blamed white planters for resistance to change that would benefit black laborers.49 Like
anti-colonial activists, though, Olivier took his argument further and claimed that planter inaction
was aided by imperial policy. He contended that it was the British government’s responsibility
“to see that the welfare of the general public is not sacrificed to the interests or supposed
interests of a small but influential minority.”50 Olivier indicted the legacy of British imperial
inaction in the region. Speaking from his experience on two different Royal Commissions to the
Caribbean, he declared, “Commission after Commission has gone to the West Indies with a view
to putting recommendations forward to check the economic decay, and circular after circular has
been issued by the Colonial Office on housing, malnutrition and labour problems with a view to
arresting social decay, and yet very little has been done.” In Barbados in particular, he argued
that the Deane report showed “the stark reality of an infinite amount of illiteracy throughout the
island, of attempts at land settlements which have been footling and more or less futile, of the
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dreadful lack of sanitation and wretched health, of the appalling housing conditions, the neglect
of labour, the neglect to provide a protective labour code.”51 The efforts of colonial radicals and
Members of Parliament alike were working to expose the hypocrisy of British claims to
trusteeship, a process initiated by West Indian workers in Barbados and Trinidad.
Released in February 1938, the report on the Trinidad disturbances only deepened the
crisis for the Colonial Office.52 The Forster Commission report caused a stir not only in Trinidad,
but also in the British press and within the British government. Like the Deane Commission in
Barbados, the results of the Trinidad disturbances commission pointed to the misery and poverty
experienced by most Trinidadian laborers. In Parliament, the Labour Party used the Forster
report to criticize Colonial Office mismanagement in the Caribbean more broadly. During the
February 28 debate on the Forster report, Aneurin “Nye” Bevan, the Welsh Labour MP, declared
that the disturbances in Trinidad and Barbados proved that the British Empire was mishandling
its colonial possessions. The Forster Commission, he argued, proved “that our boast about this
country being a good coloniser is baseless.” Bevan took the argument further by placing it within
the larger global political context of the time. He said it was a good thing that the debate had not
taken place two weeks previous, as no doubt “there would probably have been a highly coloured
paragraph about it in Herr Hitler's speech, because this report shows clearly what happens in the
Crown Colonies of this country.”53 By exposing the failures of British trusteeship, the
disturbances were affecting Britain’s moral standing in an increasingly volatile stand-off with the
Third Reich over former German colonies.
Parliamentary debates on the Forster Report accelerated discussion of West Indian
problems in British public discourse, as British newspapers repeated the accusation that the West
51
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Indian disturbances revealed the state of British colonial neglect and concurred with growing
Labour demands for an imperial commission to travel to the Caribbean. The Times, for example,
argued in favor of an investigation since the Barbados and Trinidad disturbances had shown “that
the condition of a large number of the coloured workpeople in these regions is far from
satisfactory.” Additionally, the paper placed responsibility for the region not on West Indian
planters, but on the Colonial Office, “which has paid little attention to the reports of previous
Commissions.”54 The Manchester Guardian reported that the debate on the Forster
recommendations “shed an ugly light on conditions in the British West Indies.” According to the
publication, the disturbances over the previous year “laid bare the distressing conditions under
which large sections of the West Indian population live. They have also put to a severe test the
British colonial system.” The blame fell on the Colonial Office, which “has known about the
facts for years” but had failed to do anything about it.55 For much of the British public, who had
been taught since elementary school that the “red bits” on the world map were British
possessions under British protection, the aftermath of the West Indian disturbances provided a
harsh lesson in the true brutality of colonialism.56 As more knowledge circulated about the
reality of life under British rule overseas, Colonial Office efforts to deny British responsibility
and blame planter elites for the suffering of black laborers became increasingly untenable.
Jamaica disturbances
As Members of Parliament debated West Indian conditions in Westminster, Caribbean
laborers continued to suffer low wages, poor nutrition, and overcrowded, unsanitary living
conditions. These issues were particularly pronounced in Jamaica, but the neither local state nor
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employers had addressed the grievances of black laborers. On May 2, 1938, the frustrations of
poor Jamaicans came to a head when 600 hungry men, women, and children marched to a sugar
factory in Westmoreland to ask for higher wages. When the manager threatened to shut down
rather than accede to their demands, the crowd, armed with sticks, attacked the white staff at the
factory. When the police arrived, they shot into the crowd and arrested nearly 100. Over the
following two months, protests, strikes, and riots spread throughout the colony.57 As Padmore
argued, the unrest happened because Jamaican workers were “unable to improve their conditions
by peaceful means.”58
The Jamaica disturbances, which continued far longer than in Trinidad or Barbados,
attracted even more British attention to the Caribbean. The London Times, for instance, reported
that “Labour unrest has become endemic in the West Indies.” Attributing the disturbances to
local governments and employers as well as “neglect by the Colonial Office,” the paper urged
the new Colonial Secretary, Malcolm MacDonald, to devote his attention to the region because it
“was a discredit alike to our generosity and to our intelligence.”59 The riots also provided ample
opportunity for Members of Parliament to continue making a case for British intervention in the
region. Members urged the British government to allocate imperial aid to the West Indies for
social and economic relief. Irene Ward, a Conservative MP, asked MacDonald if the Colonial
Office could grant more assistance to the Caribbean in light of the problems made clear by the
disturbances. She argued that “many people who are acquainted with these islands feel that over
a period of years we have not taken that general interest which we ought to have taken in their
welfare” and “everybody would be delighted to see their patriotic inhabitants receive more
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consideration from His Majesty's Government.”60 As politicians on both the Left and Right
urged action in the Caribbean, pressure on the Colonial Office mounted.
Prolonged turmoil in Jamaica demonstrated that West Indian problems would not simply
cease. As Nigel Bolland has argued, the Jamaica riots “convinced the British government to
think of the disturbances as a more general West Indian problem.”61 As the riots continued in
early June, Parliamentary debates about the West Indies grew more heated, and highlighted
differing anxieties about the idea of British trusteeship. Increasing numbers of MPs accused the
British government of neglecting its colonial mission in the Caribbean. In the House of Lords,
Sydney Olivier read aloud from Warning from the West Indies, and remarked “I cannot
understand how it is that no attention appears to have been given to this warning.”62 He
reproached the British government for neglecting the Caribbean, calling the disturbances a
natural response to centuries of abuse. After recounting the numerous problems with Jamaica as
well as the wider West Indies, Olivier concluded,
It appears to me now, and it has for some time, that the British Empire has reached its
culmination. I think that the British Government's attitude towards Abyssinia, justly or
unjustly, reasonably or unreasonably, has knocked the linch pin out of the British Empire.
The linch pin was absolute confidence in the King and his representatives. You have
severely damaged that confidence throughout the Empire... You have shaken the respect
and confidence that the West Indies felt in England. 63
According to Olivier, the Colonial Office had to respond immediately to save the West
Indies from the consequences of this imperial neglect. This paternalistic approach to
solving colonial problems showed that, despite the failures of colonialism, many British
officials continued to believe in the concept of trusteeship and the ability of Britain to
“save” its subject populations.
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Not all MPs were on board with these criticisms. Predictably, the former Secretary of
State for the Colonies, Lord Ormsby-Gore, responded to Olivier’s impassioned testimony by
disparaging the West Indian people. He claimed, “We must remember that in the tropics tempers
are apt to get more excitable. You are dealing with an emotional—a delightfully emotional—
people, and those smiles that you see everywhere when you go ordinarily among the people in a
quiet time may suddenly turn to violence and rage.”64 Other MPs echoed Olivier’s points
regarding the disturbances. As Lord Strabolgi warned at the conclusion of the debate, “at this
particular time we must be very careful indeed, as far as we can, that no serious charge can lie
against us of neglecting or mismanaging the great heritage of the non-self-governing parts of the
British Empire. We are being assailed for selfishness at the present time in interested quarters,
and I am sure there is no conflict between any Party in the State on the point that we should see
to it that there is no justification for any such charge.”65 Even for Lords uninterested in colonial
welfare, the increasingly tense political situation in Europe meant that Great Britain could not
afford criticism of its colonial record.
Arthur Creech Jones remained one of the most vocal critics of Colonial Office inaction.
As he argued, “the Colonial Office has tended to wait on events. It has issued many circulars,
with which few of us could quarrel, setting out magnificent lines of conduct and expressing
excellent intentions. Once these circulars have gone there has been little energy in following
them up and seeing in what degree the recommendations to the various Colonial Governments
are actually put into operation.”66 He continued, “The truth is that until riots and disturbances
occurred and we had unrest beginning to sweep from one end of our Colonial Empire to the other,
very little was really being done. This burst of activity is largely due to the fact that at last the
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workers are demanding that something should be done. It is a sad commentary on our method of
government when we have to wait for riots and disturbances to force us to do what is elementary
right.”67 Creech Jones gave the credit for shifting British thought about the empire to Caribbean
workers, who were forcing Britain to pay attention to the miserable state of its West Indian
empire.
The rhetoric of former Prime Minister David Lloyd George also echoed the sense of
disappointment in British trusteeship, and he used nationalistic language to make a case for
greater imperial intervention. Lloyd George “felt ashamed that we should have tolerated for a
very long time such a state of things under the British flag, while we were boasting of our great
Empire.” The West Indies, he argued, were evidence of “a slummy empire” that would diminish
British prestige in the world. In particular, he repeated British fears of damaging the relationship
between the United States and Britain on the eve of war. “The West Indies are next door to them,”
he claimed, “It is by the West Indies that they judge British administration. This is a good story
to tell the millions of Americans, to show what the British Empire has done.” In particular, the
British colonial record in the Caribbean was tainted by “the sanitary conditions there, the
horrible diseases from which the people suffer, and the high percentage of the population which
suffers from these horrible diseases all due to malnutrition, neglect, insanitary conditions, and to
the foul shacks in which human beings are compelled to live.” Lloyd George concluded his
impassioned testimony by echoing Joseph Chamberlain’s famous analogy of the British Empire
as a great estate. “We are the biggest landowners in the world, and we allow our people to live in
these conditions.”68 Indeed, the riots were causing a complete reevaluation of the British colonial
“mission,” both in Parliament and in the colonies.
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The Parliamentary effort to force the British Empire to actually live up to its claim of
trusteeship was echoed in the colonies by the press. Just as the Jamaica disturbances focused
British attention on West Indian problems, Wynter Crawford and the Observer used the unrest to
make claims for local reform and critique British policy. One editorial, for instance, stated that
the disturbances had “brought to light the real state of affairs as obtains in these long neglected
West Indian Islands” and made the case that it was therefore time for Barbadian workers to
unionize.69 Other articles recounted the debates taking place in Parliament. Front-page stories
claimed that the disturbances had shaken “British complacency” as reports circulated of “the
general low standard of living conditions among the great masses of the people, which have
shocked many who always prefer to believe that things are as they should be.”70 Editorials
critiqued British policy, blaming “British selfishness” for the riots sweeping the West Indies. As
one editorialist explained, the British government “does not appear to realise that economic
distress cannot be cured by a display of warships, or that it cannot feed hungry labourers by
shedding their blood. The Colonial Office will live to regret this policy.” The author warned that
while West Indians were loyal people with faith in “the morality and justice” of British rule,
recent events were “bound to shatter that faith.”71
Throughout the course of the 1937-1938, migrant activists in London, British politicians
in Parliament, reformers in the Caribbean, and members of the press on both sides of the Atlantic
pointed to the riots as evidence of the failures of British trusteeship. This diverse group of critics
called upon the British government to take a greater role in the region. Yet, the motives behind
calls for change were varied. Members of Parliament used the disturbances to make a case for
strengthening the role of the empire in the world, to protect Britain’s reputation in international
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politics, and defend a paternalistic colonialism. Radical activists used the disturbances to argue
for the destructiveness of colonialism and call for the liberation of people of color worldwide. In
the colonies, aspiring politicians and reformers like Grantley Adams seized the opportunity to
push for meaningful change as well as make a case for their leadership of the working classes. In
other cases, West Indians who still believed in trusteeship demanded that the British government
fulfill its promises to protect their welfare, once and for all.
The West India Royal Commission
The pressure from both Parliament and colonial subjects mounted on the Colonial Office,
which had also been growing concerned about the implications of continued unrest. Publicly, the
new Secretary of State for the Colonies, Malcolm MacDonald, continued to repeat the Colonial
Office dictum of denying responsibility for the disturbances. Yet, he and other colonial officials
began working to privately outline a case for a Royal Commission as early as May 1938.
Previously, the Colonial Office had resisted calls for a Caribbean-wide commission, relying
instead upon the local commissions in Barbados and Trinidad. However, the Jamaica
disturbances made it clear that the West Indian crisis was not going to end. As one clerk noted in
the midst of the Jamaica disturbances, “Things are very clearly, and as a matter of common
knowledge, not going very well in the W. Indies.” Riots were continuing, and the global prices of
sugar and other exports remained depressed, which meant that the unrest would continue. The
clerk, too, echoed concerns aired in Parliament about the effect of the unrest on Anglo-American
relations and added to it longstanding CO fears that of increasing U.S. hegemony in the
Caribbean. He wrote, “The U S A is perhaps inclined to judge British colonial administration by
the specimens which it sees of it in the territories on, or adjacent to, the American continent...
One sees signs of a growing interest in the administration of these territories on the part of
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Americans, reflected in the American magazines. The W Indies are, to some considerable extent,
the British show-window for the U S A. I am afraid it is not a very striking exhibit.”72
As a result of these fears, the Colonial Office began to urge the creation of a Royal
Commission to investigate social and economic conditions in the West Indies. In mid-June, the
Cabinet met at 10 Downing Street to discuss the problem of Caribbean unrest. On behalf of the
Colonial Office, Malcolm MacDonald argued that a commission should be appointed to examine
the problems in the West Indies, which he called “undoubtedly one of the most important in the
British Empire to-day.” In making his case for a commission, MacDonald made a number of
claims regarding the ideological and political importance of attending to the Caribbean that
echoed those made in Parliament. The first argument focused upon implications of West Indian
riots on British prestige and diplomatic relations. As he recounted the miserable social and
economic conditions that marked the West Indies, he argued that “unless the matter is tackled in
a larger and more comprehensive way, the efforts referred to above will prove mere temporary
palliatives and the general situation will deteriorate further. And any further, steady deterioration
will prove very damaging to Great Britain's reputation as a Colonial Power.” This focus on
Britain’s imperial power was particularly pressing. “It is in my view imperative that, at a time
when the ‘colonial question’ is being ventilated at home and abroad, we should ourselves be as
far as possible above reproach.”73 British neglect of the Caribbean could no longer be used as
Nazi political propaganda in Germany’s own quest to pursue its colonial ambitions.
MacDonald also framed his argument in terms of winning back the loyalty of disgruntled
West Indian subjects through development. In laying his case before the Cabinet, MacDonald
urged a radical departure from previous colonial policy: “What is required is a long-term policy
72
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of reconstruction in the West Indian Colonies. This should cover a wide field and include such
matters as the improvement of labour and housing conditions, and of medical services, etc.”
Rather than viewing development as a way to stimulate the British economy, this new vision of
colonial trusteeship argued for projects that would benefit the colonies both economically and
socially. MacDonald also made a case for the ideological value of a commission, which would
“have a good psychological effect in these Colonies. It would tend to assure their people that we
here are keenly interested in their affairs, and anxious to do what we can to help, and it would
therefore tend to calm excited feelings there.”74 In MacDonald’s view, the commission would
both prevent further unrest and begin to reconstruct fractured West Indian loyalties to Great
Britain.
MacDonald’s proposal signaled a radical overhaul of previous development initiatives.75
While the 1929 Colonial Development and Welfare Act expected that colonies would fund their
own projects, MacDonald warned that this policy could no longer stand. In order to affect
meaningful reform and reconstruction in the Caribbean, the secretary declared that the British
government would have to “be ready to spend more money on the West Indies than at present.”
The British government could not rely on the Caribbean to supply it all, and “part would have to
be found from the Mother Country. It would be disastrous to send a Royal Commission and then
reject its proposals purely on financial grounds.”76 MacDonald made it explicit that the unrest in
the Caribbean would not end unless the British Treasury was willing to abandon colonial selfsufficiency and finance a program of reconstruction. The West Indian disturbances, and the
subsequent criticisms of British colonialism, had shown that the British policy of colonial self-
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sufficiency was no longer tenable. Colonial rule would need to be changed, and the condition of
colonial subjects improved, if the empire was going to survive. The Prime Minister agreed,
conceding that Britain had to take any action necessary to rehabilitate the region. Following
MacDonald’s proposal, the Cabinet agreed to approve the announcement of a commission.77
When the formation of the commission was announced it brought “an outburst of joyful
anticipation” in the West Indies, connected to a belief that the British Empire would “provide the
necessary relief for the depression” in the colonies.78 The IASB wrote an open letter to West
Indian workers that circulated amongst the local press, praising Caribbean protests and “direct
action” for showing the world the consequences of British imperial neglect and forcing the
Colonial Office to act. The letter assured West Indian audiences that “Your sacrifice has not been
in vain.”79 Meanwhile, the British press expressed confidence in a paternalistic trusteeship,
reporting that the commission would raise West Indians “from their present condition of poverty
and ignorance” through “a policy of social and economic reconstruction.”80 It seemed that,
already, the appointment of the West India Commission was having important propaganda value,
as it worked to pacify colonies, mitigate domestic criticism, and restore Britain’s reputation as “a
benevolent colonial power.”81 The Colonial Office selected a number of British experts trained in
medicine, agriculture, labor relations, and economics chaired by Lord Moyne. Together, the
Moyne Commission departed for the Caribbean in November 1938, in what would become one
of the most sweeping knowledge-gathering efforts in British West Indian history.
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The Moyne Commission in the Caribbean
Upon their arrival in Jamaica commissioners were met by crowds eager for the
opportunity to tell British officials their stories of poverty, malnutrition, and economic struggle.
Following the announcement of the commission, letters and memos flooded the Colonial Office
from West Indian subjects who clamored to give their evidence in person. As the commission
report would later record, in all of the West Indian colonies “the number of persons desiring to
give evidence was so great that we could not find time to hear all of them.”82 While the group
traveled from colony to colony, gathering evidence and hearing the testimony of hundreds of
West Indians, the Barbadian press followed the proceedings closely and spread awareness in the
island about conditions in other colonies. The Observer, for instance, reported that the evidence
gathered in the West Indies so far made it clear “that slavery, though abolished by law a hundred
years ago, is still the dominating principle of West Indian life.” Yet, the paper predicted that the
commissioners would soon find that “in no colony has this system of exploitation of labour been
more ruthlessly and relentlessly practised than in this ‘ever-British’ colony of Barbados.”83 Thus
when the commissioners arrived in Barbados in January 1939, public attention and discourse
centered on what the commissioners would think about conditions in “Little England.”
During the course of the three weeks of testimony, which were held in Bridgetown,
thousands of Barbadians gathered in Queen’s Park daily to hear live broadcasts of the
proceedings. Additionally, the press coverage of the Royal Commission was extensive and biting,
as the level of the labor exploitation and miserable standard of living endured by most
Barbadians once again became clear. During the course of the proceedings, the commissioners
focused much of their attention on the immediate economic causes of the disturbances. The bleak
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evidence about Barbadian wages and living costs uncovered by the British experts was similar to
the conclusions drawn by the Deane commission in late 1937.
The Moyne group also made health and sanitation central concerns of its focus. This
attention to medical reform was in line with the larger idea of renovating the empire that had
come to dominate British imperial policy discourse by the late 1930s. The effects of the Great
Depression had been devastating to colonial economies, and social conditions declined
throughout most of the colonial empire in the 1930s.84 In Africa, experts on the ground in the
colonies became increasingly concerned with directing agriculture and nutrition in order to
address the concerns brought about by economic depression.85 In the Caribbean, official
discussions about the disturbances identified social welfare projects as key to preventing further
unrest. Immediately following the Barbados riots, Edward Denham, the governor of Jamaica,
wrote to the Colonial Office that "Social services, expenditure on Education, Health and
Sanitation- are the best productive services in the long run. If a Government can be assured of
the support of the women- whose interests are really the broader as they include those of their
children- there is little risk of the men proceeding to extremes.”86 Looking beyond economic
solutions, Denham used gendered development logic as a panacea for West Indian problems.
Additionally, a colonial nutrition report published in the midst of the Royal Commission
investigations revealed how British officials were making increasingly overt links between
welfare and colonial policy. The 1939 Committee on Nutrition in the Colonial Empire Report
expressly tied nutrition and health to economic development. The report linked poor nutrition to
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disease, labor inefficiency, infant mortality, and “a general lack of well-being.”87 The committee
proposed a solution to these problems in the colonies: “Proper feeding, proper housing, proper
hygiene and proper attention to the habits and customs of the labourer: these are as important as
questions relating to hours of work and rates of pay in securing a contented and efficient labour
force.”88 Attention to nutrition would have economic benefits by stimulating local food markets
and causing “less waste of human life and effort.”89 This was particularly important by 1939.
West Indian protests had forced the Colonial Office to recognize the need to take a greater role in
colonial affairs, but as Europe approached war, the British government would not have the
resources to fully invest in the agricultural and economic needs of its colonies. Furthermore, the
empire would once again need to rely on its empire during wartime, and a weak, restive colonial
labor force threatened British resources in the face of the coming war. The nutrition report
showed that simply improving food supplies, rather than engaging in more wide-reaching and
expensive projects, could achieve colonial development and strengthen working populations.
Trusteeship, then, was moving from a lofty ideal that justified imperialism to a central feature of
British imperial policy.
Welfare and middle-class politics
However, welfare was not simply a political tool used by colonizers to re-establish
British control over the Caribbean. The riots had taught aspiring middle-class politicians the
power of the working masses, and black candidates from many backgrounds framed themselves
as advocates of the working class. For some candidates, appealing to the problems of the masses
reflected a longstanding concern for the welfare of poor Barbadians. For others, particularly the
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former conservative Grantley Adams, emphasizing reform was a valuable tactic to gain votes and
political ascendancy as the value of working-class support became apparent.90 The written
testimony that Adams submitted to the Moyne Commission is thus revealing. Not only does it
show how he was reinventing himself as a nationalist leader, it also reflects the perspective and
concerns of the many Barbadians he claimed to represent.
Adams began his testimony by criticizing the failures of trusteeship, in particular the
British government’s neglect of non-elite Barbadians. “It is not unfair criticism to say that rather
than seem to interfere with this ‘representative’ system of Government the Colonial Office has
too often in the opinion of the bulk of the people yielded to the clamant minority defending their
‘rights,’ to the neglect of the well-being of the masses.” In particular, he took aim at how claims
of British trusteeship were always undercut by the official policy of colonial self-sufficiency.
According to Adams, Colonial Office attempts “to introduce legislation ameliorating the hard
economic condition of the labouring classes” always failed because “Non-intervention is their
guiding principle.” The salutary neglect of the British government was no longer tenable for
Barbadians. “The days when this policy was practicable have gone. A West Indian nation is in
process of birth and West Indians of African origin will pay respect only where it is merited.” 91
British refusals to intervene on behalf of Barbadian welfare, such as when the Colonial Office
had retreated from health reform in 1929, had contributed to the rise of Barbadian nationalism.
Framing himself as a spokesperson for this new nation, Adams warned of the
consequences of further imperial neglect. Some radicals, like the journalist Wynter Crawford,
urged the British government to remove itself from the Caribbean entirely. Inspired by the
rhetoric of George Padmore and other anti-colonial activists, he declared “It is high time that this
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infamous tyranny, this system of fascism better known as colonial imperialism, should be
completely destroyed.”92 For the most part, though, West Indian nationalism was not necessarily
about gaining independence from Britain, but about claiming increasing rights and protections
from the British government. The newly formed Barbados Progressive League (BPL), of which
Adams was a member, urged the imperial government to intervene and take a greater role in
developing the Barbadian economy. Now numbering 8,000 members, the BPL claimed to speak
for the Barbadian masses that had been neglected by the British government. According to the
BPL’s testimony, “The working man is in a questioning mood and is inclined to ask himself why
his condition has been so long overlooked in an Empire second to none in which ideals of justice
and fairplay predominate.” Using the rhetoric of British trusteeship, the BPL claimed that
Barbadian workers would continue to struggle “unless the Imperial Government comes to their
aid by instituting some form of planned economy.”93 Most evidence submitted by Barbadian
politicians and reformers to the Moyne Commission included similar demands for greater
provision by the imperial state.
A focus on welfare initiatives gave middle-class leaders grounds to critique both local
elites and the British government, but in a “respectable” manner, that was more likely to win
votes from the black and colored middle classes. Increasingly, aspiring black politicians used the
discourses of welfare to gain the loyalty of the working masses. Adams, for instance, demanded
British protection for black West Indians against white elite power because “unless the Colonial
Office more actively intervenes on their behalf the amelioration of their condition will be long in
coming.” The ruling classes, he argued, had enacted social welfare measures only “under
compulsion” and remained “singularly blind to the necessity for improvement.” Adams proposed
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a broad range of social reforms, including “the re-organisation of the medical sanitary and health
services; housing, labour and factory legislation, the hands of the Executive be strengthened so
as to enable Governors to get the necessary Acts on the Statute Book.”94 These initiatives
appealed to a number of potential Barbadian voters, and demonstrate the level of state provisions
demanded by Barbadians in the years following the disturbances.
A key part of the demands placed upon Great Britain centered on health reform. As
David Arnold has shown for the case of India, popular disputes over public health provided
colonial middle classes with a claim to speak for the body “literal and metaphorical” of the
people. This self presentation, however, was also combined with a display of “their own
contempt for the ignorant masses and a real fear of the violent propensities of ‘the mob.”’95
Similarly, aspiring middle-class politicians in Barbados used working class riots to gain
concessions from both the British and Barbadian states in pursuit of their own political goals.
Adams, one of the most aspirational of these black, middle-class politicians, used health to
censure the existing political system in the colony. According to him, Barbados had “preserved
the primitive seventeenth-century methods of health administration which it is only necessary to
see in order to condemn.” Repeating the longstanding criticisms of the health system espoused
by John Hutson and others, Adams denounced parochial authorities, whom he called “a menace
to public health,” and decried the existence of “a General Board of Health with no power to
enforce its recommendations on parochial authorities.”96
Similarly, the BPL urged the commission to recommend changes to the system. They, too,
recommended “centralising the health and sanitary services of the Colony, inasmuch as the
present system deprives the Chief Medical Officer of the Colony and the General Board of
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Health of any effective control of public health.”97 These claims were not radical ones, as they
were identical to reforms that had been urged by Barbadian doctors and British administrators for
decades. Yet, urging changes to the health system allowed black Barbadian politicians to frame
themselves as the vanguard of change. According to this reasoning, both the British government
and white elites had failed to help the working masses. Therefore, groups like the BPL and
politicians like Adams should be the rightful leaders of Barbados, with the protection and
support of the British government. Calls for health reform extended beyond the political claims
of middle-class politicians, however. The West Indian journalist Dudley Thorpe, for instance,
argued that the “medical, health and sanitary services, are scandalously deficient, and an
intelligent section of the community look on the Boards, parochial and central, with deep
suspicion, and believe, I fear with justice, that public funds in such hands are apt to be wasted,
and public interests either neglected through incompetence, or sacrificed to private ends.”98
Barbadians who had suffered for too long under a dysfunctional health system no longer trusted
the local government to change it, and looked to the British government for help.
Thus when the commissioners arrived, there was both local and international pressure to
investigate health conditions. During the second day of testimony, they questioned J.D. Alleyne,
the acting CMO, and F.N. Grannum, the Sanitation Officer. Both officers went into extensive
detail about the administration of public health in Barbados. Describing the health administration
of the island, Alleyne testified that it was 150 years behind the times, calling it “wasteful and
antiquated.”99 Like many medical officers before him, Alleyne criticized the lack of oversight
caused by this system. Lord Moyne asked what would happen, for example, if the Sanitation
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Inspector found that anti-mosquito work was not being done in a parish. Alleyne testified that he
would write to the parochial commissioners to let them know, and “They either attend to what is
wrong or let it remain as it is,” but would not be compelled to make changes. R.E. Stubbs, the
chairman of the proceedings in Barbados, scoffed at this process and the lack of accountability.
“I suppose more often than not they do nothing? Would it be putting it unfairly if I say that this
country has to thank God for the state of health of the people and not the medical profession?”100
While the issues with Barbadian medical administration had been known for a long time,
relaying the information before a high-profile British commission that would be broadcast both
locally and internationally made the problems seem particularly pressing.
Beyond administrative problems, however, the health conditions prevalent amongst
working Barbadians shocked the commissioners. Hubert Henderson, an economist, was appalled
at Barbadian mortality rates. According to Henderson, “The death rate mortality figures, both the
general ones and the infantile mortality rate are very much above the comparable figures of any
other West Indian colony we have been to. I think they are the highest in the British West
Indies.”101 While the infant mortality rate had improved slowly since the First World War, it still
remained much higher than most parts of the British Empire, at over 200/1000. As a Barbados
medical officer recounted, “I myself, the other day, spoke to a youngish woman who had had
seventeen children of whom only four were living.” The officer typically attributed part of the
problem to illegitimacy and promiscuity within the lower classes: “Many of the women having
unwanted child after unwanted child frequently by different men, and no means of supporting
them.”102 The focus on child welfare was central to the commissioners’ concern with health, as
metropolitan experts wished to reform the supposed “dysfunctional culture” of black, Barbadian
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working-class life.103 More broadly, though, no one could deny larger structural issues that
would cause a woman to lose twelve children based on preventable causes like malnutrition and
poor sanitation.
The criticism of the island’s poor health and sanitary structure continued when the
commissioner Dr. Morgan Jones recounted his own experience of how he went to the area of
Carrington Village “at the imminent risk of my life,” calling the roads a “disgrace.”104 In Dr.
John Hutson’s testimony before the Commission, he complained about how “one could not go
very far with the solid inertia which existed with regard to health matters” from island authorities.
The system, in which parochial commissioners acted independently from one another and from
centralized oversight, meant that the Barbados health system was “a question of Imperialism
within Imperialism eleven times repeated.”105 As the bleak testimony continued, the
commissioners increasingly linked better sanitary conditions to stability in the island. Hutson
agreed when Morgan Jones suggested that improved housing conditions would “avoid further
social unrest.”106 This notion would later inform the Moyne’ Commission’s wider
recommendations about how to solve the problem of West Indian discontent.
While problems with the Barbadian public health administration put on record by the
Moyne Commission once again became an indictment of elite rule in Barbados, it also made it
clear how little the British government had done to step in and fulfill its mandate of trusteeship.
During the following weeks, the commissioners publicly interviewed dozens of Barbadians each
day to establish the economic, political, and social condition of the colony. In Barbados as well
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as within the rest of the British Caribbean, the Moyne Commission would eventually put an
unprecedented amount of information about the social and economic conditions of the West
Indies on record. The fact that the testimony was publicly broadcast on speakers to crowds in
Barbados, and reprinted in newspapers around the West Indies and Great Britain, only added to
the circulation of knowledge about poor living and working conditions in the region. Crucially,
the work of the Moyne Commission exposed Caribbean subjects to the deep problems with
British administration and the extent of imperial neglect. In this context, it became impossible for
the British government to make a convincing case that the disturbances were the fault of local
governments alone. The consequences of both local white rule and British neglect had been born
in dramatic ways by poor black Barbadians, who had made their frustrations with local and
imperial rule known during the 1937 disturbances. The empire would have to drastically change
its methods of colonial administration if it wanted to survive.
Effects of the Moyne Commission
When the commissioners left Barbados in early February, commentators expressed
satisfaction that meaningful change would occur. As an Observer editorial declared, “Lord
Moyne’s Royal Commission will not inaugurate the millennium, but it is impossible to doubt
that it will inaugurate a new era in the social and economic evolution of these beautiful but
unfortunate isles of the sea.” A hundred years after emancipation, “we see the future big with
promise of the beginning of a new and healthier social and economic order.”107 Upon reading
reports of the testimony in Barbados, a Grenadian journalist asserted that “There had been a
‘shake up’ in Barbados, due to the probe of the Commission, as there never had been in ‘Little
England’ for two hundred years.”108 The effects of this “shake up” became clear when strikes
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erupted on Barbadian sugar estates soon after the commissioners left. As a memorandum on
labor conditions later reflected, the strikes broke out because news circulated throughout the
island that the Moyne Commissioners had recommended increased wages, which “undoubtedly
had an unsettling effect” amongst already the underpaid laborers.109 West Indian workers, who
had endured economic servitude for so long, were impatient for change. The British government
would have to step in with meaningful reform to prevent further unrest in the Caribbean.
The activities of the Moyne Commission also caused a “shake up” in how the British
government understood the idea of imperial responsibility. For colonial officials, the testimony
before the Moyne Commission had brought a bleak awakening. As the CO official Kenneth
Blackburne remembered, it painted “a dismal, but all too true, picture of social and economic
conditions; and it was crystal clear that something had to be done by Britain to raise the
standards of life in this unhappy area.”110 The state of the Caribbean demonstrated that “the
British policy of expecting each Colony to pay its way had produced devastating results, and
there was much justification for the description of the area as an ‘Imperial slum.’”111 In fact, the
final report of the commission revealed such a damning and dismal picture of British colonialism
that the government refused to release the report of the Commission, just the recommendations.
The report was finished months after the outbreak of the Second World War, and the British
government could not afford to let the breadth of the exhaustive volume become public.
According to the War Cabinet, “the passages describing bad social conditions in the West Indies,
coming with the authority of a unanimous Royal Commission, would be used with deadly effect
by German propaganda machine in America and other neutral countries, and so embarrass our
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war effort.”112 Therefore, only the recommendations of the commission were made publicly
available.
When published in February 1940, the Moyne Commission’s final recommendations
called for the same economic and labor reforms to address the grievances of West Indian
previously expressed by the commissions set up following the Barbados and Trinidad
disturbances. Its original contribution, however, was its call for the allocation of significant
amounts of British money to fund a long-standing development program in the West Indies.
Ranging from improvements from health care to education, the recommendations reinforced the
need to stabilize and pacify West Indians as the only way to achieve lasting peace in the troubled
region. According to the commissioners, there was “a pressing need for large expenditure on
social services and development which not even the least poor of the West Indian Colonies can
hope to undertake from their own resources.”113 The Moyne Commission recommendations
made a convincing and incontrovertible case for the rest of the British government that the
longstanding British policy of colonial self-sufficiency was no longer plausible if the empire was
to endure.
Conclusion: The Colonial Development and Welfare Act
Before the recommendations were published, the Colonial Office had begun to reconsider
how administered the empire.114 As colonial disturbances spread throughout the 1930s and
criticism of British imperialism mounted, clerks and administrators within the Colonial Office
slowly began to reevaluate existing policies. Some of the key actors facilitating these changes
were the experts and advisors enlisted by the Colonial Office since the 1920s. Doctors,
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agricultural experts, and labor advisors worked to bring concerns of local officers to London and
circulated colonial knowledge within the British government. Increasingly, administrators like
Malcolm MacDonald came to believe in the more paternalistic, state-directed approach to
colonial development promoted by these experts rather than the strictly advisory role
traditionally embraced by the British government.115 The timing of this transformation is
remarkable, as discussions about a new empire-wide colonial development policy had begun just
prior to Hitler’s invasion of Poland in September 1939. In the midst of such a crisis, it hardly
seemed possible to engineer a massive revision in Britain’s fiscal responsibility to the empire.
Indeed, the British Treasury remained as reticent as ever to fund expensive projects in the
colonies.
Yet, during a number of heated negotiations over the course of the following months,
MacDonald was able to successfully convince the Treasury that an unprecedented commitment
to colonial welfare was necessary even during wartime. He argued that colonial stability was
more important now than ever, as British military resources could hardly be diverted by colonial
revolts in the midst of a world war. Further, recognizing that there would be international
pressure placed upon Britain to decolonize after the conflict was over, he made the case that if
Britain hoped to keep its empire, the government had to demonstrate its capability for trusteeship
immediately. Finally, MacDonald impressed upon the Treasury the importance of having a
response ready once the Moyne Commission recommendations were made available to the
public. Ignoring the report would be disastrous, as the already maligned British Empire could not
suffer yet another charge of imperial neglect and mismanagement.116
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When the Moyne Commission recommendations were published, it provided the final
proof required by the Colonial Office to convince the wider British government of the need for
drastic change.117 The Colonial Development and Welfare Act (CDWA) of 1940 exemplified a
drastic new policy and vision for British imperialism. It was presented to the House of Commons
in May 1940, two years after the Jamaica disturbances made it apparent that the policy of
colonial self-sufficiency was untenable. The CDWA committed £20 million from the British
treasury over two decades for the sole purpose of development and reconstruction in the
Caribbean, both as a method to pacify restive colonial peoples as well as a way to maintain the
British Empire during and after the war. Just eleven days after Nazi troops invaded France,
Malcolm MacDonald testified before Parliament about his faith in the ultimate victory of Britain
over Germany and the continuation of the British Empire. According to MacDonald, “When the
enemy is worsted and the war is finished, Britain will still exercise vast responsibilities for the
government of Colonial peoples.”118 This new responsibility for colonial people was social
welfare, rather than just economic initiatives. As MacDonald continued, the idea of
“development” included not only “the material economic resources of a territory, but it also
covers everything which ministers to the physical, mental or moral development of the colonial
peoples of whom we are the trustees.”119 British officials had come to understand that colonial
development included an investment in education, health, and sanitation reforms, and the
Colonial Office overtly worked to use social welfare to legitimate imperialism.120 Trusteeship
had evolved from a vague justification for empire to a concrete policy that would attempt to hold
it together.
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This new direction in imperial policy found favor from most British politicians, as both
the Conservative and Labour parties supported the bill. For pro-empire Tories, alleviating
criticism of British policy was central to their support for the CDWA. According to Conservative
MP Jocelyn Lucas, the bill “gives us another opportunity of refuting the accusations of our
enemies that we won the Empire by rape and that we play the part of the dog-in-the-manger.”
Pursuing development policies that benefited colonial subjects allowed British imperialists to
uphold the myth that in the British Empire, “Every man, of every creed and of every colour, is a
free and independent citizen.”121 For the Labour Party, the bill was the culmination of leftist
efforts towards a more interventionist colonial policy since the mid-1930s. Arthur Creech Jones,
praising the bill, stated that it marked “the ending of the laissez faire attitude towards Colonial
development and, I hope, the end of platitudinous talk about trusteeship.”122 The act, which
outlined a massive program for British paternalism in the colonies, pleased members of the
British Left who preferred to see the British Empire as a benevolent, moral force for good in the
world. Despite the massive financial commitment required by the bill, the CDWA passed
through Parliament easily during the summer of 1940. In the midst of war, British colonial rule
was “undergoing renovation.”123
The passage of the CDWA also presaged a new vision of empire amongst the British
public, which became central to British self-imagining during the war. In Wendy Webster’s
terminology, during World War II the colonies came to comprise a “people’s empire” in
metropolitan culture, connected to the metropole through “welfare and partnership”.124 In British
popular opinion, the focus on colonial development, and “improving” the lives of colonial
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subjects through sacrificial grants, separated the good, kind British Empire from the aggression
and violence of the Nazis. In many ways, then, the passage of the CDWA was transformative. As
CO official Kenneth Blackburne characterized it, “For the first time Britain had accepted full
responsibility for the improvement of economic and social conditions in her colonies; and for the
first time the Colonial Office was able to back up its advice to colonial governments with
money.”125 This indeed was one of the major changes ushered in by the CDWA. Throughout the
history of health development in Barbados alone, the CO had urged the Barbadian government to
improve medical services, but never supplied the funds to help them do so. For the first time, the
CDWA promised to provide monetary backing to this relationship, not only for the Caribbean,
but for the entire empire. This marked a fundamental change in British understandings of the
responsibility of the state to its citizens and subjects.
The West Indian labor revolts had demonstrated that if Britain wished to keep its empire,
it actually had to improve the lives of the people it ruled, rather than simply promise to do so.
The protests of West Indians, both in the Caribbean and in London, had facilitated one of the
most sweeping changes in British imperial history. Yet, the British government had run out of
time to pass meaningful reform. The disturbances and the resulting commissions had already
begun the process of decolonizing the Caribbean. The failures of British imperialism had been
put on record, and this knowledge provided the space for aspiring West Indian nationalists to
make convincing claims for an increased role in colonial governance. Additionally, with the
passage of the CDWA came rising expectations amongst Caribbean subjects of the rights and
privileges that would be given to them by the government moving forward. For the late imperial
state, these demands would eventually become too much to bear.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion: “A failure in Empire building”

The Colonial Development and Welfare Act in practice
Despite the great hopes of 1940, the Colonial Development and Welfare Act could not be
implemented right away. The legislation was not meant to give immediate assistance, but rather
to build long-term development projects and investments. Indeed, colonial governments would
have to apply for funds under the CDWA that would take time to approve. In the West Indies,
there was widespread disappointment that prompt relief would not be brought after so many
years of waiting. In early 1941, C.Y. Carstairs, the Assistant Secretary for the Moyne
Commission, warned the British Treasury that “throughout the West Indies there is a rising tide
of unemployment and under employment with all its concomitants of destitution, malnutrition
and the danger of political unrest.” If there was a disturbance, he argued, “we might find
ourselves obliged to accept the assistance of United States armed forces, with deplorable
consequences for public opinion and not only in the West Indies.”1 Wartime food shortages were
particularly devastating. In mid-1942, Governor Bushe wrote an urgent letter to the CO, warning
that food and fuel shortages in the island meant that “the greater part of the population are
suffering and a large part are on the verge of starvation.” Like other governors, he was frustrated
with the slow pace of change, and was adamant that Parliament would have to alter the
Barbadian constitution when the war was over, “or stand on the place as a failure in Empire
1
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building.”2 The radical Barbadian journalist and now House of Assembly member, Wynter
Crawford, had been an admirer of the Moyne Commission and the CDWA. However, he
complained that both the British and local governments did not implement many reforms. During
his first few years in the Assembly, he would raise “some of the recommendations of the Moyne
Commission, but to no avail.”3 The slow implementation of the act only further disappointed
West Indians who had found their belief in British trusteeship to be misplaced for too many years.
Yet, the ideological consequences of the act, as well as the continued fallout from the
disturbances, were having a real effect on local politics in Barbados. During each election year
following the 1937 disorders, more and more white conservatives lost their seats in the House of
Assembly. Crawford was just one of many new black Assembly members during the war years,
as aspiring black politicians continued to frame themselves as the true reformers and defenders
of working Barbadians. Following his election in 1942, for instance, the black progressive
politician J.T.C. Ramsay entered the House of Assembly chamber in a pair of overalls to show
his representation of laborers.4 The alliance between middle class politicians and labor leaders,
and the formation of the first political parties in Barbados, caused great social conflict. In his
monthly dispatch to the Colonial Office in June 1943, Governor Grattan Bushe explained that
“certain members of the white community” were hostile “towards the aspirations of the
politically aggressive section of the Legislature as well as towards measures of social
amelioration.” To illustrate the point, he attached letters read in censorship from Mrs. G. Skinner,
a white Barbadian, whose views were “near enough to those of a far from negligible number of
persons in Barbados to make them worthy of note.”5
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In her letter, G. Skinner blamed the British government for helping black Barbadians to
take political power. As Skinner state, “I, and others like me feel in despair at seeing our island
calmly handed by the Colonial Government to the Africans in this Colony, Africans who have
barely shaken the mud of the fields from their feet.” While the electoral changes that had been
transforming the colony came from grassroots political organization, sectors of the white
community tended to blame the British government for empowering black Barbadians. As
Skinner continued, “the present Colonial policy” had caused black Barbadians to be “rushed
literally from the fields to equality with the white man.” In her mind, the Moyne Commission
had taught black Barbadians “that the British Government is so afraid of them that it has to do all
they demand.”6 Her criticisms of the British government were scathing: “It is all very well for
white people safe in their white country, with flowing words and a magnificent gesture of
democracy, to sweep away the Colour bar and decide for us that the dear Africans shall be our
brothers and associates.” But, she wondered, how would white Britons react if they lived in
Barbados? She wrote, “Would they sit by and rejoice to see their young white daughters dancing
cheek to cheek with a wooly-haired coloured boy? Would they rejoice to see their sons marry a
chocolate-coloured African girl and bring that abomination, that little Half-cast into the world?”7
While most white Barbadians would never publicly espouse the ugly sentiments expressed by
Skinner, the fears in the white community unleashed by the electoral changes were very real.
Blaming the CDWA for black political activity was ridiculous, as the Act meant to
provide paternalistic welfare services to pacify West Indian workers, not enfranchise them. Yet,
rather than believing that black Barbadians were capable of organizing political support and
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defeating the white establishment on their own, elite white Barbadians continued to blame
colonial policy for dwindling white political power in the colony. According to Bushe, during a
1943 Legislative Council debate over the bill to amend the Representation of the People Act, J.D.
Chandler made “some provocative remarks in relation to the influence of 'Downing Street' in
regard to Colonial policy.” He stated that the “bureaucratic Government in Downing Street” was
“inserting of the thin edge of the wedge and the day will come-- rather soon I fear-- when
Downing Street will say 'now you people in Barbados are hopelessly insolvent; your Legislature
is not able to run the country and we propose to take you over.’” According to the governor,
Chandler's views “give expression to a suspicion which does undoubtedly exist, that in
proffering assistance to the Colonies under the Colonial Development and Welfare Act, His
Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom has been actuated by ulterior motives.” Chandler's
remarks “found an echo” in other parts of Barbados-- it was reported that at a meeting in St.
Andrew on July 22, a schoolmaster said “we are not prepared to stay here and allow Downing
Street to make laws and push them down our throats.”8 No longer were white Barbadians
claiming an attachment to English identity. The Colonial Development and Welfare Act had
made them firmly Barbadian, an embattled minority caught between British autocrats in London
and a black majority at home.
The old rhetorical tactic of making dire predictions of a British takeover no longer
protected white political power after years of black political mobilization. The franchise was
eventually expanded in the summer of 1943, and for the first time, women qualified to vote in
Barbados. While the electorate swelled by 510 percent, continued income qualifications still kept
the number of voters restricted. Yet, the enlarged electorate meant that subsequent elections saw
the final downfall of white conservative Assembly members. Eventually, full adult suffrage was
8

	
  

TNA, CO 28/327/14, Bushe to Stanley, August 12, 1943

249

granted in 1950, and the fears of white elites were realized.9 However, while white planters lost
political power in the years following the disturbances, the moderation of the labor movement
under Grantley Adams and the slow rate of electoral change ensured that Barbadian elites
maintained their economic dominance in the colony. Black politicians gained authority over the
Barbadian government, but because of the historic land and business monopolies of white
Barbadians, economic power remained in the hands of white planters and merchants.
Additionally, the co-option of the labor movement by middle class reformers after the
disturbances pushed out more radical calls for the nationalization of the sugar industry or
initiatives that would redistribute wealth. For these reasons, black political elites in Barbados
have tended to remain focused on protecting their political positions instead of challenging the
white establishment.10
Health after the CDWA
The Moyne Commission’s great attention to health, and the emphasis of the CDWA on
welfare programs, made it seem that health and sanitary conditions would improve steadily with
the help of imperial funds. Yet, as with other welfare reforms, changing the health conditions and
administration of the colony proceeded slowly. In many ways, conditions in Barbados remained
the same as during the early 1920s. For instance, when a 1943 Barbadian committee to
investigate housing and sanitation in the island was appointed by the governor, it found that the
horrific conditions that had characterized Barbadian housing had changed little. The poor still
lacked toilet facilities, with country houses containing an outside “open pit closet” shared with a
neighbor while in town, many families simply used pails which were emptied into the sea. Most
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houses for the poor consisted of two small rooms, and in many cases, numerous children were
packed into these tiny quarters. The committee found, for example, a family with two adults and
nine children in a two-roomed house.11 The committee concluded that “The picture is a
depressing one” and would be too big for the colony to handle with its own resources.12
The Colonial Development and Welfare Act was designed precisely to fund such colonial
welfare projects. Yet, the development legislation did little to address or alter the actual local
conditions of Barbados. By 1944, the British government had spent just £2,896,456 on colonial
development.13 While this sum superseded any past spending on colonial aid, it fell far short of
the expenditure allowed in the act. The British Treasury, reluctant to expend precious resources
on the colonies during wartime, limited the amount of government spending on imperial affairs.
Furthermore, the British officials who oversaw the development programs in the Caribbean
tended to ignore the structural causes of poverty and inequality in the Caribbean, focusing
instead on correcting perceived West Indian cultural deficiencies. For instance, Frank Stockdale,
the Comptroller for Development who was stationed in Barbados, attributed economic stagnation
to the laziness of tropical workers and the presence of female-headed households.14 Overall, as
Darcy Hughes Heuring notes, “Bureaucratic and administrative difficulties delayed processing,
and there was a war to fight... the British government was fundamentally unable to maintain its
commitment to the Colonial Development and Welfare Act.”15 Despite the unprecedented nature
of the 1940 Colonial Development and Welfare Act, and the fact that the West Indies received
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more aid than any other part of the empire during the war, “little was achieved in the region by
1945.”16
The legislation faced other problems in addition to Treasury limitations and
administrative dysfunction. Under the terms of the act, colonial governments had to apply for
funds before improvements could begin. In Barbados, although electoral change was underway,
white conservatives still had power in the Legislative Council and House of Assembly. White
elites in particular viewed the act, and the new development administrators who were stationed
in Barbados, with suspicion. At the same time, newly elected reform candidates from the black
middle classes became mired in internecine conflicts within the labor movement and focused
more on protecting their new positions in the government than pushing for immediate change.
Proposals for development projects from the Barbados government, then, took time to
materialize. The CDWA sent a number of experts traveled to the colony during the war,
including a TB specialist, a nutritionist, a professor who did blood tests, and an official from the
Rockefeller Malarial Unit in Trinidad.17 But, the legislation could not force the Barbados
government to accept expert advice. Even though the CDWA could grant funds to a colony, it
did not have the authority to override constitutions. This meant that development officials had to
deal with the existing infrastructure in Barbados. In the case of health reform, the same problems
that had plagued the Barbadian public health administration for decades made meaningful
change impossible.
The new CMO, H.D. Weatherhead, found this to be the case when he arrived in Barbados
in 1944. Like many before him, Weatherhead lamented that most causes of death in the island
were from preventable diseases like typhoid and tetanus, and were caused by unsanitary
16
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conditions. Yet, under the present system it was impossible to alleviate change public health and
sanitation. As Weatherhead concluded, “until reorganisation takes place this appalling wastage
of life and intense human suffering will continue.”18 In a scathing memo, he echoed again the
complaints of previous officers: the CMO had no executive authority, the health administration
was fragmented and divided, and parish medical authorities were often untrained laymen. These
factors meant that Barbados continued to have an infant mortality rate “nearly double the other
West Indian Colonies.” This, he wrote, was “just a wicked waste of human lives.”19 Weatherhead
energetically lobbied the government to allow reform, but by the end of the war, the Barbados
health administration still suffered from many of the same problems that John Hutson had
identified in 1908.
It appeared that Weatherhead would continue the same fruitless labor undertaken by
previous CMOs in Barbados, and stand by as infants perished from dysentery because the
vestries refused to spend tax dollars on sanitation. Yet, in 1947, the medical officer reported that
progress had finally been made in reorganizing the health and medical services of the island. “A
crystallisation of public opinion was noticeable during the time mentioned above and the
Government were quick to press forward with the preparation of the much needed legislation for
early representation to the Legislature.”20 The effects of franchise expansion were having an
effect on government policy, as Barbadian voters made demands for meaningful change in the
health system. In 1948, the legislature passed acts to reorganize the public health administration,
strengthen the CMO position, and alter the administration of sanitation by parochial boards.21
The Department of Medical Services Act was finally proclaimed in 1950, officially reorganizing
18

Ibid., 8.
BDA, Pam C 194, “Memorandum on the Medical Services of Barbados and Proposals for Reorganization by
Chief Medical Officer H.D. Weatherhead,” April 12, 1945, 2.
20
BDA, SRL 12, Annual Report of the Chief Medical Officer 1946-47, 6-14.
21
BDA, SRL 12, Annual Report of the Chief Medical Officer 1947-48, 6-12.
19

	
  

253

the health administration of the island, and further reforms would be implemented later in the
decade.22 Yet, these changes did not occur because of a British government directive or colonial
development legislation. Instead, a newly expanded electorate pushed through reforms that had
been long desired by working and middle class Barbadians, but quashed by an elite, conservative
House of Assembly two decades before. In the end, it was public opinion and electoral change
that ultimately led to reform, not policies handed down from above.
Development between Britain and Barbados
In 1895, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Joseph Chamberlain, famously declared
that it was “not enough to occupy certain great spaces of the world’s surface unless you are
willing to develop them. We are the landlords of a great estate; it is the duty of the landlord to
develop his estate.”23 During the period between the two world wars, the Colonial Office, in
conjunction with metropolitan and colonial medical experts, followed Chamberlain’s call and
made a number of piecemeal attempts to develop the vast British imperial estate in the face of
mounting criticism of colonial rule. Yet, as this dissertation has argued, the very policies meant
to save the struggling empire instead contributed to its unraveling.
Following the rise of pan-Africanism and the spread of other radical ideologies during the
First World War, British authorities feared anti-colonial revolts in the Caribbean. Colonial
officials came to believe that alleviating the daily misery faced by West Indian workers would
ameliorate the grievances of newly restive colonial subjects and foster continued imperial loyalty.
This view, combined with a renewed focus on the idea of colonial trusteeship during the interwar
period, prompted authorities in London to implement a number of initiatives to improve the
health, nutrition, and sanitation of colonial subjects in the Caribbean as well as in other restless
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territories of the empire. Yet development policies, as implemented in the post-World War I
years, were constrained by the British policy of colonial self-sufficiency, which expected
colonial governments to pay for their own maintenance. When imperial authorities attempted to
improve health conditions in the island of Barbados, a colony with the highest infant mortality
rate in the British Empire, they did so by sending stern dispatches recommending reform and
pressuring British governors to persuade local lawmakers to implement changes. All of this came
without imperial financial support, and the Barbadian government was left with almost complete
leeway when it came to accepting British directives.
The ensuing disputes over health and sanitation in Barbados would have enormous
consequences both for local rule in Barbados, and for the relationship between the British
government and its Barbadian subjects. The 1925 Public Health Commission proposed relatively
minor reforms to the public health administration of Barbados, yet led to great conflict between
the Colonial Office and white Barbadian elites. The imperial and local governments held
opposite views of the best way to control black Barbadian workers. The Colonial Office believed
that improved health and living conditions would pacify Barbadian laborers radicalized by the
experience of war and the influence of pan-African ideology, while white Barbadian elites
believed that loosening their grip on vestry governance and granting concessions for black
Barbadian welfare would undercut elite power in the colony. Furthermore, the high population
density of Barbados ensured a steady, surplus labor supply. Without the need to foster and
protect a productive labor force, the planter and merchant oligarchy remained largely indifferent
to the health and welfare of the working population. The ensuing clashes that occurred between
British administrators and white creole elites over how to manage black bodies exposed the
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fragility of British rule over the colony, as white Barbadian planters and merchants used claims
of Englishness to resist imperial directives and protect their hegemony over local affairs.
While the House of Assembly had long refused to implement reforms that would benefit
non-elite Barbadians, the experience of war and the circulation of radical political ideas had
contributed to a political awakening amongst some sectors of Barbadian society during the 1920s.
As the Democratic League identified and mobilized new black voters and the Universal Negro
Improvement Association impressed upon its members the value and dignity of black lives, the
stubbornness of white legislators to accept reform that would benefit black workers was thrown
into harsh relief. When thousands of poor, black Barbadians lost their lives in malaria epidemics
due to the unorganized and uninformed response of the Barbados public health administration, it
made white elite callousness to black suffering even more apparent. Black Barbadians, who
stated their allegiance to the British crown and believed in Britain’s promises of colonial
protection and trusteeship, looked to the imperial government to intercede on their behalf. Yet,
the Colonial Office took no action. Despite the suffering of black Barbadians, and the desire of
British officials to improve health conditions in order to prevent unrest, the policy of colonial
self-sufficiency and an inclination to protect white rule in Barbados meant that British
administrators would never supersede the Barbadian constitution.
Eventually, this strategy would backfire. The struggles over public health contributed to a
growing belief amongst many poor Barbadians that no one would come to their aid. By the late
1930s, British postwar fears of West Indian revolt came to fruition as labor unrest swept the
Caribbean. In both the urban and rural spaces of Barbados, members of the Barbadian working
classes revolted against the conditions that kept them poor, desperate, and sick. The conflicts, as
many have shown, had their roots in the severe economic problems that marked Barbadian and
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Caribbean life more broadly.24 Yet, as this dissertation has argued, the disturbances were also
due to the broken promises of British trusteeship. Barbadian workers, long ensconced in British
culture and firmly attached to the idea that Queen Victoria freed their ancestors from slavery,
believed in the promises of British trusteeship for subject peoples. However, repeated instances
of British neglect, such as the refusal of the Colonial Office to override white elite resistance to
health reforms that would benefit black workers, meant that many poor Barbadians had lost faith
in the willingness of the British government to help during the throes of the Great Depression.
The Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935, and Britain’s refusal to intercede, only reinforced the
belief that the British Empire would never intervene on the behalf of black subjects. Conflicts
over health reform in Barbados were thus related to a wider crisis regarding British imperial
legitimacy in the eyes of West Indian workers.
The result of the disturbances in Barbados and the wider Caribbean was to force the
British Empire to reevaluate its policy towards the colonies. British commissions set up to
investigate events in Barbados and Trinidad articulated the needs for economic, political, and
social reforms in the Caribbean, and the British Moyne Commission, which visited the West
Indies following the disturbances, made recommendations largely based on the knowledge
produced in the earlier commissions.25 These investigations put a vast amount of information on
record, and broadcast the failures of British colonialism both to West Indian subjects as well as
to the wider world. However, Barbadian dissatisfaction with British rule did not result in a move
for independence. Indeed, even the pan-African critiques of empire that circulated between
Europe and the Western Hemisphere, and inspired the West Indian workers who revolted, were
not always focused on forming independent nation-states. Most African and Caribbean activists
24
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in London, for instance, “sought a radical transcending of empire, not a complete severing of ties
with it.”26 In Barbados, critiques of British imperialism were not about seeking independence
from British rule, but about allowing Barbadians to access the promised benefits of imperial
trusteeship. Following the disturbances, middle class politicians used discourses of welfare and
trusteeship to make a case for their political aspirations and leadership of the colony, and push
out aspiring radical activists who desired more wide-ranging reform. The disturbances, and the
commissions that followed, had created the space for Barbadian nationalist claims for wider
inclusion into imperial citizenship, greater provision for welfare services, and addressing
systemic inequality.
On the surface, it appeared that the British Empire was willing to recognize these claims.
The actions of West Indian workers had caused the British government to make welfare, health,
and development key aspects of formal British policy. The 1940 Colonial Development and
Welfare Act, which resulted from the West Indian disturbances and the recommendations of the
Moyne Commission, provided material backing for the promise of colonial trusteeship as it
committed British funds to colonial reconstruction for the first time. However, the new welfare
program was not based on the idea of political rights or enfranchisement for the colonized.27
Instead, the old Chamberlain doctrine that linked colonial development to economic benefit for
Britain “had been substantially redefined by a new liberal, paternalist agenda, which looked to
state intervention to deal with the problems of growing rural-urban migration, unemployment,
and loss of productive resources” in the colonies.28 The new development program, then, meant
to “rescue” subject populations from their misery and thus justify the continuation of a
“benevolent” British Empire.
26
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For colonial people, though, the events of the late 1930s led to far different conclusions.
As Mary Chamberlain has argued, by the late 1930s “both West Indians and their metropolitan
masters were engaged simultaneously in nation-building projects, albeit with widely different
resources and competing agendas.”29 For British administrators, development policies meant to
rebuild and restore an imperial estate that could not be broken. For Barbadian subjects, reform
attempts should lead ultimately to greater political representation for non-elite subjects and wider
provision of social services by the state. These competing aims, while similar in rhetoric, were
incompatible in practice.
The problem of the “third British Empire” for colonial authorities was that it was a period
in which colonial subjects began to make increasing claims for their equality and representative
government. This meant that the tensions that had long characterized colonialism—the ongoing
dance between inclusion and exclusion, incorporation and difference—were no longer tenable.
West Indians increasingly came to see themselves as deserving the rights and privileges of
citizenship, and to them, the passage of the CDWA appeared to codify these rights. In many
ways, then, the act had the seeds of decolonization sown within it. As Jane Burbank and
Frederick Cooper have argued, “Britain could not escape the problem of preserving empire when
the very terms by which the imperial state was trying to relegitimize itself—development and
political participation—were producing cascades of demands for social and economic
resources.”30 As World War II drew to a close, Barbadian subjects made increasing claims for
equality, representation, and a better quality of life.
During the immediate post-World War II era, the British government continued its
commitment to colonial development, dramatically increasing its financial pledges to the
29
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colonies with further legislation in 1945 and 1950. Yet as greater numbers of West Indians
gained the right to vote and governments became more representative, the dramatic political
transformations underway in the region undermined the efforts of the British government to draw
the Caribbean into its orbit of protective, paternalistic trusteeship. When reforms occurred, they
did so because due to the activism and assent of West Indian people, rather than British direction
and patronage. In the years following the passage of the Colonial Development and Welfare Act,
it became clear that the British Empire would not be able to “afford the costs of staying whole.”31
By the 1950s, the imperial government began its slow retreat from the Caribbean.
The CDWA, like many colonial policies before and after it, had intersected with local
circumstances in unexpected ways, with unintended consequences. In Barbados, white elites
blamed the British government for their dwindling political power, while the advisors sent to
Barbados under the auspices of the CDWA found it difficult to implement meaningful reforms.
Furthermore, as the consequences of the disturbances and a stated commitment to development
led colonial subjects to make increasing claims on the British government for economic and
social services, the financial cost of keeping the empire together would become unsustainable.
Yet, even as Britain retreated from the region, the logic of late colonialism would become
replicated and ingrained in West Indian nationalism. As Barbadians and other Caribbean subjects
formed first a West Indies Federation, and then independent nation-states, development became
part of the process of independence. The legacy of debates over health and welfare was reflected
in the policies of Errol Barrow, the first prime minister of an independent Barbados in 1966.
Barrow’s government instituted a broad program of state-sponsored services and reform.
Education was free for all Barbadian students from primary school to university, Barbadians
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were entitled to Social Security, and a universal healthcare system ensured that everyone had
access to medical care and treatment. The emphasis on reform and welfare that characterized late
colonial policy had become central to imaginings of the Barbadian nation, but were in the end
provided by West Indians themselves, not the British Empire.
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